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AN EXAMINATION OF KUWAITI MEDIATION IN THE GULF CRISIS

BY

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ABSTRACT

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Title: An Examination of Kuwaiti Mediation in the Gulf Crisis

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This study examines the role of Kuwait as a mediator in the 2017-2021 Gulf crisis. In so doing, the study explores Kuwait's motivations for undertaking the mediator role, the reasons for the conflicting parties' acceptance of Kuwait as a mediator and finally, analyses how Kuwait mediated between the parties. The research was based on mixed methodology, semi-structured interviews and media analyses based on Search Engine Optimization. The study argues that the small state policies of Kuwait and calculations of the disputants over small state theory are critical elements of the nomination of the mediator and the process of the mediation. The research concludes that Kuwait mediates through strategies parallel to the balance of power and soft power concepts. The study argues that Kuwait uses mediation as a soft power to become an important regional actor. The disputants accepted Kuwaiti mediation in two aspects; the first was to maintain their own small state policies (especially Qatar). The second is that Kuwait's smallness led them to approve the mediation to have flexibility in the crisis (especially blockading side). The research claims that Kuwait was more than a host in the solution of the crisis. Yet, the fact that Kuwait's lack of power to impose decisions makes the state not use any directive strategies in the mediation. The research denotes the Kuwaiti mediation in the Gulf crisis fits on formulation type of the mediation.

DEDICATION

To my family

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

EU	European Union
FM	Foreign Minister
GCC	Gulf Corporation Council
KSA	Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
KUNA	Kuwait News Agency
MENA	Middle East and North African
MHS	Mutually Hurting Stalemate
PM	Prime Minister
QNA	Qatar News Agency
SEO	Search Engine Optimization
SERP	Search Engine Result Page
SPA	Saudi Arabia Press Agency
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States
WAM	Emirates News Agency
ZOA	Zone of Agreement

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Diplomacy is one of the dynamics that international relations are built on. States follow different diplomacy approaches in foreign relations according to their capabilities, management systems, and conjunctural changes (Brown, 2001; Codrean, 2017; Cornago, 2008). Disputes between nations are an inevitable part of international relations. Countries tend to solve disagreements via diplomacy to avoid the high economic and humanitarian cost of undiplomatic ways such as military operations. Military interventions or significant diplomatic crises lower the possibility of diplomacy between parties. When the disputants decrease their relations to zero (or near to zero), and the conflict hurts both sides, governments or organizations with strong ties with the parties of the dispute may offer to be an intermediary between them (Zartman, 2003). Small states are considered ideal candidates for such undertakings (Slim, 1992).

States are classified by their size with the consideration of population, territory area, military power, and economic and technical activities of the states in classical theories like realism, neo-realism, and neo-liberalism. On the other hand, qualitative definitions of small states in the last decades have focused on the activities of states instead of their physical limits and capabilities (Galal, 2020). In either description, five of the six Gulf Corporation Council (GCC) member states – Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the UAE, and Bahrain— are considered to be in the scope of small states (Almezaini & Rickli, 2017). However, the geopolitical position and massive natural resources of the Gulf situate these countries in a crucial area for the MENA and the world (Barnes & Jaffe, 2006). Thus, disputes that affect the stability of this particular region also affect the international community economically and politically.

The search for stability in the Gulf raises the importance of intermediary actors in the Gulf. The small countries of the Gulf have good track records in meeting this expectation. For example, Qatar hosted Afghan talks in Doha. Oman was the facilitator between the US and Iran in the nuclear deal during Obama's administration. Kuwait mediated the Gulf diplomatic crisis between Qatar and KSA, Egypt, Bahrain, and the UAE. However, the Kuwaiti mediation differs from the other examples because they and the parties involved were all GCC members.

This research aims to position the intermediary power of Kuwait accurately in the peace-making literature and underscore the methods that the Kuwaitis used to mediate based on the mediation theories. This chapter sheds light on the study and denotes the theme of the study for the readers. The research problem, research objectives, and research questions are also explained in this chapter. Additionally, the literature review for the mediation, small state mediation, mediation in the Gulf, 2017 Gulf crisis, and mediation efforts of Kuwait are all presented in this chapter. The second chapter gives the theoretical framework of the study. In that part, the author establishes a conceptual background for the research. The third chapter is the Kuwaiti mediation in the Gulf crisis. Within that chapter, the author transfers the data received to the depiction of the reasons and styles of the Kuwaiti mediation. The fourth chapter analysis the Kuwaiti mediation from the findings of the third chapter with the theoretical perspective of the second chapter.

1. Research problem

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 created a realm for more independent foreign policies for states, especially for the small states (Elman, 1995). Even though regional and global powers still exert the informal sphere of influence in their relations with the small states, unbiased or pragmatic strategies of the small states

raise and highlight their importance in world politics (Súilleabháin, 2014). One of the strategies that small states utilize is diplomacy. Raising their voice in regional politics is one of the tools within the context of diplomacy. Mediation provides room for small states in diplomatic issues and thus makes them influential members of international relations (Williams, 1992).

This research focuses on Kuwaiti mediation and how it was conducted. Kuwait is an ideal choice to study the small states and their foreign policies. Kuwait's efforts in the 2017 Gulf Crisis show clearly that it uses mediation as a soft power to decrease the tension in the region between its long-term partners, allies, or even brothers and raises its involvement in regional politics. Furthermore, when one considers the role of the late Emir of Kuwait, Sheikh Sabah, in establishing the GCC and his role in the intra-GCC, the topic becomes more attractive for the study to understand the small states and functions of small states in international relations.


2. Literature review

Bilateral relations of states are expected to be based on mutual profit (Wolfers, 1991). Conflict of interest between states could cause disagreements. The diplomatic relations between the actors are based on the mentality of solving the problem without escalating the conflict. If the diplomatic initiatives fail, the conflict may reach a more severe level, including restrictions such as boycotts, embargos, sanctions, and even military operations. The humanitarian and economic costs of the conflicts may have undesirable effects for both parties, and even the broader international community, which is explained as “Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS)” by Zartman. Longer conflict durations create deeper wounds for each side. Economic limitation, insecurity, and economic loss of the crisis become burdens on both sides of the dispute in MHS (Zartman, 1989). Unnegotiable situations may occur due to

conflicting sides cutting diplomatic ties at the apex of the conflicts. In such cases, the conflicting sides need a third party for mediation to end the conflict. The exact time for effective mediation is defined as *ripeness* (Greig, 2001). The broad definition of mediation in the literature could be as

a process of conflict management where disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, state, or organization to settle their conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law (Bercovitch et al., 1991).

In this regard, the conflicting parties look for a third party that could be a bridge to de-escalate the conflicts. The third party could be a state, intergovernmental, or non-governmental organization. Easing tensions requires ending disputes by creating a solution with mutual benefits. After the damage of conflict has become more significant than both sides' interests, conflicting parties often try to find solutions to ease the tension. However, the sides may generally have so-called "red lines," which



cannot be compromised.

In international conflicts, the Zone of Agreement (ZOA) concept refers to the possible negotiable area between the parties

Figure 1: Zone of agreement (adopted from Raiffa, 2003)

(Beardsley et al., 2006a). Howard Raiffa's ZOA explanation is used for negotiable prices in the market. As shown in Figure 1, one side of conflict represents the buyer;

the other represents the seller, and the price demands of each side are depicted. Raiffa states that the sellers have a minimum price, which is s , and buyers have a maximum price, which is b , and the negotiable area between s and b is the ZOA (Raiffa, 2003).

After a long duration of conflicts, parties in disputes often seek an appropriate negotiation field for a solution. At that point, the main concern is finding a trustworthy mediator for both parties. Impartiality, having relationships with both sides, and not placing their privilege over the privilege of the involved sides are essential features when third parties seek nominations as mediators. In this regard, an accepted mediator for disputants is crucial. Small states are attractive candidates for mediation in both aspects of disputants and small states themselves. Bo Bjurulf argues that small states are the most suitable options for mediating because their lack of power satisfies the sides' concerns (Bjurulf, 2001). Small states are trustable for disputants, whether the disputants are small or big. In the case of small states, being a mediator is also an opportunity to raise its reputation in international society. Thus, small states could use mediation as soft power (Chong, 2010).

Algerian mediation between the US and Iran in the 1979-81 hostage crisis is an example of the small state mediation. According to Slim, the Algerians had not been considered a threat by the Americans, which made them a proper candidate for being a mediator in the calculation of the US; she uses the term of *strategic weakness* to define that (Slim, 1992). On the other hand, for the Iranians, the Algerians had already mediated a conflict involving Iran. Algeria's facilitation resolved the 1975 territorial dispute between Iran and Iraq (Donovan, 2011). That led most of the officials in the foreign relations department of Iran to trust Algeria as a mediator (Slim, 1992). Beyond this, the mediation record of Algerians was highly respected at that time. The motivation that led Algeria as a small state to mediate the hostage crisis was to keep

economic relations with both sides and remain a respected or even institutionalized source for future mediation in international conflicts (Slim, 1992).

2.1. The Gulf small states in mediation

The Gulf has been important in contemporary world politics. The historical importance of those sheikhdoms, emirates, and states has been sourced from their geostrategic position and/or natural resources (Barnes & Jaffe, 2006). The withdrawal of the British from the region opened a new path for the small Gulf monarchies. The state formation of the Gulf monarchies created a realm for development and progress in the region. The states' strategies provided them opportunities to develop and raise their influence in the region and even worldwide. One of the policies that small states follow to expand their political importance for the world is mediation. Small Gulf states such as Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait often play the role of mediator in international disputes.

Windecker and Sendrowicz claim that two critical points that make Oman different in the Gulf are; the country's geopolitical position (Oman shares the gate of the strait of Hormuz with Iran) and being the only country in the Muslim world with the majority of the Ibadi sect. Being a strategic neighbor of Iran and avoiding the Sunni-Shia power struggle in the region has allowed Oman to follow a more independent foreign policy (Windecker & Sendrowicz, 2015). Being a GCC member with strong economic and political relations with Iran denotes its balance of powers strategy. Aside from that, Oman is the most emphatic supporter of keeping GCC as cooperation rather than transforming it into a union (Cafiero & Yefet, 2016). As a small state, Oman built its foreign policy on diplomatic partnerships and negotiations. Mediation is one of the critical elements of these policies. Oman attempted to mediate Qatar and Bahrain's crisis in 1992, which allowed Oman to maintain strong economic and

political partnerships with both of them (Allen & Rigsbee, 2002). Muscat has been the negotiation location for Iran and Saudi Arabia, initiating diplomatic relations in 1988 after the Islamic revolution (Al-Khalili, 2009). Will Todman claims that being the only GCC state that maintained diplomatic ties with Damascus after the Arab spring ensured Oman's selection to mediate the issue between Iran and Saudi Arabia (Todman, 2016). Moreover, Oman's most crucial mediation attempt was as an intermediary between the West (EU and the US) and Iran on the nuclear deal, named the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Even though the mediation was not taken further than facilitation, Oman has mediated the nuclear deal to maintain its balance of power strategy as a small state (Al Zubair, 2017).

Qatar's progressive leadership has led it to follow diplomacy to gain the international community's support since the late 90s. As a small state, mediation is seen as one of the best tools for diplomatic success by the Qatari policymakers (Kamrava, 2011). Qatar has been trying to solidify its place as a known mediator in the region. In this regard, the first attempt of Qatari mediation was the talks between Hamas and Fateh of Palestine (Barakat, 2012). The second was the Yemeni talks, and the third was the mediation efforts of Qatar in Lebanon (Coates-Ulrichsen, 2013). Besides, hosting the Afghan talks in 2020 was significant for the region and was also an essential matter of global politics (England, 2021). Indeed, it can be said Qatar used its economic power, media sources, and the personal skills of the diplomats to mediate the crisis (Barakat, 2014).

Regional dynamics led Qatar to follow a more independent way than the other Gulf states. Mohamed Tirab underlines the reasons for this divergence of Qatar in his research. The main reasons are the geopolitical location of Qatar, Qatari resistance to the Saudi hegemony in the region, the ideological dimensions of the Middle East,

security concerns, and threat perception of the state after the Arab Spring (Tirab, 2014). However, at the same time, these differences have created disagreements between Qatar and the other Gulf state. Rory miller edited a book in 2018 to offer a view from Qatar to the 2017 blockade. In his chapter in the book, he explains the smallness of Qatar and its foreign policies to survive the siege. He underlines the solid national identity, a popular leader, and financial policies of Qatar provided survival from the blockade to the country despite the smallness. On the other hand, he claims a more extended crisis could raise the vulnerability of Qatar to underline why Qatar did try to keep the diplomatic ways alive in the crisis (Miller, 2018). Tirab also mentions Qatar as a mediator, yet at times needed Kuwait to mediate the disputes between other GCC members (Tirab, 2014).

2.2. Kuwaiti mediation in the GCC crisis

Being in a location between the Middle East's three significant powers leads Kuwait to follow a more pragmatic and tolerant foreign policy as a small state. Kuwait has been acting in the role of a problem-solver in the Middle East since the beginning of the country. Kuwait offered Baghdad mediation after the Iraq-Iran war, emphasizing their neutrality. They also participated in mediations in the conflicts, such as between Egypt and Saudi Arabia in North Yemen in 1968, the dispute between factions in the Lebanese civil war from 1975-1991, the dispute between Turkey and Bulgaria over the Muslim population in Bulgaria in 1989. This shows a legacy of mediation in Kuwaiti history and the use of mediation as a soft power by Kuwaiti politicians (Al Saleh, 2000; Kostiner, 2009).

GCC states have faced significant policy divisions in the last two decades, particularly with the Arab Spring. The policies of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE were

significantly different from the vision of Qatar (Coates-Ulrichsen, 2014). Oman and Kuwait remained neutral states during this rift. Arab Spring and the aftermaths deepened the intra-GCC differences (Zweiri & Doğan-Akkaş, 2021). In 2014 three member states of GCC and Egypt recalled their ambassadors from Doha. In this situation, Kuwaiti efforts eased the tension. After a few months, the mediation by Kuwait decreased the pressure, and Qatar and Saudi Arabia signed the Riyadh agreement with the assistance of Sheikh Sabah. However, even though the sides agreed after the prolonged efforts of the Kuwaitis, the disagreements were not resolved (Coates-Ulrichsen, 2020). The GCC Crises deepened, and in 2017, three members of GCC (and Egypt) declared an embargo on Qatar. Mehran Kamrava mentions the impact of the 2016 elections of the US on the Gulf and underlines the timing of the embargo. He highlights the blockade was a sign of failure of the US security arrangements in the Gulf since the actors were under that umbrella (Kamrava, 2018). Because of its concerns about security and GCC unity, Sheikh Sabah and Kuwaiti diplomats began diplomatic trips between both parties. Their mediation efforts and role in Kuwait's foreign policy are evident in the 2017 blockade by 3 GCC member states (plus Egypt) of another member, Qatar. Even though there were other countries that offered mediation, the acceptance of Kuwait as a mediator by both sides of the conflict gave Kuwait a more critical position in the dispute.

Ibrahim Fraihat, in his article named 'Small State Superpower Mediation,' examines the mediation of Kuwait and the US in the Gulf Crisis. Fraihat mentions four main features of the mediations: timing, power, legitimacy, and interest of mediators. In this aspect, he claims that Kuwait does mediate the crisis because it wants to keep GCC secure. It can be said that the crisis's proper mediation would facilitate an opportunity to keep GCC functional (Fraihat, 2020). Regarding these interests, Fraihat

claims, the informal mediation of Kuwait started even earlier than the crisis itself. The crisis had begun on the 5th of June 2017, yet the Emir of Qatar and Emir of Kuwait met on the 31st of May about the Gulf states and ways of decreasing the growing tension between the members (Fraihat, 2020).

Abdulhadi Alajmi explains that Kuwait's primary objective of the mediation was keeping the GCC secure because of Kuwait's fragile situation (Alajmi, 2018). Additionally, in one of his statements, the Kuwaiti Emir underscored Kuwait's reluctance about the intervention of other countries in the issue, albeit as Egypt was formally a part of the crisis and Turkey and Iran indirectly. Kuwait's attitude can be read as protecting the unity of GCC, which became a *raison d'être* for the Kuwaitis after the Kuwait invasion in 1990. Hence, it could be said that Kuwait's mediation efforts were led by their security concerns (Alajmi, 2018).

Kuwait's impartial position and historical background on mediating led the leaders of the conflict to accept Kuwait as the mediator. Even though Oman was another neutral state of the Gulf in the conflict, its recent problems with the UAE and Saudi Arabia left Kuwait as the prime choice for the mediator.

In the conflict and its mediation process, one of the aims of the Kuwaitis was keeping the foreigners outside, even though they offered help in the mediation. Kuwait's view was that internationalization of the dispute could cause unsolvable, even more radical, situations like what has happened in Syria, Iraq, and Libya (Alajmi, 2018). The timing was also crucial for Kuwait; they knew that the longer the crisis endured, the more unsolvable it would become (Alajmi, 2018).

Lack of power and involvement of multiple external factors, aside from GCC members, were the negative parameters for the management of the crisis by the

Kuwaitis (Kabalan, 2018b).

Furthermore, the shuttle diplomacy and preventing the escalation of the crisis were Kuwait's early reactions to the situation. Kuwait was the mediator from the very first point of the problem, without a doubt. However, their lack of power paralyzed the efforts. Fraihat emphasized that legitimacy without power could not solve problems in the international crisis (Fraihat, 2020).

The valuable sources above explain the Kuwaiti mediation from several aspects. However, the researcher realized that there is a gap in the literature, which is the examination of Kuwaiti mediation by the theoretical perspective of the mediation styles. At the same time, the relationship between Kuwait's small state foreign policy and other Gulf states during mediation in the crisis will be conveyed to the readers. Thus, the contribution of this study to the literature will be the theoretical examination of Kuwaiti mediation in the case of the 2017-2021 Gulf crisis

3. Research objectives

Even though the literature gives the background of the selected crisis and the mediator, there is still a lack of clarity about the theoretical background of the mediation efforts of Kuwait. The main aim of the research is to put the GCC countries in the literature with an adequately designed work. Furthermore, this research aims to offer another perspective for the GCC states in IR studies, as they are perceived as important, mostly due to their natural resources and the vast wealth accumulated from those resources. Thus, the theoretical concept of Kuwait's mediation efforts is essential for understanding the role of these states in conflict resolution politics. Underestimation of the GCC countries in current international relations literature, except for their economic sources, makes this research important for the literature. The study points out that GCC states are comprehensive examples of international

relations science in terms of their diplomatic activities. Kuwait's current position as a mediator was successfully built in the Gulf. Furthermore, the examination of the mediation in the crisis was crucial for the Gulf and the world.

4. Research questions

The main research questions answered in this thesis are: How did Kuwait mediate in the resolution of the Gulf crisis? What can be said for Kuwaiti mediation in peace-making studies in International Relations? Seeking a broad answer for this question requires answering some sub-questions: Why did the disputants accept Kuwaiti mediation in the Gulf crisis? Why did Kuwait mediate the Gulf crisis? How did Kuwait mediate the Gulf crisis? After answering these questions, the research will situate Kuwaiti's role in mediation literature. It will show how mediation is a significant policy for the GCC states for issues they face within the GCC or global issues.

5. Methodology

The qualitative research method was adopted in this study. The multiparametric style of the field of International Relations complicates finding exact answers to the aforementioned questions. However, the technique applied by the researcher raises the objectivity and correctness of the findings. In this regard, this research utilizes a two-part methodology. The first method is semi-structured interviews using open-ended questions with experts in the region who provided valuable information. The second is a comprehensive media analysis. The media analysis was applied to the case by using Search Engine Optimization (SEO) techniques. In addition to those, opinion-based sources were the elements for testing and reinforcing the accuracy of the findings.

5.1. Semi-structured interviews

The objective of the research is an accurate depiction of Kuwait's mediation efforts in international relations. The information in the thesis was gathered from experts in international relations, especially from Gulf studies. Hence, the interviewees are scholars and experts of the region. The primary motivation behind selecting that group was to interview people who have both theoretical knowledge and field experience. Besides, interviews with experts provided practical answers to the questions. The researcher followed an inductive method in the interviews to draw a comprehensive analysis of the topic. Every question was asked in search of an answer to a specific part of the thesis. After the interviews, collective data answered the main research questions of the thesis.

Interviews were conducted with academics. The scholars were chosen from diverse backgrounds. Western scholars working in Europe and the US, Kuwaiti scholars, Khaleeji scholars, and non-Khaleeji Arab experts were selected. Abdulhadi Alajmi, Abdullah Baabood, Ali Bakir, Christian Koch, Courtney Freer, Hamdullah Baycar, Kristin Diwan, Zafer Alajmi are the participants who allow the researcher to use their names. Some of the interviewees asked the researcher to stay anonymous. Semi-structured questions were asked with some specific themes. For example, what was Kuwait's role (if any) in the resolution of the crises? Why did Kuwait initiate such an undertaking? Why did the parties accept the mediation? Was Kuwait a good candidate for the mediation? The meetings were done in person and virtually according to the availability of the participants. The author has recorded face-to-face meetings on his mobile phone—the virtual meetings set via Zoom software and recorded for the transcription. The author asked for and received written and verbal consent from the participants for the recordings. The transcripts were made, and content was divided

according to the thesis division. The software programs have provided transcriptions of the recordings. However, the author transcribed 80 percent of the recordings manually, twice. The author followed the order of questions for each interview and transcribed them question by question in the first manual transcription. The second transcription was done for each of the interviewees separately. The aim of this double-check, besides the software's transcription, was to understand the essence of the interviews and the impression of the participants. Thus, it can be said the researcher compiled a good number of interviews and their examinations.

5.2. Search Engine Optimization (SEO) method and application to the case

SEO is a technique for obtaining the desired information from online sources due to the vast amount of data on the online sphere. The term search engine defines the databases that provide users with the results they search for. The method is based on the software guarantees that the user's web pages are indexed and updated (Malaga, 2007). The search engine listed the results related to the keywords for the search in the search engine result page (SERP) (Pabitha & Sangeetha, 2014). Search engine optimization (SEO) allows the web page to be more visible on the SERP (Zilincan, 2015). Using SEO is common in business and commercial industries. The modern marketing system takes advantage of SEO and tries to develop techniques to reach a wider population (Marshall, 2021). Even though optimizing the web sources would be essential for academic research, researchers generally focus on the part that makes the publication more visible via SEO (Cushman, 2018; Schilhan et al., 2021). This study used SEO methods to narrow down the SERP for the research. In this regard, it can be said the researcher extracted primary sources from an enormous database via SEO.

5.2.1. Application of the SEO to the case

The Gulf Crisis is one of the most widely recognized incidents in recent regional political relations. The topic, thus, has attracted both academic and non-academic interest. Media, International organizations, think tanks, and many other institutes have focused on the crisis from various perspectives and for many purposes. The Gulf Crisis, which happened between multiple actors, makes SEO ideal for this research. How involved (and non-involved) parties have covered the situations and how they changed throughout the 3.5 years can be seen best via SEO. In this regard, specific words were searched throughout the databases. The timespan was divided annually, starting from the beginning of the crisis. The research begins by analyzing the first year of the blockade – from 5th June 2017 to 5th June 2018. In that time range, numerous sources have been examined. National news agencies were a vital source to draw the traffic of the visits of Kuwaiti officials and the officials of the disputants. Thus, Kuwait News Agency (KUNA), Saudi Arabia Press Agency (SPA), Qatar News Agency (QNA), and Emirates News Agency (WAM) were important national news agencies that this research benefitted from. Different keywords were used on other platforms. In KUNA, for example, pages that contain the words “Qatar,” “Saudi,” “Dubai,” and “Abu Dhabi,” both in English and Arabic, were analyzed. In QNA, SPA, and WAM, the words that were searched were “Kuwait,” “Kuwaiti,” and “Sheikh Sabah.” Some significant figures, such as Marzouq Al-Ghanim and Khaled Jarallah, having played an active role in the crisis, were also searched. The pages obtained from these searches were examined in chronological order in parallel with their relevance to the subject. The platforms that the researcher employed were narrowed down manually by their relations to the Crisis. The information from these

websites led to the designed chronology of the visits. After that, the researcher looked at international media corporations. Al Araby, The Nationals, and Al Jazeera were the first sources to provide the crisis timeline with experts' opinions. The words that the researcher searched for on those websites were "Kuwait," "Gulf Crisis," "Gulf boycott," "Gulf blockade," and "Kuwaiti mediation." The research was done for each website and each word separately between the denoted time ranges. In addition to this, some websites like the BBC, Financial Times, Foreign Affairs, Wall Street Journals, Reuters, and TRT World were taken into consideration. The researcher manually reviewed the websites obtained by the search and sorted chronologically for relevant data. After collecting data from these sources, the researcher searched for these words from governmental authorities such as websites of foreign ministries, Emiri divans, official interviews, press conferences, etc. Multiple checks of the data obtained led the researcher to more accurate information for the mediation efforts of Kuwait in the Gulf Crisis. This method applied to the following years of the blockade either.

The method mentioned above was used for answering the question of how Kuwait mediated the crisis. The other two research questions were examined in the same process but in different ways. The researcher tried to answer why Kuwait accepted to be the mediator and why disputants accepted them with data obtained SEO. Even though most of the sources were taken from the evaluation of the crisis, the researcher added specific keywords for the search in websites. The period was adjusted from the beginning of the problem to the first anniversary. However, the researcher then repeated the process, removing the time parameters to see the results relating to the event from a broader perspective also. This research provided the researcher with the repercussions of Kuwaiti mediation from different actors and different approaches.

6. Challenges and limitations

While conducting this study, several challenges and limitations are experienced. Access to valid and rich data is one of the first issues that were faced during the research. Because mediation and negotiations are naturally conducted behind closed doors, confidentiality was also something that the researcher faced as a challenge. To overcome these challenges, the researcher attempted to diversify the source of the publicly available information. Moreover, data collected from open sources were confirmed and interpreted via the experts' thoughts. As denoted in the literature and will be denoted in theoretical background, mediation has four critical elements: the mediator, the disputants, the context of mediation, and the process of mediation. The researcher attempted to examine all in the research, yet the obstacles above caused the inability to investigate the context of mediation. The aim of answering these limitations might be a good contribution in future works responses to these issues.

CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This research examines the Kuwaiti mediation in the GCC Crisis with several interconnected International Relations concepts and theories. Mediation types, facilitation, formulation, and manipulation will be explained. Furthermore, the “small state theory” will be presented to help the understanding of Kuwait and the behavior of small states in general.

1. Mediation

International disputes, after a stalemate situation, require a third party to resolve the conflicts. The nomination of the third party, the mediator, is one of the essential points of the process. A successful mediation starts with two main points: disputants should ask or permit a third party to mediate the disputes, and the possible intermediary actor should accept or ask to mediate (Wall et al., 2001). The timing of the mediation and the time that the mediator intervenes are also essential factors for success. The term used in the mediation theory for the timing is ripeness or readiness (Pruitt, 2015). The mediator’s closeness to any conflicting sides could result in a biased agreement that is not a complete solution to the crisis. Thus, the impartiality of the mediator is also a crucial element for dispute resolution (Moore, 2014). Therefore, it can be said four factors are critical for shaping the style of mediation: (1) mediator, (2) conflicting sides, (3) process of mediation, and (4) the context of mediation (Bercovitch et al., 1991). These four elements define the types of mediation as facilitator-communicator, formulator, and manipulator.

1.1. Facilitator-Communicator

A Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS) situation generally occurs when the sides cut all diplomatic ties with each other. The initial duty of the facilitator is to make contact

with each side of the conflict. After the connection, gaining their trust and establishing credibility is the most critical point to start mediation. A trustable facilitator's next step is connecting the sides to each other. The term delinking is also used in facilitation to establish the sides' connection (Druckman et al., 1988). Creating a proper information channel between the sides is one of the main aims of the facilitator. The information could be demands, plans, or capabilities to clarify the sides' misunderstandings (Bercovitch, 1997). The facilitator transmits messages between sides and sometimes acts in the role of host for the negotiation place. Because both sides have limited trust in each other, a trustworthy host creates a comfortable place for negotiation. In this regard, the facilitator should be careful about the confidentiality of the talks to prevent the sides' diffidence about the process.

However, the facilitator does not offer any solution or blueprint for the operation of the solution. The primary goal of the facilitator is to provide a connection between the disputants. Thus, a facilitator is a “conduit” between the sides of a conflict (Kleiboer, 1996; Zartman, 2009). The facilitator's role is generally indicated as “passive” in the theoretical background (Babbitt, 2008). The primary aim of the facilitator/communicator is to sustain a link between the disputants via providing information (Pospieszna & Schneider, 2017). Thus, the facilitator/communicator starts the contact with the disputants, who do not intend to begin direct talks because of the intensity of the crisis or avoiding giving any concessions. The mediator behaves like a “telephone wire” in such cases (Zartman & Touval, 1985)

1.2. Formulator

The formulation is the type of mediation where strategy plays a crucial role in the process. Before mediating, the formulator type of mediator should be aware of all of the dimensions of the conflict. The formulator should be mindful of the sides'

demands, powers, and redlines. This fullness of knowledge about the situation leads the formulator to show alternatives to the conflicting sides. Solutions originating from the proper place in the ZOA most often lead the conflict's sides to accept the solution (Bercovitch, 1997). The position of the formulator should be recognized by both sides respectfully. The formulation type of mediation is more active than facilitation. From the beginning of the conflict, the mediator does not start the meetings before setting up a formula for the negotiations (Babbitt, 2008). Avoiding establishing direct connections from early on in the conflict works to save face between disputants (Wilkenfeld et al., 2005). The early stage of disputes is the time for calculating the possible ZOA for the mediator. The formulator offers disputants a structured plan from the possible outcomes. De-escalation is another duty of the formulator. A successful formulator arranges the timing and tries to overcome the stalemate situation (Beardsley et al., 2006b). The negotiation phase of the conflict is also crucial for the formulator. The mission of the formulator at that stage is to keep parties at the table, protect the confidentiality of the meetings, deal with simple issues, and highlight common interests (Bercovitch, 1992). Even though some features of facilitation and formulation overlap in the theoretical approach, the formulator is more active and analytical in practice (Kleiboer, 1996). The main differences from the facilitation involve the negotiations and offering solutions.

1.3. Manipulator

Manipulation is a type of mediation where the mediator has significant involvement in the crisis. This type of mediation is generally seen as a directive third party involving greater power in the conflict. One of the primary features of the manipulators is in dominating the crisis. The manipulator could force the sides to stay in negotiations or even to make them agree with its hard power (Babbitt, 2008). However, at the same

time, a manipulator could reward disputants in return for their accordance with the process that the manipulator offers (Beardsley et al., 2006b). In this regard, manipulators use the tactic of carrot and stick (Eriksson, 2019). The knowledge of being rewarded or punished according to their decision leads both sides to end the problem. The manipulator helps by restating the commitments of the sides, which decreases the possibility of disagreement. Supplying information, even filtering at times, and taking responsibility for deals are the manipulator's key actions (Bercovitch, 1997). The power of the manipulator creates a “settlement oriented” mediation which is also called “directive” or “heavy” mediation (Pospieszna & Schneider, 2017). The mediator's involvement at such a high level makes it a full participant instead of an ordinary third party (Zartman & Touval, 1985). However, being a full participant raises the uncertainty of the mediator's neutrality (Wilkenfeld et al., 2005). The efficiency of directive methods to reach an agreement is visible in short-term conflicts (Gartner & Bercovitch, 2006). Forcing sides to a contract is also seen from the impact of the manipulator in the short-term conflicts. However, being forced to reach a consensus makes peace or deals fragile (Werner & Yuen, 2005).

2. Smallness

Small states began to appear on the international scene after the World Wars. Many small states were established in the former lands of empires that were divided into smaller parts. However, these countries were generally seen as satellites of greater powers between the Second World War and the end of the cold war. Soviet Russia's dissolution led small states began to form independent foreign policies (Galal, 2020).

Some social scientists describe small states by the numbers, which are usually population, territory, and the economic size of the states (Crowards, 2002; Jalan,

1982; Kuznets, 1960). Yet, this paper shares Galal's view that quantities do not explain the small states' effectiveness in international relations (Galal, 2020). Small states make alliances with more extraordinary powers to avoid threats from other greater powers. Joining regional and international organizations are examples of these alliances (Vaičekauskaitė, 2017). Creating unique places or features in the sphere of global public opinion is also essential for small states' foreign policies (Roberts, 2012). Small countries cannot compete with the greater powers in terms of military power or hard power. Thus, small states apply soft powers to raise their influence in international society (Chong, 2010). In this regard, some terms of IR that are applied to the strategies will be defined below. Small states use a variety of methods to survive and gain regional and global influence. Some of the strategies overlap with medium power as well. The strategies related to this research are bandwagoning, balancing power, being a hallmark, and soft power policies.

2.1. Bandwagoning

Small states' lack of power and sources leads them to align with greater powers. If the concept of this alignment is seen as following the policies of a great state return to its protection, it can be named bandwagoning. Walt argues that small powers are probably bandwagoning with aggressive great powers for their security (Walt, 1987). The study will examine the foreign relations of the smaller Gulf states with the regional powers on the basis of the theory.

2.2. Balancing power

Unlike bandwagoning, balancing power is based on the diversification of the alignments. This policy leads small states to offer to join in coalitions against aggressive forces. Balancing powers allows small states to maneuver diplomatically

(Bar-Siman-Tov, 1980). Claude examines the UN with balancing power theory. He argues that the system provides a fair distribution of power among the constituents. Approximate equilibrium in such a system is the prime objective of the balance of power theory (Claude, 1989). The role of GCC as an organization for Kuwait is perceived as a balancing power against the Saudi hegemony or any asymmetric relation in the Gulf in this study.

2.3.Hallmark

Hallmark can be described as the uniqueness of a country. Small states use this strategy to raise their importance in international society. Services, commodities, or some features of the states could be considered as their hallmark. For example, Kadioğlu and Bezci claim New Zealand created its hallmark as preventing overdependence on any greater power (Kadioğlu & Bezci, 2020). Being a mediator also can be listed under this category (Abu Laila, 2017). Mediation and domestic plurality will be examined as hallmarks of Kuwait in the study.

2.4.Soft power

In the late 20th century, after technological developments, the rise of nationalism, and social mobilization, the military intervention of the states became more expensive and more ineffective than in the early times. Nye gives the example of US involvement in Iranian politics to exemplify that. The US managed to restore the Shah's authority in the 50s; however, after the 1979 revolution, they considered and discarded the idea of using the military to keep the Shah in power (Nye, 1990). At this level of politics, a new type of power became necessary, referred to as "soft power." According to the soft power theory, states can influence other countries or international society with cultural, technological, ideological, and strategic tools. Unlike hard power, the smaller

states also could use soft power tools because it bypasses the limitation of the states and makes them influential in politics. The tools of soft power can be listed as media, education, investments as well as mediation (Amirbek & Ydyrys, 2014; Eliküçük Yıldırım & Aslan, 2020; Flew, 2016; Vukovic, 2015). Economic powers of the smaller Gulf states will be examined as the soft powers of the states. Besides, the personality of leaders such as Sheikh Sabah will be discussed as the soft powers of Kuwait.

CHAPTER 3: KUWAITI MEDIATION IN THE GULF CRISIS

The literature states that Kuwait has mediated several international conflicts since the early times of the country. The strategy that the Kuwaiti administration follows is affected by the contemporary history of the country. The domestic politics of Kuwait - compared to its Khaleeji counterparts- and the Iraqi invasion are some of the main factors that have affected the stance of Kuwait in regional incidents. The Gulf crisis is one of the incidents that has clearly impacted the perspective of Kuwait in the Gulf. Even though Oman also chose to be impartial in the crisis, being the mediator of the Gulf crisis differentiates Kuwait from Oman. This research will examine why two sides of the conflict -Qatar on one side, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt on the other- asked for or approved Kuwaiti mediation in the first section. The second section will be the reasons behind Kuwait's motivation to accept its intermediary role. The third section will explore answers to the question of how Kuwait mediated the crisis.

1. Why did the disputants accept Kuwait as a mediator?

As mentioned in the literature review and theoretical background, the nomination of the mediator is one of the most challenging parts of dispute resolution. The first thing that sides need to agree on is the mediator. If one of the sides is not satisfied with the mediator, intermediary action would be unavailing. The Gulf diplomatic crisis is one of the examples where the mediator was apparently chosen even before the crisis. The crisis started officially on the 5th of June 2017, but the issues that led to the embargo had been there since the Arab Spring. And the struggling third party between the disputants was Kuwait even then. This part will explain why the disputants accepted Kuwait as the mediator of the crisis.

1.1. Qatar

After a years-long disagreement between Qatar and embargoing countries, the blockade was not unexpected for experts, especially after the 2014 ambassador withdrawal of UAE and Saudi Arabia from Doha; growing tension indicated the possibility of such an action. Some business of the Saudi-led group remained “unfinished,” though the ambassador crisis was solved at those times (Kabalan, 2018a). Qatar's initial reactions to the blockade show that Qatar also expected that growing disagreement could turn into such an embargo. After the solution of urgent problems inside the country, the first reaction of the Qatari administration was to convey a statement about the crisis. The statement was expected to be made by the Emir. However, the phone call from Kuwait’s Emir not to make any statement for that day was accepted by Sheikh Tamim, and the foreign minister of Qatar made the statement (Al Jazeera, 2017a). The acceptance revealed that Qatar's first channel for the solution was Kuwait. Qatar’s early commitment to the Kuwaiti Emir was a good reason for Qatar accepting Kuwait as the mediator. The research claims that (1) the personality of Sheikh Sabah, (2) the neutral stance of Kuwait, and (3) Kuwait’s political maturity, parallel to the Qataris vision, are three main reasons that the Qataris accepted and even welcomed Kuwaiti mediation.

1.1.1. Sheikh Sabah

During the interviews, the personality of Sheikh Sabah was one of the most important factors mentioned by the participants to explain subjects that made Kuwait’s mediation legitimate and effective, if not the first. Abdullah Baabood, a famous Omani professor of IR, mentioned Sheikh Sabah’s UN award in 2014 for his humanitarian efforts for Syrians and Iraqis to denote that the respect the Sheikh reserved was beyond the Gulf. Serving as Kuwait’s Foreign Minister for 38 years

(1965-2003), as the Prime Minister for three years (2003-2006), and as the Emir for more than a decade solidified the respected position of Sheikh Sabah in the Gulf and its people, beyond the politics. Participant A, a well-known Khaleeji scholar, said,

The tribal dimension played a role in Kuwaiti mediation. Because of the age of the Emir at that time, Sheikh Sabah, one of the elderly leaders in the region. Besides, he was the one who was looking at the crisis as damage in a one home, the Gulf house. He felt that he was responsible because he was one of the eldest among the leaders. Thus, his personality played a key role in acceptance because they knew where Sheikh Sabah was coming from

The observation that the author of this research made on the day Sheikh passed away clearly exemplifies that. The national mourning of the Sheikh was evident from the attitudes of Qataris. Indeed, in one of his statements, the foreign minister of Qatar professes that the Sheikh was not just a political leader that Qataris are respected, but was more like a “father” for the nation (KUNA, 2017a). Christian Koch, a well-known European scholar of the Gulf politics, mentioned:

There is a transition going on in the GCC monarchies to a new generation of leadership. At the time when the crisis broke out, it was basically Sheikh Sabah of Kuwait was one of the old guards in the GCC who was always represent the benefits of the Gulf beyond the ideology. He was a member of the crew when the GCC was created. He has always played a role to bridge differences to bring about reconciliations. And these all were important for gaining trust for the role he played.

Abdulhadi Alajmi, a famous Kuwaiti historian who is an expert on the contemporary history of Kuwait and the Gulf, said:

This was (mediation) a part of Sheikh Sabah character. He gave great attention through his long experiences. Being a member of organizations and by protecting these organizations and the role of Kuwait in these organizations, he created a way of thinking that affected the state's foreign policies. For example, the Arab League summit in Mauritania. Most of the leaders were absent from that meeting. Still, Sheikh Sabah attended and gave money to the embassy of Kuwait in Mauritania for the summit to make sure this organization would not lose its function and importance. Again, with the GCC, he tried to make it work. It was a very harsh moment for the intra-GCC relations. But he kept on going and kept supporting the organization (GCC).

In this matter, Qatari Emir and other officials had seen Sheikh Sabah as a critical consultative authority for the regional issues beyond the Gulf crisis.

1.1.2. Impartiality of Kuwait

Kuwait chose to be neutral inside the GCC despite the growing partnership of three member states, Bahrain, KSA, and the UAE. The mediation efforts of Kuwait in the 2013 and 2014 diplomatic crises of GCC proved its impartiality and enthusiasm for the stability of the Gulf (Kabalan, 2018b). The attendance of Qatar's emir to the first summit of GCC after the blockade, which was held in Kuwait, was a sign of that trust. Professor Ali Bakir, a well-known scholar in the Middle East politics and security from Qatar University, said that "even though the pressure that the blockading side imposed to join them, Kuwait's neutral standing in the crisis led Qatar to trust the mediation of Kuwait." Participant A stated:

One of the reasons that this crisis happened was the support of Qatar to the Muslim Brotherhood movements. But if you look at Kuwait Muslim Brotherhood has played a role in Kuwaiti politics for a long time; they have been in the

political system. However, Kuwait has never followed in particular support to these movements, though it has still accepted them as part of their political system in Kuwait.

Kristin Diwan, a well-known scholar of the Gulf politics, said:

Oman always stands a bit apart from the GCC, so they were not really in a position to play the role of mediator, and I think Kuwait was eager for that role. Kuwait was trusted by Qataris, and Qatar saw it as very important to keep Kuwait on its side. I think Qatar appreciated Kuwait playing the mediation role because of that.

Considering the Qatari position of being under a blockade, their support for a third party that does not have a problem with the ideological view of the country would be crystal clear.

1.1.3. Multiplicity of thoughts

One of the demands that blockading countries asked from Qatar was closing some media corporations, including Al-Jazeera. In an interview, the spokesperson of the Qatari foreign ministry claimed that it was an attack on the diversity of thoughts in Qatar (Al-Khater, 2019a). The vision of creating a sphere for freedom of speech in the Gulf was not only the vision of Qatar. Having an effective parliament and political activities, compared to their Khaleeji counterparts, put Kuwait at the apex of the democratic level in the Gulf (Herb, 2016). The vision itself could be interpreted as adopted from Kuwaiti political developments. Professor Courtney Freer, a well-known American scholar of the Gulf politics, especially Kuwait's, said:

The pluralism in Kuwait was seen as an important element for Qataris as an insurance of their standing against the blockade. Because the similar

dynamics, or even further ones, count for Kuwait

Participant B, a famous expert of the Gulf politics, said:

Some of the internal groups in Kuwait were accused of being supporters of Qatar's popular movements in the region. However, being a mediator, being in the middle, was very popular and supported in Kuwait, even between the opponents of the Emir.

Even though the parameters that lead each country's domestic politics are different, Kuwait's tolerance is seen as essential support for the Qataris to welcome the Kuwaiti mediation.

Kuwait's political maturity, intra-GCC impartial policies, and personality of the Kuwaiti Emir are central pillars of Qatar's acceptance and faithfulness to the mediator. Sheikh Sabah has held an important place for Khaleeji people since the foundation of the GCC. Qatari diplomats and even nationals had respected the Sheikh as well. The political choices which Kuwait has made are seen as an essential sign of confidence in Qatar. Moreover, the domestic political maturity of Kuwait is seen as indirect support for the Qatari vision of promoting diversity of thoughts.

1.2. The blockading countries

Qatar's position in regional politics had been questioned by Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and UAE since the beginning of the Arab Spring. The Gulf crisis was expected by the Qatari, as mentioned above. On the other hand, the embargoing countries were preparing themselves for such restrictions years ago (Hearst, 2014; Naylor, 2014). However, in the first days, there was an assumption that the crisis would be solved quickly. A senior official of Saudi Arabia visited the Emir of Kuwait on the day of the blockade with a 'message' that immediately made the Kuwaiti Emir call Sheikh

Tamim (Gambrell, 2017). The day after the embargo was announced, Sheikh Sabah visited KSA and UAE. The first statements by the embargoing countries about the mediator were that Kuwait could be the only mediator for the crisis. Nominating Kuwait as the mediator had some important reasons by that side of the conflict. These reasons could be explained as; (1) to keep trouble inside the Gulf, (2) to prevent Kuwait become a partner of Qatar against them, (3) international support that Kuwait received for mediation, and (4) limited manipulative power by Kuwait.

1.2.1. Keeping the crisis inside the Gulf

The blockading side's main reason for sending an official to Kuwait on the first day of the crisis was to keep the crisis in the Gulf. Two impartial states of the GCC were seen as possible mediators: Kuwait and Oman. However, one of the reasons that the blockading countries did not accept or ask for Omani mediation was Oman's relation with Iran. In the declared demands -two weeks after the blockade- by embargoing countries, there were severe aspersions cast on the relationship between Qatar and Iran. It was apparent this crisis would not be solved by a party that had obvious relations with Iran. Oman also was not supportive of changing GCC into a union from a council (Kholaf, 2013). These two points made Kuwait the only choice for KSA, Bahrain, and UAE. Keeping the crisis inside the Gulf was mentioned by the embargoing countries. Baabood stated:

The blockading side aimed to keep the crisis inside the Gulf in two aspects. First, the mediator should not gain interest from the crisis. The candidates that could be a mediator in this regard were Oman and Kuwait, and both have no aim to gain from the crisis beyond the unity of the Gulf. But if an outside party offered mediation, the Saudi-led side could not be that much confident about the mediator. The second, traditional and historical links with the Gulf states

led them to keep crisis inside the Gulf. Considering the health condition of Sultan Qaboos of Oman at that time and Oman's foreign policy approach made Kuwait the only option for them.

The blockading countries' aim to keep the crisis inside the Gulf was sourced from the desire to control the blockade as they wished. This was further confirmed when the Emirati minister of state for foreign affairs posted a tweet one year after the embargo, which mentioned that "any non-Gulf mediation would not be accepted. Qatar should go back to its root for the solution of the crisis (Gargash, 2018)." That statement showed that non-Gulf mediation could be seen or wanted to be seen as disrespect from the Khaleeji identity from the blockading side, even as they embraced efforts of the US for the solution. Bakir said:

They had no chance to reject Kuwait's offer to mediate because if they did so, they would reflect an aggressive image, an image of a side that does not want to resolve the crisis plus they also blocked officially and publicly accepted Kuwaiti offer for stopping any other mediation offer outside the Gulf.

The commitment of Kuwait to the GCC was crystal clear. The most successful operation in the region by the GCC since the foundation was the US-led operation for the liberation of Kuwait. Koch mentioned the efforts of Kuwaitis in the early 80s in the establishment of GCC and added, "GCC is in somewhere of Kuwait's DNA." Thus, if there is one state that most strongly supports the GCC entity, this would be Kuwait.

1.2.2. Keeping Kuwait impartial

The second reason for acceptance of Kuwaiti mediation is to keep Kuwait away from any partnership with Qatar. Kuwait and Qatar's foreign relations approach was closer

than the approaches of the Saudi-led blocks. Kuwait had not intended to support the growing aggression in the region. Even though the state initially supported the Saudi operation in Yemen, after a time, Kuwait withdrew its support and offered mediation to both sides. Kuwait's foreign policy has been constructed on the necessity of stability since the foundation of the country, which was contrary to the Saudi-led group's regional foreign policies, especially after the Arab Spring. In the early times of the blockade, the Saudi Arabia-based Al-Arabiya website posted an article that contained Kuwaiti activists' call for the Kuwaiti government to join the blockade against Qatar (Jarrah, 2017). Participant C, an expert in the Gulf security, mentioned the pressure of the quartet on Kuwait for joining them in the early times of the blockade and described that with "if you are not with us then you are against us" and added, "however, it was unrealistic so that can be said they pushed Kuwait at least keep distance to Qatar." Even though Kuwaiti support of the siege was almost unimaginable, one of the motivations behind accepting or promoting Kuwaiti mediation was to keep the country as an impartial third party.

1.2.3. Lack of Kuwait's manipulative power

The third reason the Arab quartet wanted Kuwait mediation was Kuwait's lack of hard power. Even though the personality of Shaikh Sabah and Kuwaiti officials' positive reputation in the Gulf could be counted as soft power, Kuwait could not implement any hard power to the disputants to start negotiations. Also, while the commitment of Kuwait to the GCC gave the state legitimacy to intervene in the crisis, Kuwait's lack of power resulted in a limited range of mediation (Fraihat, 2020). Zafer Alajmi, a famous Kuwaiti scholar who is an expert in Kuwait's foreign policy and the Gulf security, said:

They preferred to see Kuwait instead of any foreign country intervening in this

matter, especially those with their own interest. Because the Americans might jump, the British might jump, even some Arab countries might see this as a chance for playing the good guy to solve this problem but gaining their own interests.

Thus, any solution excluding the blockading countries' demands would not happen in a crisis mediated by the Kuwaitis. That gave the blockading side room to maneuver.

1.2.4. International support for the Kuwaiti mediation

The fourth reason in this research for the acceptance of Kuwaiti mediation from the embargo countries is international powers' support of the Kuwaiti mediation. After his statements about the crisis, the UN secretary-general mentioned their support of Kuwait. The UN also released a report about the situation, in which the Kuwaiti mediation importance was also underscored (see appx. C). UK foreign secretary (then) Boris Johnson stated they would help Kuwait in mediation after a meeting with the Emir of Qatar with the stated goal of “assisting Kuwait’s important efforts ” (Al Jazeera, 2017d). The vice president of the EU Federica Mogherini (2014-2019), in a press release, after she visited Kuwait on 23rd July 2017, emphasized the support of the EU of Kuwait’s efforts and called the sides to negotiation for the resolution of the crisis (EEAS, 2017). The support of US officials was solid from the beginning of the blockade, despite President Trump's inconsistent attitudes (Lee, 2017). Furthermore, leaders visiting the sides of the crisis were always discouraged by Kuwait. The leaders of China, Russia, Turkey, Italy, and many other countries publicly stated their support of the mediation efforts of Sheikh Sabah and Kuwait. A stunning title of a news article from the Kuwait National News Agency was ‘Kuwait turns into political Mecca.’ That further emphasized how regional and international actors pay attention to Kuwait’s mediation (Mahmoud, 2017). It can be said that widespread support of

Kuwait's mediation pushed the blockading countries to accept the Kuwaiti mediation.

Participant A said:

Kuwait followed a smart way of diplomacy to get international support that led the quartet to accept Kuwait as the mediator to not giving the image of being bullies in the sense of the international community.

However, some of the interviewees mentioned that the quartet accepted Kuwait as a mediator but made things difficult for mediation. For example, Kristin Diwan used the phrase "limited strategic acceptance," Participant C said, "they were not happy about Kuwaiti's mediation," Participant B said, "their acceptance was a cosmetic acceptance." Participant A used the word "formality" for that acceptance.

Thus, keeping the crisis inside the GCC, avoiding any partnership of Kuwait with Qatar against them, Kuwait's limited power for pushing them to agree, and international support for Kuwait's mediation are the primary reasons the research reached. Blockading countries aimed to be free from any external power's pressure, to keep the crisis inside the GCC, to leave Qatar alone and not make the country accept the demands, to lead the problem without any forceful intervention of the mediator, and to decrease international pressure in negotiations with Qatar for the solution.

2. Why did Kuwait become the mediator?

The late Emir of Kuwait, Sheikh Sabah al Ahmad, did not hesitate to initiate mediation between the disputants from the very beginning of the crisis. The mediation process will be conveyed later in the study, yet this early reaction of the Sheikh and the country shows the enthusiasm of Kuwait to be the mediator. The fair foreign policy of Kuwait in the GCC motivated the Kuwaitis to be a mediator. In addition, Sheikh Sabah believed that an extended crisis would damage the Gulf's security and

economy. Indeed, the political sphere of Kuwait was threatened by the growing aggression in the region. The reasons for Kuwaiti willingness to mediate in this research are clearly delineated; (1) the foreign policy of the state, (2) the economic concerns, (3) the security concerns of Kuwait from the extension of aggression on the region, and (4) the domestic sphere of the state.

2.1. The foreign policy of Kuwait

The first reason for Kuwait's willingness to be the mediator was the foreign policy approach of Kuwait. The crisis highlighted the foreign policy differences of Qatar on one side and Bahrain, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia on the other. However, as mentioned in the literature review, the third wing of the GCC regarding foreign policy was comprised of impartial ones, namely Oman and Kuwait. Kuwait's foreign policy had been built on that approach since the foundation of the country. Even though the threat of expansion of Iranian influence after the Islamic revolution, Kuwait recognized the Islamic Republic of Iran. In the Iran-Iraq war, despite the initial support to the Iraqis, Kuwait became more neutral as a means to offer mediation.

Diwan said:

To some degree, the mediation was Kuwait's way of balancing. I don't think they could openly confront the UAE and Saudi Arabia as more powerful parties. But on some level, Kuwait felt that if things went badly for Qatar, at some point, Kuwait's own sovereignty -or at least room for sovereign action - would be limited. So, Kuwait used mediation to balance against that

Saudi domination of the GCC led other countries to follow the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia. However, partnership with the US and providing military facilities to the Americans led the country to operate more independently of the GCC. Christian Koch said:

Kuwait was the one who offered an initiative to contain Gulf states before the GCC. The first establishment of the Gulf, the Gulf Postal Service, was in Kuwait. The first secretary-general of GCC was a Kuwaiti, Abdullah Bishara. Kuwait was one of the most active countries during the foundation of the GCC. The invasion of Kuwait by Iraqis deepened the relation of Kuwait with the GCC. After the invasion necessity of GCC was positioned in the heart of Kuwaiti foreign policy.

Participant C mentioned the crisis was a threat for the Kuwaiti foreign policy and said:

Kuwait was the founder of the GCC in the first place. Kuwait was one of the early supporters of the organization. For Kuwait having an organization aside of western allies, which sometimes seem hesitant or late to take actions in regional incidents. The question is, are all GCC members at the same level in the organization? Of course not. The Kuwaitis think that Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, smaller states should be influential in the organization not to face Saudis' hegemony. So, this organization built on the idea that we are all equal though we are different in ways.

Even though the Kuwaiti government did not wholly support Qatari foreign policy, the domination of a group and demanding to change the foreign policy to another one led Kuwait to act as a third party to set a barrier. Moreover, Hamdullah Baycar, an expert of Gulf politics from the University of Exeter, said that:

My Kuwaiti sources told me the Kuwaitis are now building their foreign policy on being a known mediator beyond the Gulf. It is very embedded in Kuwaitis' foreign policy approach. We can compare the mediation for Kuwaitis to the foreign direct investment of Doha and Abu Dhabi in Europe. Mediation nowadays

for Kuwaitis is a strong tool for diplomacy.

2.2. Economic concerns

The second reason Kuwait wanted to be the mediator in the crisis was the country's economic concerns. The GCC countries' primary wealth source is in their natural sources. Regarding this wealth, the states maintain governance over the income share to nationals. The fluctuation in the price of natural sources has led countries to find new solutions for sustainability. Like the other GCC states, Kuwait is trying to develop a new economic strategy. Since the mid-2010s, this has included adjusting policies of subsidies that the government provides for the citizens (Krane & Hung, 2016). In this context, the economic importance of the GCC for Kuwait is undoubtedly a fact. Even though the GCC was established as security cooperation, it has turned into economic cooperation more than security. Baabood described the situation further:

Kuwaiti economy was not damaged due to the crisis. However, the lack of integration in the regional trade seems to be a problem in the long term for Kuwaiti officials. They could not transport their product as before. The multilateral economic agreements of the GCC have been suspended, and redistribution- which is highly important for the region- was not effectively done because of the sanctions. So, Sheikh Sabah's statement of the crisis wounded our economy should be interpreted in that way.

As a member of the GCC, Kuwait is one of the top countries that benefit from the economic cooperation of the Gulf. Diwan said:

There were dual boycotts against companies: If you do business with Qatar, then you cannot do business with us. There were, definitely, some demands

like that early in the blockade. I think the US pushed back against this very strongly. But these actions make it more difficult for foreign investors in the region as they effectively have to choose between two sides.

Since the oil and gas exports of the GCC countries depend on political stability, any disagreement in the GCC could cause fiscal problems in the council. This was considerable concern in the 2017 crisis.

2.3. Security

The third reason Kuwait made endless efforts to mediate the crisis from the beginning of the situation until the solution was the fear of growing aggression in the region. After the Islamic revolution of Iran, Arab countries of the Gulf had been furious about the situation. Even though Iraq, as a powerful Arab country, stood against the expansion of Iran, Saddam Hussain's vision to become an influential leader in the region and the anti-monarchical and populist ideology of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party of Saddam Hussain made Iraq also an unreliable source for the Sheikhs (Al-Kayssi, 1998). After the Iran-Iraq war, six Arab monarchies declared the establishment of the GCC. Iran-Iraq war kept both countries away from intervening in the GCC countries. However, after the end of the war, Saddam Hussein marched to Kuwait. The invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces was the first incident that shook one of the GCC countries after the establishment. The members of GCC called the western powers to expel the Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Providing military bases to the troops that carried out the operation and building diplomatic relations with other Arab countries against Iraqi aggression are some indirect benefits of the GCC to Kuwait during the invasion. Moreover, some of them have been a part of military intervention directly (Hellyer, 2001). After the rescue, the GCC was crucial for Kuwait. Participant A said:

One of the main interests of Kuwait was security; Kuwait does not want to see a weak GCC. Of course, they were genuine to help the brothers, but the security dimension of the Kuwaitis' approach was very important within the umbrella of the GCC. So, we can say the main aim of Kuwait in that mediation was to maintain the structure of this regional organization; if it collapses, I think Kuwait would be very much in trouble

However, at the same time, being invaded led Kuwait to follow a fairer foreign policy to avoid any repeat experiences. One way or another, most of the participants of the interviews conducted by the researcher mentioned Kuwait's fear of being 'the next target' of growing regional aggression. For example, Freer said:

I think Kuwait is very cautious that it can be and has been invaded. It does need to have strong partners in the region, and to be a mediator, being a neutral party, is a really good way to maintain relationships with neighbors. So, if anything happens in the future, it would be protected. I am always surprised that how the memories of invasion and occupation are fresh, and that makes Kuwait very hesitant to take a side or to lean too much to one side or another, so Kuwaiti mediation is the way to maintain its position.

Participant C said, "if the blockade had resulted with the Qataris stepping down, new targets would be Kuwait and Oman." Participant A said:

After the invasion [in 1990], all the calculation of Kuwaitis [were] based on the security of the region to not face similar things. And what happened in the crisis reminded them of their experiences, and they become the mediator to not being a side on such a dispute.

Progressive policies of Kuwait turned to more stable policies after the invasion. Any

security threat to the country or region reminded the government and citizens of the trauma of the invasion (Alterman, 2007). Because of that, the leaders and the people of Kuwait were uncomfortable with the crisis. Participant B said:

Kuwait and Qatar are similar vis-à-vis financial capacity, not to need anyone else. However, they are in the same need or weakness vis-à-vis the Saudis, who are the backbone of the GCC. So, for Kuwaitis, protection of the Qataris is the protection of any unequal relations of the GCC.

Considering some of the thirteen demands, which blockading countries asked from Qatar, it can be said the crisis also threatened Kuwait because some of the demands were related to Kuwaiti policies also (Barakat, 2018). Besides this, the Yemen operation of Saudi Arabia, intervention in Bahraini uprisings, and supporting autocratic leaders could be seen to be in the interests of the leaders of the blockading countries (Darwich, 2018). Thus, the people and administration of Kuwait had noticed that a resolution to the crisis was crucial for their national security.

2.4. Domestic sphere of Kuwait

The fourth reason that Kuwait agreed to be a mediator was to keep the domestic atmosphere of the country safe. Kuwait was the first Arab monarchy that adopted a written constitution. Besides this, the political activity in the country is unique compared to the other GCC countries. Political parties, the National assembly, and the political maturity of Kuwait all date back to Sheikh Abdullah al Salim al Sabah (Herb, 2016). Even though it has fluctuated between the decades after the invasion, the relation between state and society is more stable than the other Gulf monarchies. Participant A claimed that the Kuwaiti community supported Qatar in the crisis, and this support reflected the pressure on the government to play an active role in the solution. Also, Kuwait has a considerable Shia population, which makes the state

concerned about any sect-based conflict. In 2015 a terrorist attack targeted a Shia Mosque in Kuwait. Sheikh Sabah, right after the bombing of the Shia Imam al-Sadeq mosque, visited the place and spoke with the injured and stated that this security attack did not target only the Shia population but the whole population, as well as Kuwait's tolerance (Hafidh & Fibiger, 2019). The sectarian attitude of blockading countries and their disturbance to the Kuwaiti political sphere led Kuwait to play a role in preventing the dominance of either side. Baabood said:

The foreign policy itself is the mirror of the domestic policies of the states. Kuwait has different societal groups. Shia, for example, although they are not very large, they are not very small either, or they seem pretty close to the ruling elites. And they got the merchants, they have the Bedouins, and they have the Palestinians...So, any conflict inside the region between countries it can have the implication on Kuwait's domestic policies. Trying to maintain domestic peace is very important, and that has a reflection on the foreign policies of the country.

Kuwait's security concern was one of the reasons that the state mediated the crisis. Any aggression and instability in the Gulf would have been the greatest threat to Kuwaitis since the Iraqi invasion. The tolerant political sphere and demography of the country were other motivations behind the mediation. The fiscal situation of the country and the region made the crisis intolerable. Moreover, Kuwait's foreign policy pushed the country to be an intermediary power in the Gulf.

3. How did Kuwait mediate the crisis?

The role of Kuwait between Qatar, on one side, and UAE, KSA, and Bahrain, on the other, has been solidified since the Riyadh meetings in 2013 and 2014. The first move of Kuwait then was to use the soft power of the country, with Sheikh Sabah as a

respected leader in the Gulf to ease the tension. The agreement in the first Riyadh meetings was a signed paper between the leaders. The language used also denotes the sincerity of the leaders (see the appx. B). However, the 2014 Riyadh supplementary agreement was more comprehensive. In that meeting, the Kuwaiti leader facilitated the discussion to find a solution for the sides. This 2014 Riyadh supplementary agreement was an achievement for Kuwaiti mediation since the ambassador crisis between the sides was solved. However, the sides continued to follow different paths about the political incidents of the MENA. Their approach to Muslim Brotherhood, handling the political incidents in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, and partnerships between regional powers diverged and were watched closely by all sides. Moreover, the disputes grew, and the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain with Egypt declared an embargo on Qatar on the 5th of June 2017. This part of the research focuses on Kuwaiti mediation in the 2017 Gulf diplomatic crisis from the beginning to the solution. Participant B said:

The mindset of the Kuwaitis, even in the most challenging times of the crisis, was to keep the train going. There was an excellent aspect of the Kuwaitis on the mediation dividing the process into stages. Because everyone was expecting Kuwait to interfere, set conditions, and the sides would not accept it, that is it. But the Kuwaitis made it step by step.

Thus, the study divides the process of mediation into four parts, which are chronologically divided by year. The first is from 5th June 2017 to 5th June 2018, the second 5th June 2018 to 5th June 2019, the third is from 5th June 2019 to 5th June 2020, and the last part is from 5th June 2020 to Al-Ula declaration, which was the end of the diplomatic crisis.

3.1. The first year

Hours after the blockade was announced by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt, a senior Saudi official -advisor of the King of Saudi Arabia- visited the Emir of Kuwait to inform him about the situation (KUNA, 2017b). The first reaction of Kuwait to the crisis was to prevent initial statements by the sides that could deepen the crisis. Koch said:

The Kuwaiti mediation was absolutely critical in preventing the crisis from escalating further. If there was no immediate Kuwaiti involvement and attempt to calm down tensions, this crisis could have been much worse at the end of the day.

The Kuwaiti Emir called the Qatari Emir to postpone his expected speech about the blockade. On the second day, Sheikh Sabah visited Saudi Arabia and the UAE the day after. Doha was the third stop of the Emir two days after the embargo. This could be seen as preventing irreversible actions on either side. During the visit of the (then) US secretary of state Rex Tillerson, officials said to reporters that Kuwaiti and Qatari foreign ministers were working on a strategy to find a solution. Still, the blockade was not likely to be lifted soon (Al Jazeera, 2017c). Even though they were sought by the Kuwaiti officials for the solution, the demands were not declared to Qatar for lifting the blockade. Two weeks after the siege, the famous 13 demands were sent to Qatar via a message from Kuwait. Even though blockading countries claimed that requests had been prepared in Jeddah with the participation of a Kuwaiti envoy, Sheikh Sabah stated that the demands were not realistic to be accepted after the rejection of Qataris (Al Arabiya, 2017). As was expected, the Qatari side rejected the demands, yet a Gulf official claimed that the Kuwaiti side asked not to disclose the details publicly from the Qataris (Bakir, 2017). Qatar's foreign minister delivered the letter, rejecting the

demands, to his Kuwaiti counterpart in Kuwait. During that meeting, they discussed those demands. An Al Jazeera reporter, after the meeting, claimed that there was a suggestion of the participation of Kuwaiti FM in the discussion of Egypt, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and UAE in Cairo, which was about the rejection from Qatar (Al Jazeera, 2017b). In the following days, the Emir of Kuwait claimed that they had discouraged any expected military operations, though the blockading sides did not admit this. The statement itself was an essential move for the mediator. Kuwait had solidified its place as a mediator and prevented any possible military operation after the statement. Bakir said:

I am not sure that Kuwait was the one who prevented the military option. However, after the statement of Sheikh Sabah, there was no possibility to plan or implement any possible second attempt of military intervention from the blockading side. Sheikh Sabah completely blocked that way with the statement.

Besides, mentioning that in a joint conference with the US president broadly hinted that they had the support of the US in mediating (Oliphant, 2017). Participant A said that “Sheikh Sabah underscored how serious the crisis was to make President Trump take notice of the issue.” The phone call between the Emir of Qatar and Crown prince of Saudi Arabia days after that joint conference could be seen as the result of Kuwait’s efforts (Arab News, 2017). Yet, the phone call did not have any demonstrative effect on the crisis. The diplomatic tour of the Emir of Qatar during the crisis and the statement made in the meetings were positive for Kuwaiti mediation. Tamim al Thani said in a joint conference with the president of France, “We still support Sheikh Sabah Al Ahmed’s mediation attempt, and we will continue to do so until we find a solution that satisfies all parties” (The National, 2017). Three months

after the blockade, the Arab League summit in Cairo was the scene of reciprocal accusation between the Saudi-led bloc and Qatari officials (Hashem & Awadalla, 2017). Kuwaiti Emir Sheikh Sabah, in a statement, said the crisis could be the reason for a collapsing GCC, and he added, “History and the future generations of Arabs will not forget those who contributed to the escalation of the conflict and caused the destruction of the Gulf” (Al Jazeera, 2017e). In the 46th opening of the Shura council of Qatar, the Emir of Qatar praised the call of Sheikh Sabah for lifting the boycott (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Qatar, 2017). Expressions that underscored the seriousness of the situation were seen in some statements of Kuwaiti officials. For instance, Deputy Foreign minister Khaled Jarallah, after a meeting with the Qatari Foreign minister, stated that a more prolonged crisis would open permanent wounds economically, politically, and in the region's security (Al Jazeera, 2018a).

After the first months of the blockade, the Kuwaiti side regularly visited Qatar and the blockading countries, and sometimes envoys carried letters; sometimes, Emir or high officials met in person. Through this "shuttle diplomacy" of Kuwait between the sides, the first year of the blockade was the year of indirect meetings via Kuwait. The 38th GCC summit was a critical incident for the crisis held in Kuwait City. Even though Sheikh Sabah's expectation was the participation of the leaders, Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al Thani was the only leader who joined the meetings except the Sheikh. Thus, the sessions lasted two hours instead of the expected two days. On the same day of the meetings, the UAE and Saudi Arabia leaders had a gathering in Abu Dhabi for new security cooperation (Kerr, 2017). Participant B said, “that reaction of the quartet has shown their unwillingness to the solution and hurt Kuwaitis and Sheikh Sabah.” The experts dubbed the 38th GCC summit as the worst in GCC history (Cafiero & Al-Jaber, 2017). Kuwaiti Emir Sheikh Sabah stated that

the GCC structure could change in the future after that meeting (Al Jazeera, 2017f). However, despite these statements of Sheikh Sabah, Saudi and Emirati news agencies underlined the speech of the GCC secretary-general, which contained goodwill for the Gulf's unity, to illustrate the summit was performed successfully (Ismail, 2017; SPA, 2017).

Kuwait's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense were invited to Saudi Arabia in late December, and one month after that visit, the same invitation was extended by Qatar's Emir. The day after the meeting of Sheikh Tamim and the Kuwaiti Minister of Defense, Qatar's permanent representative of the UN reiterated Qatar's commitment to Kuwaiti mediation at the UN security council open debate. However, the blockading side had insisted on the demands that they made of Qatar. The spokesperson of the foreign ministry of Qatar in the UN human rights council stated that the blockading sides had not presented any evidence to Kuwait about Qatar's supposed support of extremism and terrorism and appreciated the Kuwaiti mediation (Al-Khater, 2018). She also urged blockading sides to respond to Kuwaiti mediation for the dialogue in the same speech. The day after that speech, the Kuwaiti Emir sent an envoy on a Gulf tour. This envoy delivered letters to Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and Qatar as well (KUNA, 2018a, 2018b; Kuwait Times, 2018). Even though the shuttle diplomacy of Kuwait had continued, any further development had not been seen in the first year of the siege.

3.2. 2018-2019

The first anniversary of the blockade has been examined by various experts and officials. The majority of them considered that a more extended crisis would open deeper wounds in the GCC body and that mediation efforts were futile. In the first months of the second year of the crisis, Kuwaiti officials' visits, and phone calls

attracted attention. Significantly, the periodic visits of Marzouq al Ghanim, Speaker of the Kuwait National Assembly, to Saudi Arabia seems important for the solution (KUNA, 2018c). Zafer Alajmi said:

Those visits were highly encouraged by the Emir himself. Marzouq al Ghanim and other officials who have relations with both parts of the dispute have been mobilized by the Emir. Sheikh Sabah has supported and welcomed everyone in Kuwaiti politics to take a role in the solution using their personal links and skills.

However, another dimension of the crisis, the debate of sides using international public law, darkened the first months of the second year. Even though Qatari officials praised the Emir of Kuwait's efforts and frequently declared their commitment to the mediation efforts, international public law cases, which were seen as a matter of survival, were handled carefully (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Qatar, 2018). Sheikh Sabah's visit to the US in September 2018 could be seen as a call for US support from Kuwaitis to solve the crisis (Al Wasmi, 2018). The meetings that were set for the Foreign Ministers of GCC countries in New York were a result of this call. However, the press conference of the Qatari FM after the meetings also revealed no further progress (Al Jazeera, 2018b). The speech from the minister was business as usual. The Kuwaiti Emir invited the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia to visit after those meetings. Mohammad bin Salman and other officials claimed that during this visit, the GCC crisis would be the primary subject and could be a milestone (The National, 2018). Even though the content of the meetings held in that visit has not been disclosed, the visits' results were far from a solution. Even though King Salman invited the Emir of Qatar, as well as other leaders of the GCC, to the 39th GCC summit, which was arranged in Riyadh, Sheikh Tamim did not attend the meetings.

Some experts considered that the invitation was merely a formality, which the Qatari declined (Najjar, 2018). However, blockading sides interpreted that as Qatari unwillingness to the resolution. The Qatari FM and officials explained that it was not about refusing the solution but about the lack of effect of summits for the blockade (Al Jazeera, 2018c; Wintour, 2018). The blockade had not been a subject of the summits except for the Kuwaiti Emir's speech about unity in the Gulf. Freer said:

Support of Qataris on social media after Sheikh Sabah touched the Qatari flag on that summit as a sign of respect and even a sign of love for Qatar, where the Emir of Qatar was absent, was incredible. This move of Sheikh Sabah could be interpreted as making the Qataris not feel that they are isolated.

Sheikh Sabah mentioned that the crisis was affecting the states and the Gulf people and decreased the respect of the GCC in the international arena in his speech (Gambrell & Harb, 2018). In a speech to the UN, the Qatari Foreign Minister mentioned that his state is ready for the negotiations if the blockading side respected the sovereignty of Qatar and repeated their commitment to the Kuwaiti mediation (M. bin A. Al-Thani, 2019). The following months passed by with more shuttle diplomacy of Kuwaitis between the sides. Marzouq al Ghanim's visits to Saudi Arabia and Qatar are also seen in these months. The most significant incident in the second year of the blockade is an urgent call from the Saudi King to the GCC members for a summit. Qatar attended those meetings, sending their Prime Minister. This was the highest-level representation of Qatar since the blockade started and was interpreted as an essential step towards a solution. Significantly, the Kuwaiti Emir encouraged the Prime Minister and Saudi King to shake hands. The handshake was also considered important as a sign of respect from both sides (Al Jazeera, 2019a). Zafer Alajmi emphasized that action done by Sheikh Sabah was a traditional way of diplomacy for

the Gulf; he used the term “hubbul khushum,” which means kissing the noses, to refer to a Khaleeji tradition resolving crises between “the brothers” and “among the family.”

3.3. 2019-2020

The third year of the blockade could be considered the most exciting year of the crisis and the mediation. Beginning that June, the crisis was in a stalemate situation despite all of the efforts done in the last two years. And this long-term stalemate started to raise the argument that the problem would not be ended in the Gulf being divided. In this situation, Qatar called Saudi Arabia to end the crisis (QNA, 2019a). In one of her speeches, the spokesperson of the Foreign Ministry of Qatar claimed that Qatar and the blockading states were not so different in their visions of the future. However, the blockade was irrational, and Kuwait’s Emir was still trying to find a solution for the dispute. At the same time, she accused one of the blockading countries of sabotaging the progress. (Al-Khater, 2019b). Sheikh Sabah stated Gulf crisis is no more acceptable and tolerable in late November to change that stalemate (Al Jazeera, 2019b).

A few incidents happened in the third year, which raised the possibility of a solution. The first was the Gulf Cup, a football tournament that has been organized since the 60s between the Arab Gulf states, which included the members of GCC plus Iraq. The 2019 cup was hosted by Qatar. Even though the initial decision of the blockading states was not to attend the tournament, the Qatari committee invited all the states. The final decision of the Saudi-led side was to participate in the cup. The tournament was not just a sports event; it was highly politicized. The games attracted attention from all Gulf nations and the leaders. The political experts and officials separately watched nearly every game. The respect of Qatari nationals to the other Gulf nations

was clearly observed during the tournament. After the tournament, the Emir of Kuwait kindly expressed his pleasure to the Qataris for their hospitality. Participant C said, “the Cup was not just a tournament; it was something that Gulf people missed, the feeling of unity and brotherhood.” The Cup was seen as an important step toward the solution and a good move of Kuwaiti mediation (Fraihat, 2019; Kerr et al., 2019). Even though the exact date is unknown, the Foreign Minister of Qatar visited Saudi Arabia and met with senior Saudi officials, including the Crown Prince, and stated that they were in contact with the blockading countries, especially with Saudis, thanks to the efforts of Kuwait. (Al Jazeera, 2019c, 2019d). Those moves created hope for the next GCC summit. The Qatari Emir was invited again by the King of Saudi Arabia. However, they decided instead to participate in the summits at the Prime Minister level, such as the urgent summit in Mecca on the 31st of May 2019. The Emir of Kuwait and the PM of Qatar had met before the summit to discuss the developments (QNA, 2019b). However, unlike the prediction of a solution, the crisis remained unsolved. One week after the summits Egyptian president stated that nothing had changed and doubled down on their stance against Qatar like it was the first day of blockade (Al Jazeera, 2019e). The bilateral cooperation of Kuwait with Qatar and Saudi Arabia in the field of Energy had seemed an important topic at this stage (QNA, 2020; SPA, 2020). Participant C said, “the economic activities that Kuwait followed were also important for the mediation. Kuwait had continued with both sides to keep them indirectly integrated.” The official visit over the blockade between Qatar and Kuwait seemed part of that plan also. Additionally, official letters were delivered by high-level officials at these moments. The Qatari UN ambassador called the blockading side to an unconditional dialogue under the mediation of Kuwait (A. A. bin S. Al-Thani, 2020). However, the Foreign Minister of Qatar stated that the

negotiations had been suspended (Al Jazeera, 2020a). Zafer Alajmi put a critical note about the negotiation and the mediation process in the interview. He said:

Kuwaitis knew that Saudi Arabia is the flagship, so they mostly contacted the Saudis. These negotiations generally were between Saudi Arabia and Qatar via the Kuwaiti channel. Kuwait tried to initiate direct talks between Saudis and Qataris. At the same time, that can be said Kuwaitis tried to make Saudis convince the other members of the boycott for negotiations because they knew that if the Saudis say, “it is over,” it is over.

The third development of the third year of the blockade was the start of the Covid-19 pandemic. The disease changed the dynamics of the Gulf countries just as it did in other parts of the world. Even though the disease restricted travel and foreign relations in countries, Kuwaiti mediation continued in person at that stage—verbal and written messages delivered and received as usual. The economic difficulties because of Covid-19 and volatility of the oil prices created financial strains for the Gulf countries, especially for Saudi Arabia. In May 2020, the rumors that Qatar would leave the GCC spread. Qatar's foreign ministry spokesperson denied this to the newspapers (Al Jazeera, 2020b). At the beginning of June, the FM of Qatar stated there were new initiatives, unlike the previous ones, and there would be progress (Al Jazeera, 2020c).

3.4. 2020 the resolution

The fourth anniversary of the blockade started with rumors that Qatar was planning to withdraw from the GCC. The spokesperson of Qatar's Ministry of Foreign Affairs clarified the rumors are baseless and mentioned that the Kuwaiti efforts to solve the crisis had never ended from the beginning of the blockade. In addition, she mentioned the visit of the Foreign Minister of Kuwait to Qatar for starting a new initiative after

dialogue between embargoing countries and Qatar. She also declared that Qatar was open to all initiatives for the solution and remained committed to Kuwaiti mediation (Al-Khater, 2020). The shuttle diplomacy between Kuwait and the disputants accelerated in the following months. At the same time, the health condition of Sheikh Sabah increased communication between the Kuwaiti Emir, the Qatari Emir, and the King of Saudi Arabia. Even though the contents of those phone calls were announced as the assurance of the health of Sheikh Sabah, the message that they gave for the hope and stability of the Gulf nations could be interpreted that further meetings would also include the Sheikh's mediation efforts.

However, during most of the year, the Kuwaiti Crown Prince Sheikh Nawaf led the mediation because of Sheikh Sabah's health. The Kuwaiti Emir died on the 29th of September; the death of Sheikh Sabah had a significant impact on Gulf nations (KUNA, 2020b, 2020a). Not only politicians but also the people of the Gulf expressed their sadness for the loss. After this time, the opposition between the sides was labeled as disrespectful of the efforts of the late Emir. Public support for the resolution was raised because of this situation as well. Participant A said, "at that stage, the death of Sheikh Sabah accelerated the efforts of Kuwaitis. Because they wanted to solve the crisis as to show their respect to the legacy of Sheikh Sabah." The contact between Qataris and Kuwaitis in the following months also drew attention. Joint meetings of senior officials, high-level visits, and contracts are examples of cooperation in that period. After a joint meeting of the Kuwaiti and Qatari cabinets, FM of Qatar stated that Qatar was open to a dialogue with the words, "The only consequence of this crisis is more instability in our region. If we are keen on our future and the future of our people, I think we need to find a just solution to this crisis" (M. bin A. Al-Thani, 2020). After this constructive statement, he expressed appreciation for the efforts of

the late Emir and his successor Sheikh Nawaf. Then, at the same speech, he appreciated the efforts made by the US administration. The Foreign Minister of Qatar stated that Kuwait was trying to start a new initiative for dialogue between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, and it seemed very different from the previous attempt. By the beginning of December 2020 (nearly one month before the solution), the Qatari FM, after a meeting with his Kuwaiti counterparts, stated that those last efforts of Kuwait could be the final step before the solution (KUNA, 2020c). The following days, Kuwaitis visited Egypt. The statements during December were highly constructive. Saudi King asked the secretary-general of GCC to invite the leaders of the GCC countries, including Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim, to the 41st GCC summit in Al-Ula, Saudi Arabia. The Qataris welcomed this invitation, unlike previous invitations, which were seen as a matter of formality. On the 4th of January, the Kuwaiti foreign minister announced that Saudi Arabia was opening its border with Qatar on Kuwait National TV (Al Arabiya English, 2021). Participant C emphasized the involvement of Kuwait in the writing process of the Al-Ula declaration. Zafer Alajmi said:

Kuwait's role on Al-Ula was so critical. Because Kuwait was filtering the misunderstandings, each side sent some drafts to Kuwait, and Kuwait combined those with softening the language. In fact, I understood from what my sources told me the government hired a research center for doing that properly in legal and political dimensions. In my opinion, this shows how much the Kuwaiti government cared about the solution.

The disputants agreed on the famous Al-Ula declaration in the 41st summit of GCC, which was named “Sheikh Sabah and Sultan Qaboos.”

CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS OF KUWAITI MEDIATION WITH THE THEORETICAL DIMENSIONS

As mentioned in the earlier chapters, Bercovitch addresses the main features of mediation as the mediator, the disputants, the process of mediation, and the context of the mediation. The disputants in this research study were Qatar on one side and Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates on the other; the mediator was Kuwait. The examined process was the 2017-21 Gulf crisis. Context is crucial for mediation, yet the limited available information about the context of the Kuwaiti mediation in the Gulf crisis led the researcher to cover only three of the features of mediation in the research. In this case, the last chapter examined the three main mediation components from the data obtained without a theoretical interpretation. The timeline and the pieces of information from the participants were conveyed in the previous chapter. The examination of the case in a theoretical aspect will be in this chapter. In this regard, this chapter will cover the features of the disputants, the mediator, and the process of mediation. The small state theory will be used for the disputants and the mediator. For the mediation process, the research will examine the case with three different types of mediation: facilitation, formulation, manipulation.

1. Examination of the disputants

The case contains five disputants, four from the Gulf and one from North Africa; all participants are Arab countries. The Gulf countries are the member of the GCC. The theory used for examining the disputants' decision to nominate Kuwait as the mediator is the small state theory and foreign relations of the small states.

1.1. Qatar

Qatar was one of the sides of the conflict against the other four countries. Examining

chapter three reveals that Qatar accepted Kuwait as the mediator because of the personality of Sheikh Sabah, the impartiality of Kuwait, and the multiplicity of thought. As seen in the previous chapter, the Qatari Emir and high-level officials often stated their commitment to the mediation of the Sheikh Sabah. For example, not making a statement at the beginning of the crisis demonstrates the respect of the Emir of Qatar for the Emir of Kuwait. Attending the 38th GCC summit with the invitation of the Kuwaiti Emir also indicates how the personality of Sheikh Sabah was important to the Qatari Emir. Hence, the personality of Sheikh Sabah could be interpreted as a soft power of Kuwait towards Qatar. The second reason is seen as the impartiality of Kuwait. That could be construed as one of the results of Qatari foreign policies. Qatar has declined to be a bandwagon of Saudi Arabia; the reason for the blockade simply could be explained like that. Because of this, they needed a third party that followed impartial policies, not only for the case in general. The third reason that counted in the previous chapter is the multiplicity of thought. One of the demands that the Saudi-led bloc asked from Qatar was shutting down some of the Qatar-based media corporations, including Al Jazeera. The media power of Qatar, Al Jazeera, made the country one of the most significant soft powers in the Gulf or even MENA. Therefore, the soft power strategy of Qatar was also an essential element of the country and the crisis. Qatar supported mediation from Kuwait to keep its soft power safe.

1.2. Blockading side

The blockading side of the crisis consisted of three GCC member states: Bahrain, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, plus Egypt. Each of the countries had effects on the blockade. However, this research focuses on the mediation process of the crisis. The reasons why the Saudi-led bloc accepted Kuwaiti mediation are varied: keeping disputes inside the Gulf, keeping Kuwait impartial, the lack of Kuwait's hard power,

and international pressure. The bloc aimed to keep the crisis inside the Gulf, although Egypt was not a member of the GCC. It was formed as an organization of six countries, five small states, plus Saudi Arabia. Being the only non-small state made Saudi Arabia the dominant figure of the corporation. Thus, a dispute inside the Gulf was seen as easily manageable for the Saudi-led bloc. Even though the other states were small states, keeping them separated, if not under its hegemony, was also crucial for the dominant power. The third reason was Kuwait's lack of hard power. The blockading countries were satisfied to have the crisis mediated by a party that could not force them to make any concessions. Yet, the international society fully supported the Kuwaiti mediation. Kuwait's acceptance as a mediator was the result of Kuwait's soft power strategy, which will be expanded below. Overall, Kuwait as a small state was a perfect candidate for the mediation from the blockading side's perspective.

2. Examination of the mediator

The previous sections of this chapter have examined the reasons for the nomination of Kuwait as the mediator from the perspective of the disputants. Aside from that, Kuwait had other reasons for being the mediator. The reasons for Kuwait will be examined in the theoretical background of the small states. The reasons described in the previous chapter were the foreign policy of Kuwait, the economic concern of the state, security, and the domestic political sphere of the country.

2.1. The foreign policy of the state

Kuwait has been impartial inside the Gulf and even in the Middle East since the Iraqi invasion in 1990. This impartiality in the region is based on the partnership of the country with external forces. However, being a member of the GCC gives the government a feasible area of focus for constructing foreign policy. Kuwait follows the balance of power strategy inside the Gulf as a small state. Although the crisis has

been interpreted as the beginning of the end of the corporation, the balance of power-based methods and impartiality of Kuwait, as well as with Oman, creates a realm for an effective GCC. The high importance of the GCC summit was apparent in the research. It can be said the foreign policy of Kuwait is based on the balance of power policies inside the Gulf, and the GCC as an establishment is a power that has solidified the country's soft power. In addition to this, being an internationally recognized mediator makes Kuwait a hallmark in regional issues.

2.2. Economic concerns of Kuwait

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Kuwaiti economy is based on natural resources like the other member states of the GCC. The fluctuations in prices lead the countries to take a variety of measures. Reforms, new strategies, and economic corporations are some examples of that. The GCC provides Kuwait the opportunity to pass the transition term in their economy. However, low oil prices, political instability, and the Covid-19 restrictions have had negative impacts on that strategy. Considering the economic power of Kuwait, like the other GCC countries, has been a soft power since the discovery of oil, keeping that power stable is also critical for the state to maintain its future aims domestically and internationally.

2.3. Security

The previous chapters presented the most traumatic incident in Kuwait's history as the invasion of the state by the Iraqi forces. Even though the state made international partnerships to overcome their fragility, instability in the region also threatens Kuwait. The growing aggression in the region has been seen as a threat from some regional powers to jump on the bandwagon. Kuwait's fair balance of power strategy has stood strong against growing aggression. Also, the state offered to solve the crisis for de-escalation and intra-GCC instability. Thus, the security concerns of Kuwait

lead the country to follow more tolerant foreign policies based on the balance of power strategies. As a small country, Kuwait does not want to be on the bandwagon of any regional actors. Mediation of Kuwait in the crisis gave the state the ability to reduce the risk of security threats.

2.4. The domestic sphere of the country

Kuwait's domestic sphere has been examined in two dimensions in the previous chapter. The first dimension is the political development of the country. The second is tolerance to the sectarian identity of the nationals. The country's political development indicates that Kuwait has built a more accountable system than the other Gulf states. The establishment of an effective parliament, recognition of a written constitution, and tolerance to political diversity could be seen as one of the sources of Kuwait's soft power. Although their level of influence is not pervasive, it can be said Kuwait is unique in the GCC. The tolerance to sectarian differences affects the country's decision to be a mediator. The growing anti-Shia campaign in the Gulf pushed Kuwait to alleviate the dispute for the sustainability of the policies. Thus, being a mediator provides a soft power to the country to keep its domestic sphere free from regional conflicts.

3. Examination of the mediation process

The 43 month-long efforts of Kuwait resulted in an agreement between the sides. From the first moment of the disputes until the declaration of the final deal, Kuwait was the face of negotiations. In that process, Kuwaiti mediation exhibited several theoretical dimensions. Sometimes the mediation is seen as more participating, sometimes as passive. The directive role of Kuwait is seen in some cases, but the disputants ignoring Kuwait can also be observed at times in the process. Furthermore, this part of the study examines the process of mediation in the Gulf crisis in the

facilitation, formulation, and manipulation approaches.

3.1. Facilitator role of Kuwait

As seen in the theoretical framework chapter, the facilitator plays a passive role in the mediation process. Being a channel between the sides to supply indirect communication and being a host in the talks are the primary missions of the facilitator. Kuwait delivered messages to and between the sides constantly. The shuttle diplomacy that Kuwait followed was not interrupted despite the long duration of the crisis and its restrictions. Kuwait tried to solve the problems from the beginning by agreeing to be the host of the 38th summit of the GCC, which was held months after the crisis. The process showed that Kuwait had not precisely followed a passive way to create communication between the sides. However, delivering letters, supplying information from the sides, and official senior-level visits are some facilitative features of the Kuwaiti mediation.

3.2. Formulator role of Kuwait

Even though the roles of facilitator and formulator overlap in some aspects, the theory clarifies that the formulator plays a more active role in the crisis. The formulator acts as a channel for communication like a facilitator, but they participate in crafting the solution or even offer their ideas for the solution. Kuwait's first example of being a formulator was asking sides not to make sudden statements from the beginning of the dispute. Kuwait began to work on a Zone of Agreement to satisfy parts of the conflict from the very beginning. Giving the mediation mission to some high-level officials showed how much Kuwait utilized the role of the formulator. The demands were sent to the Qataris by Kuwaiti officials two weeks after the dispute; this was a clear example of Kuwaiti's direct involvement in the process. Kuwaiti officials also concurred that not all of the demands were acceptable; this was also a sign of Kuwaiti

active participation in dispute resolution. The shared values were mentioned by the Kuwaiti officials in the process of mediation. Arab identity, Khaleeji identity, brotherhood, and the importance of the Gulf "house" are values that the disputants share; Sheikh Sabah and other officials focused on those common features to start the negotiations. During the stalemate situation, Kuwait had pushed the disputants to reframe the situation. For example, the Gulf tour of Kuwaiti officials in March 2018 was a move for changing the stalemate situation. The speech of Sheikh Sabah during the opening session of the Kuwaiti parliament in 2019 was also a move to change the stalemate situation. The Sheikh called the disputants to move from the stalemate and added that the crisis which weakened the GCC was no longer acceptable or tolerable. The Sheikh used shared values to overcome the stalemate situation in that speech. Further, the process revealed that Kuwait had primarily been in contact with Saudi Arabia. Even though there was communication with other disputants, the Kuwaitis saw Saudi Arabia as the main interlocutor from the blockading side to make the crisis manageable, as the others were expected to follow suit. The bilateral meetings between the Emir of Kuwait and Qatar before the GCC summits, with Qatar represented by their PM, is another example of Kuwait acting as the formulator. Being a channel to save face for the disputants was also an essential step from Kuwait to handle the crisis.

3.3. Manipulator role of Kuwait

Manipulator refers to the directive third-party participation in crisis. The manipulator's power gives the ability to control the situation and even allow interference in the conflict. The lack of such power from the Kuwaiti sides was one of the reasons that the blockading side accepted Kuwait as the mediator. However, Kuwait has played a manipulative role in some issues with the support of external

forces. For example, the statement of Sheikh Sabah about preventing the military option was one of the examples of the manipulative role of Kuwait. Kuwait, with the support of the US, stopped the exercise of hard power from the blockading side. Also, one can see the personality of Sheikh Sabah is also a manipulative power for the disputants. The Sheikh encouraged the PM of Qatar and King of Saudi Arabia to shake hands in the GCC urgent summit in Mecca, another example of the role. But the actions of Kuwait generally steered away from manipulation.

In conclusion, this chapter has covered the application of the theory to Kuwait's mediation in the Gulf crisis. The nomination of Kuwait as the mediator and the logic behind the Kuwaitis acceptance to be a mediator are examined with the theory of the small state. Furthermore, the mediation process is discussed by the mediation types: facilitation, formulation, and manipulation. Qatar accepted the mediation offered by Kuwait because of the policies of the state and features of Kuwait. The foreign relations policy of the small state explains why Qatar accepted: in order to keep its soft power safe from demands of the blockading side. The request to shut down Al-Jazeera prompted Qatar to look for a mediator that valued freedom of speech more than other members of the GCC. The impartiality of Kuwait also kept the balance of power inside the Gulf in Qataris' aspect. Notably, the personality of Sheikh Sabah as a soft power of Kuwait led Qatar to support Kuwaiti mediation. From the other side of the dispute, the acceptance was motivated by the smallness of Kuwait. The Saudi-led bloc had expected to keep the crisis inside the Gulf and keep other GCC members separated from Qatar instead of becoming partners against them. Even though these states are small, keeping such small countries divided was more favorable for the blockading side, especially for the Saudis. Additionally, Kuwait's lack of hard power led the blockading side to accept the Kuwaiti mediation, as they were sure not to be

manipulated. From the Kuwaitis' aspect, the mediation was a mission to maintain its balance of power strategy as a small state since economic power was a tool of their soft power strategy, and the conflict had adverse effects on the economy of the Gulf. The invasion of the country from a bigger state also led the government to make efforts to decrease aggression in the region. Finally, Kuwait became the mediator and used soft power to secure its inner sphere.

The mediation process indicates that Kuwait's type of mediation was mostly formulation type. Preventing military options and the directive role of Sheikh Sabah could be seen as manipulating the disputants. However, the lack of Kuwait's hard power inhibits the state from playing the role of the manipulator. Delivering messages and being a host of some meetings could be seen as the facilitative features of Kuwaiti mediation. Yet, the absence of one side of the dispute during the sessions, which Kuwait hosted, indicates the insignificance of the meetings for dispute resolution. In addition, delivering the messages was a mission whose features and purpose overlap between facilitation and formulation types of mediation. Asking sides to avoid any irreversible moves at the beginning of the crisis was the first formulative request of Kuwait from the disputants, and another example was how they worked to establish a Zone of Agreement. Attendance of the Kuwaitis in the meetings of both sides and offering them some advice also denotes the formulation role of Kuwait. Insisting on one primary interlocutor from the blockading side and interfering in the crisis during the stalemate situation are features of the formulator. Avoiding direct talks between the parties, for saving face, was also essential for the Kuwaiti mediation. And the announcement of the Saudi decision of lifting air restrictions to Qatar on Kuwait national TV by the FM of Kuwait apparently shows Kuwait played the role of formulator in the crisis.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

The research aims to put Kuwait into the literature for their mediation efforts in the Gulf crisis. The literature highlights the importance of mediation in the dispute resolution processes. Further, the mediation efforts of the state are seen in the literature of Kuwait's history. The works about the Kuwaiti mediation of the Gulf crisis have also helped the researcher accurately create the parameters. Kuwait has been selected for the thesis because of its success and endless efforts to solve the crisis. The questions that the researcher aimed to answer in the thesis were why Kuwait was accepted as the mediator by the disputants, why Kuwait admitted to being the mediator, and how Kuwait mediated the crisis. The methodology followed for this study was a mixed methodology. The first pillar was interviewing subject matter experts. The researcher conducted interviews with the well-known experts of the Gulf politics and security to get their assessments and interpretations. The second pillar of the methodology was the Search Engine Optimization (SEO) method. The researcher adopted the methodology from marketing. Online databases use specific features to bring results to the users. The business and marketing sectors use this method to reach more clients. The main elements were well-designed keywords, specific websites, and specific periods. The researcher applied these main elements to the databases to achieve accurate information about the Gulf crisis and Kuwaiti mediation. The method allowed the researcher to construct and analyze the reasons behind the Kuwaiti mediation and the process.

The research indicates that Qatar accepted Kuwait as the mediator due to the personality of Sheikh Sabah, which was seen as a soft power of Kuwait. The impartiality of Kuwait and diversity of thought in Kuwait were other reasons for Qatari acceptance, which were considered to help the Qataris maintain their balancing

power and soft power strategies despite the other side of the conflict. From the perspective of the embargoing countries, Kuwait was a prominent contender for mediator due to its commitment to the Gulf and impartiality. These two features of the country were seen as necessary for navigating the conflict and the politics inside the Gulf by the Saudi-led bloc. The research also concludes that the blockading countries aimed to maintain the balance of power inside the Gulf, if not manage to leave Qatar alone. In addition, Kuwait's lack of hard power encouraged the blockading side to accept a mediator that could not force them to deal. Moreover, international support of Kuwait was perceived as one of the sources of Kuwait's soft power that made the blockading side accept the mediation of Kuwait. The Kuwaitis accepted and even wanted to be the mediator to keep the country from being a part of the disagreements, which could be seen as a balance of power strategy. The economic power of the state was threatened by regional instability. The government aimed to solve the crisis to maintain the primary source of Kuwait's soft power. The research claims that the trauma of being invaded has shaped the foreign policy of Kuwait since the Iraqi invasion. Consequently, the country's political sphere required decreasing any aggression in the region. Kuwait uses mediation as a soft power to maintain security and keep its domestic sphere untouched by external actors.

For the most part, the process that Kuwait followed was to be an active channel between the sides. The lack of hard power prevents the state from following the manipulator's way of mediation. Nevertheless, the external relation of the state and the personality of the leaders sometimes help to manipulate the disputants. The message deliveries, visits, and hosting of the disputants are elements of the facilitator method. However, the research reveals that delivering messages and visiting the sides are features that overlap with the features of the formulator and hosting the conflicting

sides had no positive impact on the dispute resolution process. On the other hand, preventing irreversible moves from both sides, starting initiatives, decreasing tension, trying to dissolve the stalemate situation, participating in the negotiations, helping the sides to agree on a deal, making statements about the process. Even the solution indicates Kuwait can all be considered as following the formulator type of mediation in the Gulf crisis.

Thus, this research claims that Kuwait followed a way of diplomacy for sustaining its policies. The policies are mostly related to or due to the size of the country. Kuwait wanted to make the Gulf free from insecurity for reasons of economy, domestic issues, and national security. Kuwait's economy and the domestic sphere have been seen as the state's soft power; the national security is sustained by diplomacy, which could be interpreted as Kuwait's balance of power strategy as a small state. Beyond this, the research denoted that Kuwait uses its mediation power and experiences as a soft power tool.

On the other hand, examining the process shows that Kuwait tries to formulate intra-Gulf politics. The personality of the officials, a massive legacy of diplomacy, and the neutral standing of the state allow them to maintain their position as a trusted mediator. However, regional dynamics, Kuwait's limitations, and the eagerness of the new generation of the Gulf states' leadership make the diplomatic power of Kuwait weaker. Thus, it can be said that Kuwait favors formulation, uses many facilitation features, and avoids most manipulation types of mediation.

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APPENDIX A: IRB APPROVAL



Qatar University Institutional Review Board **QU-IRB**

QU-IRB Registration: IRB-QU-2020-006, QU-IRB, Assurance: IRB-A-QU-2019-0009

DATE: September 7, 2021

TO: Huzeyfe ALTIOK
FROM: Qatar University Institutional Review Board (QU-IRB)

PROJECT TITLE: 1756358-1 Mediation in the Gulf
QU-IRB REFERENCE #: QU-IRB 1580-EA/21
SUBMISSION TYPE: New Project

ACTION: APPROVED
REVIEW TYPE: Expedited Review
DECISION DATE: September 7, 2021
REVIEW CATEGORY: Expedited review category # 6&7

Thank you for your submission of New Project materials for this project. The Qatar University Institutional Review Board (QU-IRB) has APPROVED your submission. This approval is based on an appropriate risk/benefit ratio and a project design wherein the risks have been minimized. All research must be conducted in accordance with this approved submission.

This submission has received Expedited Review according to Qatar Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) regulations. This project has been determined to be a MINIMAL RISK project.

Please remember that informed consent is a process beginning with a description of the project and insurance of participant understanding followed by a signed consent form. Informed consent must continue throughout the project via a dialogue between the researcher and research participant. Qatar MoPH regulations require that each participant receives a copy of the consent document.

Please note that Expedited Review approvals are valid for a period of one year and renewal should be sought prior to August 8, 2022 to ensure timely processing and continuity. Moreover, any changes/modifications to the original submitted protocol should be reported to the committee to seek approval prior to continuation.

All UNANTICIPATED PROBLEMS involving risks to subjects or others (UPIRSOs) and SERIOUS and UNEXPECTED adverse events must be reported promptly to this office. Please use the appropriate reporting forms for this procedure.

All NON-COMPLIANCE issues or COMPLAINTS regarding this project must be reported promptly to this office.

Please note that all research records must be retained for a minimum of three years after the completion of the project.

Documents Reviewed:

- Consent Form - Consent Form for Interview -201903669 last docx.docx (UPLOADED: 08/11/2021)
- Consent Form - Consent Form for Interview -201903669 docx.docx (UPLOADED: 08/10/2021)
- Consent Form - Consent Form for Interview -201903669 docx.docx (UPLOADED: 05/26/2021)
- Other - QU-IRB Check List filled.pdf (UPLOADED: 05/26/2021)
- Other - Secondary Sources.docx (UPLOADED: 05/26/2021)

- Proposal - Thesis Proposal Huzeyfe Altiook .doc (UPLOADED: 05/26/2021)
- Qatar University - IRB Application - Qatar University - IRB Application (UPLOADED: 08/26/2021)
- Questionnaire/Survey - Questions of the interviews-Huzeyfe Altiook.docx (UPLOADED: 05/26/2021)

If you have any questions, please contact QU-IRB at 4403 5307 or qu-irb@qu.edu.qa. Please include your project title and reference number in all correspondence with this committee.

Best wishes,



Dr. Ahmed Awaisu
Chairperson, QU-IRB



This letter has been issued in accordance with all applicable regulations, and a copy is retained within Qatar University's records.

Qatar University-Institutional Review Board (QU-IRB), P.O. Box 2713 Doha, Qatar
Tel +974 4403-5307 (GMT +3hrs) email: QU-IRB@qu.edu.qa

APPENDIX B: RIYAD SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENTS

Qatar made a series of secret agreements with its Gulf neighbors in 2013 and 2014, signed by the leaders of those countries. A third supplemental agreement was made in 2014. The agreements are translated by CNN below, followed by the original documents in Arabic, including the handwritten 2013 agreement.

1: The handwritten 2013 agreement

On Saturday, 19/1/1435 (Hijri Calendar, November 2013), The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Abdullah Bin Abdel Aziz Al-Saud, the King of Saudi Arabia, and his brother His Highness Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, the Prince of Kuwait, and his brother His Highness Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, the prince of Qatar, met in Riyadh.

They held extensive deliberations in which they conducted a full revision of what taints the relations between the [Gulf Cooperation] Council states, the challenges facing its security and stability, and means to abolish whatever muddies the relations.

Due to the importance of laying the foundation for a new phase of collective work between the Council's states, in order to guarantee its movement within a unified political framework based on the principles included in the main system of the Cooperation Council, the following has been agreed upon:

1. No interference in the internal affairs of the Council's states, whether directly or indirectly. Not to give asylum/refuge or give nationality to any citizen of the Council states that has an activity opposes his country's regimes, except with the approval of his country; no support to deviant groups that oppose their states; and no support for antagonistic media.
2. No support to the Muslim Brotherhood or any of the organizations, groups or individuals that threaten the security and stability of the Council states through direct security work or through political influence.
3. Not to present any support to any faction in Yemen that could pose a threat to countries neighboring Yemen.

2. The 2014 agreement

Top Secret

The Supplementary Riyadh Agreement

Based on a generous invitation by the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Abdullah Bin Abdel-Aziz Al-Saud, the king of Saudi Arabia, the following have met in Riyadh today, Sunday, 23/1/1436 (Hijri Calendar), 16/11/2014 (Gregorian Calendar): His Highness Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, the Prince of Kuwait, His Majesty King Hamad Bin Eissa Al-Khalifa, King of Bahrain; His Highness Shiekh Tamim Bin Hamd Bin Khalifa Al-Thanki, Prince of Qatar; His

Highness Sheikh Mohamed Bin Rashed Al-Maktom, the vice president and prime minister of the United Arab Emirates and the governor of Dubai; and His Highness Mohamed Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, and the deputy Commander of the Armed Forces of the United Arab Emirates. This was to cement the spirit of sincere cooperation and to emphasize the joint fate and the aspirations of the sons of the Gulf Cooperation Council for a strong bond and solid rapprochement.

After discussing the commitments stemming from the Riyadh Agreement signed 19/1/1435 (Hijri) – 23/11/2013 and its executive measures; reviewing the reports of the committee following the execution and the results of the joint follow-up [operation] room; and reviewing the conclusions of the report of the follow-up room signed on 10/1/1436 (Hijri) – 3/11/2014 (Gregorian) by the intelligence chiefs of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Bahrain and the state of Qatar.

The following has been reached:

1. Stressing that non-committing to any of the articles of the Riyadh Agreement and its executive measure amounts to a violation of the entirety of the agreement.
2. What the intelligence chiefs have reached in the aforementioned report is considered a step forward to **implement** (not clear because of the bad resolution, it could be SAVE) Riyadh agreement and its executive measures, with the necessity of the full commitment to implementing everything stated in them (agreement and the Intelligence report) within the period of one month from the date of the agreement.
3. Not to give refuge, employ, or support whether directly or indirectly, whether domestically or abroad, to any persons or a media apparatus that harbors inclinations harmful to any Gulf Cooperation Council state. Every state is committed to taking all the regulatory, legal and judicial measures against anyone who [commits] any encroachment against Gulf Cooperation Council states, including putting him on trial and announcing it in the media.
4. All countries are committed to the Gulf Cooperation Council discourse to support the Arab Republic of Egypt, and contributing to this security, stability and its financial support; and ceasing all media activity directed against the Arab Republic of Egypt in all media platforms, whether directly or indirectly, including all the offenses broadcasted on Al-jazeera, Al-Jazeera Mubashir Masr, and to work to stop all offenses in Egyptian media.

Accordingly, it has been decided that the Riyadh Agreement, and its executive measures, and the components of the supplementary agreement, requires the full commitment to its implementation. The leaders have tasked the intelligence chiefs to follow up on the implementation of this results of this supplementary agreement and to report regularly to the leaders, in order to take the measures the deem necessary to protect the security and stability of their countries.

It has been agreed that implementing the aforementioned commitments pours in the unity of the Council states and their interests and the future of their peoples, and signals a new page that will be the strong base to advance the path of joint work and moving towards a strong Gulf entity.

3. 2014 supplemental agreement.

This is a translation from a meeting of the foreign ministers following the initial agreement of the leaders in 2013.

It's a detailed implementation mechanism for the three points that comprise the 2013 document we had last night. This is a rough translation

1. Sets annual meetings for the foreign ministers for review
2. GCC heads of states take the necessary measures against other non-abiding states.

Required measures

A. Concerning domestic affairs of the GCC:

1. The commitment of all media networks owned or financed –directly or indirectly – by a member state to not discuss topics harmful to the GCC states. A list of usch media outlets would be prepared and updated periodically.
2. Each member state commits to not giving its citizenship to whoever is proven to have been involved in opposition activities against their governments. Each country will report the names of its citizens, involved in opposition, to the countries they reside in. This is in order to stop their activities and take the necessary measures against them.
3. Take all the necessary precautions that guarantee no interference in the internal affairs of other states: such as: 1. No financial or media support by official or societal institutions, individual or activists. 2. No refuge or encouragement or support or making the country a platform for opposition. 3 preventing external groups, parties and organizations that target the GCC from finding a place inside GCC countries. 4. Prohibits financial or intangible support to external organizations hostile to the GCC

Concerning foreign policy:

Committing to collection discourse of the GCC and not to support entities that pose a risk to the GCC including:

1. No support of the Muslim Brotherhood, whether financially or through media.
2. Agreeing to expelling the non-citizen Muslim Brotherhood members, within the agreed time frame and coordinating the lists of these people
3. NO support to the outside groups that pose a threat to the security and stability of GCC whether in Yemen, Syria or any of the sites of sedition.
4. No support or offering refuge to those who commit acts in opposition to any of the GCC states, whether they are current or former officials or others, and not facilitating a place for these people inside the country or allowing them to harm another GCC country
5. Shutting down all academies and centers that train and rehabilitate GCC citizens to work against their own governments.

Concerning internal security of GCC:

Bilateral meetings between security officials to discuss the details of the security files.

للمه اصرارهم

انه في يوم السبت الموافق ١٩/١/١٤٣٥ هـ فقد
اجتمع خدام الحرمه الشريفه المده محبهم سيد الفيز
آل سعود من المملته لبعينه السعوديه ، وأخيه
صاحبه السوالتي صباح الذخره الجابر الصبح أصر دولة
الكورتي وأخيه صاحبه السوالتي بميم بهر بهر خلفه
آن ثاني أصر دولة قطر في الرياض .

وقد تم عقد باجتماع متصفه سم خلالها

اجراء مراحله حمله لايكوب اعرفان
سيد دول المجلس والخدمات التي تواجه
أمنك واستقرارها ، والسبل الكفيلة لانزاله
والعبار صفه العراقات بنزله .

واللهجة تأمير من مرملة جديدة في العمل
الجماعي بين دول المجلس بما يخلق خيرها من
إطار حيا من موعده تقدم على الامس
التي تم تفضيل في النظام الامس للمجلس

السعوان فقد تم الاتفاق على
الترب
البحر صبح خالد الصانع
أ. الدكتور خالد العبد

- ١- عدم التدخل في الشؤون الداخلية لأي من دول المجلس بكل مباشر أو غير مباشر وعدم الواد أو تجنيس أي من مواطني دول المجلس من نشاط يتعارض مع أنظمة دولته الرفيعة حال حصول موافقة دولته ، وعدم دعم الفئات الحارثة المعارضة للإسلام ، وعدم دعم الإعلام المعادي .
- ٢- عدم دعم الدخول المباحين أو أي من المنظمات أو التنظيمات أو الأفراد الذين يهددون أمن واستقرار دول المجلس من طريق العمل الخفي المباشر أو غير مباشر محاولة التأثير السياسي .
- ٣- عدم قيام أي من دول مجلس التعاون بتقديم الدعم لأي فئة كانت في اليمن من قبل دوله نظراً على الدول المجاورة لليمن . والله الموفق .

صاحب السرد الشيخ محمد بن عبد خليفه آل ثاني
أمير دولة قطر

صاحب السرد الشيخ صباح الأحمد
الخابر الصباح
أمير دولة الكويت

عبدالله



سرى للغاية



آلية تنفيذ اتفاق الرياض



بعد اطلاق وزراء خارجية دول مجلس التعاون على الاتفاق الذي تم التوقيع عليه في الرياض بتاريخ ١٤٣٥/١/١٩ هـ الموافق ٢٠١٣/١١/٢٣ م من قبل خادم الحرمين الشريفين الملك عبدالله بن عبدالعزيز ملك المملكة العربية السعودية ، وأخيه صاحب السمو الشيخ صباح الأحمد الجابر الصباح أمير دولة الكويت ، وأخيه صاحب السمو الشيخ تميم بن حمد بن خليفة آل ثاني أمير دولة قطر . وأطلع ووقع عليه كل من صاحب الجلالة الملك حمد بن عيسى آل خليفة ملك مملكة البحرين ، وصاحب الجلالة السلطان قابوس بن سعيد سلطان عمان وسمو الشيخ محمد بن زايد بن سلطان آل نهيان ولي عهد أبوظبي نائب القائد الأعلى للقوات المسلحة بدولة الامارات العربية المتحدة .

ونظراً لأهمية هذا الاتفاق الذي تم التوقيع عليه والذي لم يسبق وأن

تم التوقيع على اتفاق مشابه له استشعاراً من القادة بأهمية مضمونه .

شهر
ص
7
22



سري للغاية

ثانياً - الجهة المناظرة بها اتخاذ القرار :

قادة دول مجلس التعاون :

يتخذ القادة ما يرونه مناسباً من إجراء حيال ما يتم رفعه لأنظارهم من وزراء الخارجية ضد الدولة التي لم تفي بما التزمت بما يتم الاتفاق عليه بين دول المجلس .

ثالثاً : الإجراءات المطلوب الالتزام بها :

يتم الالتزام بوضع هذا الاتفاق موضع التنفيذ وذلك من خلال الآتي :

١ - فيما يتعلق بالشؤون الداخلية لدول المجلس :

- الالتزام بعدم تناول شبكات القنوات الإعلامية المملوكة أو المدعومة بشكل مباشر أو غير مباشر من قبل أي دولة عضو لمواضيع تسيء إلى أي دولة من دول مجلس التعاون، ويتم الاتفاق بين دول المجلس على تحديد قائمة بهذه الوسائل الإعلامية ويتم تحديثها دورياً.

- تلتزم كل دولة عضو بعدم منح مواطني دولة من دول المجلس جنسيتها لمن يثبت قيامهم بنشاط معارض لحكومة بلادهم، على أن تقوم كل دولة



سرى للغاية

ولما كان الأمر يستدعي اتخاذ الإجراءات التنفيذية اللازمة لإنفاذ مقتضاه، فقد تم الاتفاق على ضرورة وضع آلية تضمن ذلك وفقاً للتالي :-

أولاً - الجهة المناطة بها مراقبة تنفيذ الاتفاق :

وزراء خارجية دول مجلس التعاون :

يعقد وزراء الخارجية على هامش الاجتماعات الدورية السنوية للمجلس الوزاري اجتماعاً خاصاً يتم خلاله استعراض التجاوزات والشكاوي التي تردهم من أي من الدول الأعضاء ضد دولة أخرى عضو في مجلس التعاون . للنظر فيها ومن ثم رفعها للقادة . مع التأكيد على أن أول مهمة يقوم بها المجلس وفق الآلية المشار إليها هو التأكد من تنفيذ جميع ما تضمنه اتفاق الرياض المشار إليه أعلاه واعتبار محتواه أساساً لأمن واستقرار دول مجلس التعاون وتماسك دوله ، سواء المتعلقة بالشئون الداخلية ، أو الجوانب السياسية الخارجية أو الأمن الداخلي وعدم تجاوز التوجه الجماعي لدول المجلس والتنسيق مع الدول الأعضاء فيه ، وعدم دعم أي تيارات تمثل خطورة على دوله .



سرى للغاية

بإبلاغ أسماء مواطنيها الذين يقومون بنشاط معارض لحكومتهم إلى الدولة الأخرى التي يتواجدون بها وذلك لمنع أنشطتهم المخالفة واتخاذ الإجراءات المناسبة بحقهم.

- اتخاذ الإجراءات اللازمة التي تضمن عدم التدخل في الشؤون الداخلية لأي دولة من دول المجلس وفي أي موضوع يمس الشأن الداخلي لتلك الدول، وعلى سبيل المثال لا الحصر ما يلي :

أ- عدم دعم الفئات المعارضة مادياً وإعلامياً من قبل مؤسسات رسمية أو مجتمعية أو أفراد ونشطاء.

ب- عدم إيواء أو استقبال أو تشجيع أو دعم أو جعل الدولة منطلقاً لأنشطة مواطني دول المجلس أو غيرهم الذين يثبت معارضتهم لأي من دول المجلس.

ج- منع المنظمات والتنظيمات والأحزاب الخارجية التي تستهدف دول مجلس التعاون وشعوبها من إيجاد موطئ قدم لها في الدولة وجعلها منطلقاً لأنشطتها المعادية لدول المجلس.


صبر





سرى للغاية

د- عدم تقديم التمويل المادي والدعم المعنوي للمنظمات والتنظيمات والأحزاب والمؤسسات الخارجية والتي تصدر عنها مواقف معادية ومحرضة ضد دول مجلس التعاون.

٢ - فيما يتعلق بالسياسة الخارجية :

الالتزام بالتوجه الجماعي لدول مجلس التعاون والتنسيق مع دول المجلس وعدم دعم جهات وتيارات تمثل خطورة على دول المجلس ومن ذلك :-

أ- عدم دعم الإخوان المسلمين مادياً وإعلامياً سواء في دول مجلس التعاون أو خارجه.

ب- الموافقة على خروج مجموعة الإخوان المسلمين من غير المواطنين وخلال مدة متفق عليها على أن يتم التنسيق مع دول مجلس التعاون حول قوائم هؤلاء الأشخاص.

ج- عدم دعم المجموعات والجماعات الخارجية التي تمثل تهديداً لأمن واستقرار دول مجلس التعاون سواء في اليمن أو سوريا أو غيرها من مواقع الفتن.

موقع الفتن.



سرى للغاية

د- عدم دعم أو إيواء من يقومون بأعمال مناهضة لأي من دول مجلس التعاون سواء كانوا من المسؤولين الحاليين أو السابقين أو من غيرهم، وعدم تمكين هؤلاء الأشخاص من إيجاد موطئ قدم داخل الدولة أو المساس بأي دولة أخرى من دول المجلس.

هـ- إغلاق أي أكاديميات أو مؤسسات أو مراكز تسعى إلى تدريب وتأهيل الأفراد من دول مجلس التعاون للعمل ضد حكوماتهم.

٣ - فيما يتعلق بالأمن الداخلي لدول المجلس :

إن وجود ملفات أمنية معلقة تحتاج إلى إيضاح وذات ارتباط مباشر بالشأن الأمني لدى الأجهزة الأمنية المختصة في أي دولة من دول المجلس، يتطلب الدخول في تفاصيل تلك المواضيع وسبر أغوارها من خلال اجتماعات مباشرة فورية بين المختصين الأمنيين بشكل ثنائي مع نظرائهم.



سري للغاية

وفي حال عدم الالتزام بهذه الآلية فلبقية دول المجلس اتخاذ ما تراه
مناسباً لحماية أمنها واستقرارها.

والله الموفق.،،،

معالي الشيخ / خالد بن احمد بن محمد آل خليفة
وزير الخارجية في مملكة البحرين

سمو الشيخ / عبدالله بن زايد آل نهيان
وزير الخارجية بالإمارات العربية المتحدة

معالي / يوسف بن عوي بن عبدالله
الوزير المسئول عن الشؤون الخارجية في
سلطنة عمان

صاحب السمو الملكي الأمير / سعود الفيصل
وزير الخارجية في المملكة العربية السعودية

معالي الشيخ صباح خالد الحمد الصباح
نائب رئيس مجلس الوزراء ووزير الخارجية
بدولة الكويت

معالي الدكتور / خالد بن محمد المطيرة
وزير الخارجية في دولة قطر

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

" سرى للعلية "


" اتفاق الرياض التكميلي "

بناءً على دعوة كريمة من خادم الحرمين الشريفين الملك عبدالله بن عبدالعزيز آل سعود ملك المملكة العربية السعودية فقد اجتمع هذا اليوم الأحد ١٤٣٦/١/٢٣ هـ الموافق ٢٠١٤/١١/١٦ م في مدينة الرياض لدى خادم الحرمين الشريفين - حفظه الله - صاحب السمو الشيخ صباح الأحمد الجابر الصباح أمير دولة الكويت، وصاحب الجلالة الملك حمد بن عيسى آل خليفة ملك مملكة البحرين، وصاحب السمو الشيخ تميم بن حمد بن خليفة آل ثاني أمير دولة قطر، وصاحب السمو الشيخ محمد بن راشد آل مكتوم نائب رئيس دولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة ورئيس مجلس الوزراء حاكم دبي، وصاحب السمو الشيخ محمد بن زايد آل نهيان ولي عهد أبوظبي نائب القائد الأعلى للقوات المسلحة بدولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة، وذلك لترسيخ روح التعاون الصادق والتأكيد على المصير المشترك وما يتطلع إليه أبناء دول مجلس التعاون لدول الخليج العربية من وحدة متينة وتقارب وثيق.

وبعد مناقشة الالتزامات المنبثقة عن اتفاق الرياض الموقع بتاريخ ١٤٣٥/١/١٩ هـ الموافق ٢٠١٣/١١/٢٣ م، وآلياته التنفيذية، والاطلاع على تقارير لجنة متابعة تنفيذ الآلية ونتائج غرفة المتابعة المشتركة، واستعراض ما خرج به محضر نتائج غرفة المتابعة الموقع بتاريخ ١٤٣٦/١/١٠ هـ الموافق ٢٠١٤/١١/٣ م من قبل رؤساء الأجهزة الاستخباراتية في كل من (المملكة العربية السعودية، ودولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة، ومملكة البحرين، ودولة قطر).

فقد تم التوصل إلى الآتي:

أولاً، التأكيد على أن عدم الالتزام بأي بند من بنود اتفاق الرياض وآلياته التنفيذية يعد إخلالاً بكامل ما ورد فيهما.



ثانياً، أن ما توصل إليه رؤساء الأجهزة الاستخبارية في محضرهم المشار إليه أعلاه يعدّ تقدماً لإنفاذ اتفاق الرياض وآلياته التنفيذية، مع ضرورة الالتزام الكامل بتنفيذ جميع ما ورد فيهما في مدة لا تتجاوز شهر من تاريخ هذا الاتفاق.

ثالثاً، عدم إيواء أو توظيف أو دعم - بشكل مباشر أو غير مباشر - في الدخّل أو الخارج أي شخص أو أي وسيلة إعلامية ممن له توجهات تسيء إلى أي دولة من دول مجلس التعاون، وتلتزم كل دولة باتخاذ كافة الإجراءات النظامية والقانونية والقضائية بحق من يصدر عن هؤلاء أي تجاوز ضد أي دولة أخرى من دول مجلس التعاون لدول الخليج العربية، بما في ذلك محاكمته، وأن يتم الإعلان عن ذلك في وسائل الإعلام.

رابعاً، التزام كافة الدول بنهج سياسة مجلس التعاون لدول الخليج العربية لدعم جمهورية مصر العربية والإسهام في أمنها واستقرارها والمساهمة في دعمها اقتصادياً، وإيقاف كافة النشاطات الإعلامية الموجهة ضد جمهورية مصر العربية في جميع وسائل الإعلام بصفة مباشرة أو غير مباشرة بما في ذلك ما يبث من إساءات على قنوات الجزيرة وقناة مصر مباشر، والسعي لإيقاف ما ينشر من إساءات في الإعلام المصري.

وبناء على ما سبق، فقد تقرر أن مقتضى اتفاق الرياض، وآلياته التنفيذية، وما ورد في هذا الاتفاق التكميلي، يتطلب الالتزام الكامل بتنفيذها. وقد كلف القادة رؤساء الأجهزة الاستخبارية بمتابعة إنفاذ ما تم التوصل إليه في هذا الاتفاق التكميلي، وأن يتم الرفع عن ذلك بشكل دوري للقادة لاتخاذ ما يرونه من التدابير والإجراءات المناسبة لحماية أمن دولهم واستقرارها.

كما تم الاتفاق على أن تنفيذ ما ذكر أعلاه من التزامات يصب في وحدة دول المجلس ومصالحها ومستقبل شعوبها، ويعدّ إيماناً بفتح صفحة جديدة ستكون بإذن الله مرتكزاً قوياً لدفع مسيرة العمل المشترك والانطلاق بها نحو كيان خليجي قوي ومتماسك.


والله ولي التوفيق.

صاحب السمو الشيخ محمد بن زايد آل نهيان صاحب السمو الشيخ محمد بن راشد آل مكتوم

نائب رئيس دولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة
ورئيس مجلس الوزراء حاكم دبي


ولي عهد أبوظبي نائب القائد الأعلى للقوات المسلحة
بمملكة الإمارات العربية المتحدة

صاحب الجلالة الملك حمد بن عيسى آل خليفة




ملك مملكة البحرين

صاحب السمو الشيخ تميم بن حمد بن خليفة آل ثاني




أمير دولة قطر

صاحب السمو الشيخ صباح الاحمد الجابر الصباح



أمير دولة الكويت



خادم الحرمين الشريفين
الملك عبدالله بن عبدالعزيز آل سعود

ملك المملكة العربية السعودية

APPENDIX C: UN REPORT



United Nations

SECRETARY- GENERAL'S TRAVEL PRESS RELEASE

SG/T/3185
3 OCTOBER 2017

Activities of Secretary-General in Kuwait, 26-27 August

United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres arrived in Kuwait from New York on Saturday evening, 27 August, for his first official visit since taking office.

On Sunday, prior to the start of his bilateral meetings, the Secretary-General went to the United Nations House to meet with the staff. He thanked them for their hard work and dedication, and encouraged them to continue to strengthen the relationship between the United Nations and Kuwait.

From there, the Secretary-General met with Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah, Amir of the State of Kuwait. Following that meeting, the Secretary-General spoke to the media, saying that Kuwait's agenda is peace and understanding, expressing his support for the country's mediation efforts in the current Gulf crisis.

While in Kuwait City, the Secretary-General also had separate meetings with Sheikh Sabah Khalid al Hamad al Sabah, First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Marzouq al-Ghanim, Speaker of the Parliament, along with other members of the legislative body.

Before leaving, the Secretary-General and his delegation were hosted to lunch by the Amir of Kuwait.

The Secretary-General left Kuwait for Israel on Sunday evening.

! For information media. Not an official record.