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THE CASE OF QATAR FOREIGN AID TO AFRICA

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Committee Page

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Name __________________________________________
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Name __________________________________________
Signature _______________________________________ Date__________
Abstract

It is uneasy to lose sight of the critical role foreign aid plays in Qatar's engagement with the wider world. Since 1995, Qatar has occupied an enviable reputation as emerging donor in the Middle East region. It relations with Africa is sophisticatedly managed through foreign aid. However, big changes are already afoot in the Middle East in general. The outbreak of the Arab Spring has forced countries like Qatar to remodel their foreign policies through the use of foreign aid in a quest to optimize their gains from this turbulent political environment. To this end, this thesis examines changes in Qatar foreign aid in the span of four years, 2010 to 2013. Specifically it investigates the extent to which the eruption of the Arab Spring in 2011 has shaped Qatar foreign aid and the reflection of this on the flow of Qatar external aid to Africa.

Through a thorough analysis of Qatar Foreign Aid Reports of 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013, it is found that changes in the overall architecture of Qatar foreign aid- in terms of volume and the recipient countries- are determined by the Arab Spring. Nevertheless, the extent to which the Arab Spring has remodeled Qatar foreign aid to Africa is generally imprecise and sketchy. The volume and the recipient of Qatar development assistance to Africa remained stable and consistent in the last past five years, and the insignificant changes in the recipients
of Qatar foreign aid to Africa is connected to factors associated with political and economic developments in different African countries.

The stability in Qatar foreign aid flow to Africa, despite the dynamic of Qatar foreign policy, discloses that Africa occupies footnote position in Qatar foreign policy priorities; and it also reveals that Qatar could not realize the importance of the Africa in the context of its struggle to optimize its gain from the Arab Spring. As Qatar lacks alternative and meaningful foreign policy to engage with Africa than foreign aid, it should relax its dependence on its NGOs to carry out this task. This should allow Qatar to strategically use its aid to Africa in a quest to advance its national interests in the continent.

*Keyword: Foreign aid, Africa, Arab Spring, Qatar.*
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Dedication

I dedicate this thesis to my family, especially to my father, mother and step mothers for opening my eyes to the world and for instilling the importance of hard work and higher education in me; to my brothers and sisters Lamin Manjang (Lang Basse), Lamin Manjang (Gayo), Kawsu Manjang, Kassum Manjang, Jallow Manjang, Omar Manjang, Jarra Nanki, Marry Manjang, Kaddy Manjang, Jarjuba Manjang, Omar Camara, Muskuta Manjang, Tapha Manjang, Sillah Manjang, Muttar Manjang and Musa Manjang for their encouragement and for cheering me up; to my devoted wife Fatou Camara for her patience and understanding during my studies; to our baby Satou Manjang who just arrived in this word to grace the last moment of studies,

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**Introduction**

Flows of foreign aid to recipient countries have been highly volatile over the past 60 years, and there are significant evidences that this volatility is caused by interplay of political and economic factors and changes in domestic, regional and international settings. The efforts of donor countries to optimize their gains from these changes drive their aid allocation in terms of volume, recipient countries and motives. Political and economic developments that followed the Second World War have widely influenced foreign aid disbursement of many donor countries. The stream of large size of US aid to Turkey and Greece, and its Marshall Plan of four years $13 billion aid program for the recovery of war-affected countries in other European countries matched with United States concern over the expansion of Soviet Union's influence in Europe in the post Second World War bipolar system (Lancaster, 2007). Similarly, the rise of Socialist aspiration in Africa, and the European fright for their former colonies' association with the Soviet Union induced the flow of large among of French and British aid to Africa to facilitate the development of their colonies and to sustain the predominance of their influences in these countries (Van Der Veen, 2011). The dynamics of politics in the Middle East region in 1960s and 1970s also inspired number of developing countries of the Middle East (notably oil producing countries like Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar,
 Iraq, Libya and Algeria) to provide financial support to developing countries in Africa in search for political reward in their conflict with Israel.

Thus, dynamics of politics at regional and international levels have brought changes in foreign aid architectures of donor countries since the outset of exploiting foreign aid as foreign policy tool. Since the Middle East region has been undergoing many changes after the Arab Spring 2011, one would expect to see changes in the aid strategy of major players in this hostile and unstable region, especially in the Middle East many countries have had to use foreign aid to compensate for their limited diplomatic and military capacities. This is even more acute in the case of Qatar which has emerged recently as game changer in the Middle East region in general and the Gulf region in particular.

It is uneasy to lose sight of the critical role foreign aid plays in Qatar's engagement with the wider world. Qatar has occupied an enviable reputation as emerging donor in the Middle East region. As a middle power at the regional stage, foreign aid has played a unique role in projecting Qatar interests in Europe, Asia and America. In addition to these continents, Qatar official development assistance has being labored as sophisticated foreign policy tool to manage its relations with African countries. The return on Qatar foreign aid to Africa can be calculated in terms of new trade and investment opportunities, political reward and religious promotion. However, big changes are already afoot in the Middle East in general, and in the Gulf region in particular. The outbreak of the Arab
Spring and ensuing political disruption have caused remodeling of foreign policies, and they have also offered opportunity for rich countries like Qatar to use its foreign aid to enhance its position in a quest to optimize its gains from this turbulent political environment.

Against this background, this thesis studies changes in Qatar foreign aid architecture in light of the Arab Spring. In more specific terms, it examines the extent to which the eruption of the Arab Spring in 2011 has shaped Qatar foreign aid in terms of volumes it allocates, countries that receive this aid, and the motives of this aid. In this connection, the thesis also inspects the effects of the Arab Spring on Qatar foreign aid allocation and how this has reflected in the flow of Qatar foreign aid to Africa. The foreign aid strategies and the ensuing flow of aid to receiving countries are, in many ways, symptomatic of the strategic importance of these countries to donor countries. Therefore, stability or dynamism in the flow of Qatar aid to Africa, in light of Qatar constant struggle to benefit from regional political status quo, should suggest the significance of Africa or its triviality to Qatar foreign policy objectives.

**Literature Review:**

Qatar foreign aid is echoed in literature that considers Arab foreign aid in general and Gulf foreign aid in particular. However, despite the qualified

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1 Unless it is stated otherwise, the term Africa in this thesis refers to all African countries with exclusion of North African countries which includes Egypt, Tunis, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria and South and Northern Sudan.
substance of this literature, little attention is given to how the Gulf States’ aid allocation is influenced by dynamics of politics at the regional level. In general, precedent literature that explored Arab and Gulf foreign aid mainly focused on the main aid donors and the characteristics their aid. Although recent studies have extensively examined how the outbreak of the Arab Spring has induced Qatar and other Gulf States to refine aid and investment into sophisticated foreign policy tools, the extent to which Arab Spring created a shift in foreign aid recipients is less emphasized by these past studies. Similarly, there is little, if any attempt, to examine how the Arab uprising could have reshaped the flow of Gulf aid in general, and flow of Qatar foreign aid in particular to African countries. To this end, the thesis will take traditional or narrative approach to literature review in order to critique and summarize a body of literature and relevant studies that addressed the subject of Arab and Gulf foreign aid in general and Qatar foreign aid in particular. In this connection, literature will be divided into categories or themes.

_Gulf States as Emerging Aid Donors_

Relevant literature (Hunter, 1984; Kilby, 2011; Momani & Ennis, 2012; Neumayer, 2002, 2003; Villanger, 2007) which explored the Arab aid allocation suggested the existence of a complex of bilateral aid donors that were established decades ago to facilitate the management of aid giving of Arab-Gulf states (also
Gulf Cooperation Councile GCC members). In this connection Momani and Ennis (2012) suggested that shift in political and economic power away from the west to the south has led to the emergence of new donors in development aid scene. Momani and Ennis (2012) referred to the oil boom as catalyst in the introduction of new players in the foreign aid outside member of Development Assistant Committee (DAC); the six members of the GCC are pointed out by Momani and Ennis as rising donor groups. The nationalization of oil industries in these countries in 1960s has set the stage for the Gulf countries to play decisive role in international cooperation (Momani & Ennis, 2012). In contrast to Momani and Ennis (2012), and in analysing the organizational structure of development finance provided by Arab donors, Neumayer (2012) reduced the Gulf donors to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates as three Arab donors that have organized their aid giving through their national agencies.

Hunter (1984) echoed Neumayer (2012) in referring to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and UAE as major providers of the Gulf bilateral aid; however, in discussion the aid programs of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Hunter recommended the role of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and to some extent Qatar and UAE, in Arab aid giving to champion the Arab cause through their financial leverage. According to Hunter (1984) these countries have

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committed to the ideal of Arab unity and the Arab political and economic objectives. Thus, their new wealth in the form of oil was used to achieve these objectives; this in turn spotlighted their position among Arabs as major aid donors to developing countries.

In addition to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, recent literature also took account of Qatar as one of new emerging aid donors in the Arab world which extensively bends on foreign aid as its diplomatic tool. For example, Kamrava (2011) argued that the emergence of Qatar as a successful mediator between conflicting parties in Yemen, Sudan, Lebanon and Eretria is attributed to her financial incentives that are given to conflicting parties. Colombo (2012) concurred with Kamrava in emphasizing the leading role of Qatar in using its financial resource to achieve its strategic interests. He asserted that the concurrent of surge in Qatar diplomacy and political upheaval that followed the 2011 Arabs uprising has been an opportunity for the state of Qatar to expand her aid giving at regional level not only to boost the economic stability of the recipient countries, but also to protect herself from the wave of political unrest that could have jeopardized her own stability. While Colombo (2012) recognized the fact that all other three GCC states (Kingdom of Saudi Arab, Kuwait and UAE) have been providing foreign aid during the Arab Spring, he held that Qataris the most active among these countries because of her wish to gain the influence in the region.
Characteristics of the Gulf aid

Past studies (Momani & Ennis, 2013; Neumayer, 2004; Shihata, 1982; Shushan & Marcoux, 2011; Villanger, 2007) referred to certain characteristics that make the Gulf aid different for the aid of Western donors. The most striking characteristic of the Gulf aid is its volatility. Unlike aid from Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistant Committee (DAC), the Gulf aid commitment is severely determined by oil production and price. For example, development aid as percentage of Gross National Products (GNP) of Gulf States decreased from 12.48% in 1973, at high of oil boom, to 5.94% in 1978 and 2.38% of GNP in 1985 (Momani & Ennis, 2012). Another characteristic of the Gulf aid is that, in contrast to Western donors, their aid lacks transparency and consistency in record keeping. The barriers to achieve transparency stems from two sides: first; insufficient data provided by national aid agencies. Second: unreported transfer made by the Gulf countries which bypass national agencies (Shushan & Marcoux, 2011). The Gulf countries also exhibit distinctive character in terms of absolute volume as well as their generosity. While DAC members never come close to hit United Nations UN mark of 0.7% minimum of ODA in GNP, during 1973-2008, the average of the Gulf donors ODA combined GNP stand at 1.5% (World Bank, 2010). Perhaps the
most characteristic of the Gulf aid givers is their adherence to the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of recipient countries. The Gulf donors do not prescribe any development or economic policies for the countries that receive their aid neither do they require democratic reforms for receiving their financial assistance (Villanger, 2007).

In terms of motives or objectives of the Gulf aid, the issue has been a subject of scholastic debate. For example, Hunter (1984) argued that Arab members of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries OPEC, which include the Gulf countries, are motivated by security, political-ideological and economic objectives. The same argument is advanced by Neumayer (2003b) who believed that complex web of political, economic and security objectives drive the Arab donors including the Gulf states to give aid. Like Hunter (1984) and Neumayer (2003) Villanger, (2007a) subscribed to the same belief; he argued that political and economic motives are also considered as other motives behind the Gulf aid giving. According to him the Gulf foreign aid is used to reward their allies and to build strategic alliances. The Kuwait-Iraq war is cited by Villanger (2007) as an example in which Gulf donors used their aids to gather support for Kuwait and deprived recipients that sided with Iraq during the War. In addition to political motives, Villanger (2007a) also cited promotion of religion as motives for the Gulf aid. On other hand, Shihata (1982) stressed that Arab aid including that of the Gulf is generous, untied and diversified in terms its recipients. Form his
perspective, Arab aid is pure altruistic and not meant to achieve political or economic objectives.

Regarding the recipients of the Gulf aid, different literature suggested that wide ranges of poor countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia benefit from the Gulf aid. However, they recognized that since the beginning of their foreign aid, promotion of Arab solidarity was widely observed as motives behind the foreign aid of Gulf States; thus, the most recipients of the Gulf financial was exclusively allocated for Arab countries (Bin, Al, & May, 2012; Hunter, 1984; Neumayer, 2003; Shushan & Marcoux, 2011; Villanger, 2007). Additionally, Neumayer (2012) found that Arab, Sub-Saharan Africa, Islamic as well as countries with voting similar to Saudi Arabia in the UN are more likely to receive the Arab aid.

*Regional Politics aid Gulf Foreign Aid*

Past studies that studied foreign aid of the Gulf States mainly cited factors related to regional politics as stimulator of changes in Gulf aid giving in general and their aid flow to Africa in particular. For instance, Villanger (2007) suggested that the Gulf aid provision is driven by the dynamics of politics at regional levels. To him, the Iraq-Iran war of 1980s, and the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1991 were impulsive in the Gulf countries' aid giving especially to Iraq-- in which Kuwait emerged as major donor-- and to Kuwait to reconstruct the country on the wake of the Iraq invasion. Similarly, Barakat & Zyck (2010) shared with Villanger (2007)
the impact of regional development like Iraq-Iran war and Iraq invasion of Kuwait on the flow of the Gulf aid in terms of increase and decrease in the volume. In this connection, the surge in Gulf aid in the mid-1970s to early 1980s are highlighted to be correlated closely with rising crude oil prices and rises in crises in the Middle East. Likewise, the fall in the volume of official aid from the Gulf States in the mid- to late-1980s is viewed by Barakat & Zyck (2010) in the context of Iran-Iraq war and the consumption of the Gulf state with securing the survival of their regimes amid domestic and regional threats. Additionally they argued that the sharp rise in official aid in 1990 reflected a quadrupling of aid from the region in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, which was facilitated by the simultaneous and closely related jump in crude oil prices. See the Figure (1).
In relation to the flow of Arab and Gulf aid to Africa, Al Sarihan (2012) argued that a positive change in Arab-African relations in 1970s has stimulated Arabs to allocate their foreign aid to Africa. According to him the Arab concerns about Palestinian issues forced them to engage with Africans in a quest to win the support of the later in championing the Palestinian cause at international level. Al Sarihan (2012) further held that the huge economic capability of Arabs as the
result of their oil revenues permitted them to use oil not only to fight Israel, but also to entice Africans to take side with Arabs vis-a-vis Palestinian cause. This, according Al-Sarihan (2012) has positively changed the volume of Arab aid to Africa in early 1970s compared to the late 1970s after the Camp David agreement. See the figure (2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>4.85</td>
<td>2.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>7.14</td>
<td>6.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>9.11</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>1.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>7.79</td>
<td>4.155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>3.49</td>
<td>0.195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>7.202</td>
<td>5.167</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure (2), Arab Multilaterals Aid to some Africa from 1973-1980 in Million $ (Al-Sharihan, 2012: p102)*
Hunter (1984) echoed Al-Sharihan (2012) as she ascribed the extensive flow of Arab aid to Africa in 1960s and 1970s to dynamics of politics in the Middle East region. In this context Hunter specifically related the use of aid in the context Arab foreign policy to the prevalent trend of supporting Arab cause in the Arab Israel conflict in 1960s and 70s. According to her, the quest for political reward prompted the Arab donors to employ their oil wealth as foreign policy mean and provide financial aid to their African counterparts in a bid to win their supports. In this connection, she specifically referred to Saudi Arabia as one of the largest economic donors in 1970s as its aid has widely received by African countries as illustrated in figure (3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>No. of Projects</th>
<th>Total Value in Saudi Riyal. Million</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guinea Conakry</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>292/00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>42/99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>308/721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>168/30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>643/30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure (3), *Saudi Aid in the form of Loan to African countries 1974-82* – (Hunter, 1984: p 139)
Similarly, Hunter (1984) believed that drastic changes in the regional balance of power due to an increase in the power and influence of the two larger regional states-Iran and Iraq has threatened Saudi Arabia and small Gulf states; thus, Saudi Arabia attempted to maintain a favorable balance of power to achieve the interests of Arab Gulf monarchies by extending its foreign aid to the Horn of Africa particularly. According Hunter, the Horn of Africa is of geo-strategic importance to the Saudis in the context of the Arab Israel conflict as well as in the context of Iranian threats of exporting revolution to the Gulf. These factors compelled Saudi Arabia to allocate aid to the Horn of Africa, which controls the gate to Bab-al-Mendab, in order to secure its interest in of the world important maritime choke point (Hunter, 1984).

Additionally, (Chibwe, 1977) argued that the 1973 Arab-Israel conflict acted as a stimulus for the improvement of Arab co-operation with Africa and with the Third World in general. According to him political sympathy between African and Arabs has been an excellent factors in the increase of the value of financial transfer from the Special Arab Fund for Africa in 1970, the heyday of Arab African cooperation. See figure (4).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Value of each installment in US $</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>3,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>7,100,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>3,750,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>4,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>5,650,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure (4), Sample of Loans from the Special Arab Fund for Africa 1974-1975–1976 (Chibwe, 1977; p 166)

Likewise Sylvester (1981) echoed Chibwe, (1977), Hunter (1984) Al-Sharihan (2012) in referring to dynamics of politics in Middle East in 1970s as formidable factor in the flow large share of the Arab aid to Africa. However, he was specific in the motives for the flow of this aid to Africa. According to him, the motives ranging from political self-interest to humanitarian altruism prompted oil-rich Arab countries to open their purses wide for the benefit of Africa in 1970s.
Likewise, recent studies on the Gulf foreign policy has observed unprecedented surge in the Gulf States' use of foreign aid to achieve their collective and individual purposes. For example, Colombo (2012) related this surge to the political upheaval that followed the 2011 Arabs uprising; hence, this development has been an opportunity for Gulf States to expand their aid giving at regional level. In this context large amount of aid has been flowing to the Arab Spring countries not only to boost the economic stability of the recipient countries, but also to protect the donor's interests and prevent the wave of political unrest that could have jeopardized their own stability from reaching their countries (Colombo, 2012). Like Colombo (2012), Talbot (2012) also associated the rise in the volume the Gulf foreign aid to the Arab Spring as he understood that Egypt has been in the forefront of countries that received the largest amount of the Gulf aid for political, economic and security interests of the Gulf States. For instance, in May 2011 the UAE pledged $ 3b; Saudi also promised to provide $ 4b in loan, deposits and grants; and Qatar promised $ 10b through investment (Talbot, 2012). Although these pledges were not materialized at the time, Saudi Arabia released aid to Egypt following Muhammad Morsi's visit to Saudi when aid package worth $ 500m was provided to Egypt. This was followed by a deposit of $1 billion to Egypt Central Bank, and $5m was later transferred to buy Egyptian T-bones. Additionally, $430m for projects in Egypt was also provided.
(Talbot, 2012). Qatar's hyper foreign policy ambitions and its ardent support for revolution prompted her to deposit $500m to boost Egyptian foreign reserves in 2011; moreover the Qatar monarch announced a $2 billion deposit with Egypt central Bank (Talbot, 2012). Although the UAE and Kuwait remained ambivalent to fulfill their aid pledge, few days after the toppling of Morsi by the Egyptian Supreme Council of the Arm Forces SCAF, Saudi Arabia and UAE pledged a total of $8b in aid package to support Egyptian government. In following days, Kuwait also announced the aid package of $4b (the Pulse of the Middle East,” n.d.)

While acknowledging the Arab Spring's factor in pushing the use of foreign aid by Gulf states, Colombo (2012) maintained that the Sunni-vs Shias's dichotomy aroused the Gulf countries to use aid in response to the Arab spring in Syria and Bahrain (Colombo, 2012). The Gulf countries uneasiness with Iran's outreach and influence in Syrian and Bahrain stimulated them to provide different sorts of aid to different liberal and Islamic groups in Syria in a bid to topple Bashar Assad's regime. Similar motivation forced the Gulf countries to provide aid to Bahrain and Oman in order to consolidate Al-Khalifa regime against mainly Shiisats protests. Meanwhile, Qatar's efforts to assume regional leadership amid the consumption of traditional regional leaders like Saudi Arabia and Egypt by internal instability drove the tiny Gulf state of Qatar to funnel aid to Libyan revolutionists to topple the regime of Ghaddafi (Khatib, 2013).
Although the Gulf involvement in Syrian conflict is understood to be escorted by financial supports, -as Qatar and Saudi Arabia heavily involved in the Syrian civil war through a state sponsorship of various groupings, in addition to activity from independent Gulf charities and individuals, the motive for this financial involvement is understood differently. For example, report of Middle East Centre of London School of Economy (2014) stated that even though the sectarianism is interpreted as the main driver for Gulf financial involvement in Syria, a depth analysis of Qatar and Saudi’s foreign policies reveals a much more complex reality. According to this report the flow of Qatar and Saudi aid to Syria is akin to a proxy war, very different to a mere primordial civilization clash between Shia’ and Sunni Muslims. This is evident in the switching of Saudi and Qatari support between different opposition groups in Syria, which has led to factionalization among the Syrian opposition.

**Research Questions**

Overall, the referred literature that considered the Gulf foreign aid mainly fleshed out the major donors and the characteristics of their aid with little focus on how different factors define the volume, the recipients and the purposes of Gulf aid in general and Qatar foreign in particular. Added to this, earliest studies in the subject matter suffered from the following shortcomings:

First: These studies are general as they collectively dealt with foreign aid flow of the Arabs Gulf countries to different countries. Thus; they failed to take
the advantage of case study that could permit them to intensively describe and analyze a single individual case of one Gulf state foreign aid allocation in terms of motives, recipients and volume. Although Arab and Gulf countries have a lot in common, however it is misleading to believe that their politics and foreign policies for that matter are driven by similar factors and that they pursue similar foreign policy objectives.

Second: previous studies were mostly concern about how the Arab Spring has shaped the foreign aid of Gulf States to Arab Spring countries; thus, they could not make extra effort to investigate how the Arab Spring could remodel the allocation of Gulf aid to other countries that were immune from the effects of the turbulent events of the Arab Spring.

Third: Literature related to the flow of Arab and Gulf aid to Africa is generally scant and the available ones are outdated to rely upon them as they no longer reflect the philosophies that guide the allocation of Gulf foreign aid in general and Qatar foreign aid in particular. Leadership changes in many Gulf States and dynamics of the politics in the region has tremendously transformed how their foreign policies are projected as so as their foreign aid.

Finally, most of these previous studies are literature based researches and none has combined quantitative and qualitative strategies to collect data in a quest to serve for the mutual validation of data and findings as well as for the production of a more coherent and complete picture of the investigated topic.
Thus, they either answer what or why or how questions in relation to changes in the architecture of the Gulf foreign aid.

In light of the above mentioned shortcomings in literature that examined the subject, this study will contribute to existing literature by investigating changes in Qatar foreign aid since 2010. Ultimately, our intention is to understand the extent the Arab Spring constituted a formidable factor in these changes, and how these changes are particularly mirrored in Qatar aid flow to Africa.

To this end, this thesis enquires into three main questions:

- What are the patterns of changes that occur in Qatar foreign aid disbursement since the outbreak of the Arab Spring?

- To what extent these changes are triggered by the Arab Spring?

- How these have shaped the volume, the recipients and the motives of Qatar foreign aid to Africa?

To answer these questions, this thesis is guided by Foreign Policy Change Approach which explains factors that brought changes in relations to foreign policy. Foreign Policy Approach identified three factors that induce countries to consider changes in their foreign policies. These factors include (1) changes in individuals or leadership (foreign policy changes due to cognitive and motivational psychology of individuals or leaders); (2) changes in state institutions, domestic and regional structure (domestic and regional structures
provide clues to the possibilities of changes and obstacles to changes within a given polity in order to optimize gains); (3) changes in political regimes (state moving from democratic to authoritarian regime changes foreign policy of that state) (Alden & Aran, 2012).

While this approach examines factors that brought changes in overall foreign policy, it also fits to examine changes in the architecture of foreign aid of a country as foreign aid is enveloped in foreign policy and it is a device of foreign policy. Therefore, this study considers the effect of one factor, which is the effect of changes in regional structure (Arab Spring in our case) on foreign aid of Qatar in terms of recipient, volume and objectives.

The Arab Spring has brought changes in the Middle East in general and Gulf in particular, as it has reconfigured regional structure and reshaped relations between countries; ultimately it has shaped foreign policies including foreign aid allocation. In this connection, we examine how it has changed foreign aid architecture of the state of Qatar.

**Significances of the Study**

This study has scientific and practical significances. Scientifically, because Qatar foreign aid is generally under-researched, this study will enrich the bulk of literature that focused on Qatar foreign aid in general and Gulf foreign aid in particular. Similarly this study will also contribute in enriching the field of Gulf- African relations which is largely ignored by literature. Moreover, as this
study is mixed-method designed, it will expand the research on Gulf foreign aid in general and Qatar foreign aid in particular in a way that a single approach cannot do. The process of offering a statistical analysis of aid allocation, along with survey of literatures make the research more comprehensive compared to previous studies. Added to this and to understand why Qatar foreign aid has increased to Africa, despite the challenges of the Arab Spring, will challenge taken-for-granted theories that assume the lack of capability of small states to manage their relations in time of turbulence.

 Practically, to understand exactly that regional factors like the Arab Spring prompted Qatar to diversify the allocation of its foreign aid to other regions beyond the Middle East will inform help policymakers in recipient countries of Qatar aid the volatility and reliability of Qatar foreign aid. Additionally, the increase of Qatar foreign aid to Africa in light of the Arab Spring will deepen our understanding about the strategic importance of Africa in addressing political, economic and security challenges that face Qatar in the context of the Arab Spring. Conversely, the decrease or stability of this aid to Africa will make us to comprehend the triviality of Africa to Qatar foreign policy as the ensuing flow of aid to receiving countries are, in many ways, symptomatic of the strategic importance of these countries to donor countries in projecting their national interest at regional and international levels.
Research Methodology

This research combines both quantitative and qualitative research methods to answer the questions of the extent Qatar’s foreign aid has changed since the outbreak of the Arab Spring, and whether the Arab Spring has any significant effect on Qatar foreign aid to Africa. On the one hand, qualitative method is appropriate to analyze how and why the Arab Spring could change Qatar foreign aid to African countries. In order to reach these answers, survey of literature was conducted to examine the wide range of primary and secondary data drawn from different sources. These sources, which include, but not limited to, books, magazine articles, journal articles, online newspapers, reports and documents from think tanks and the governments of Qatar were selected according to their relations to the main themes of the thesis, Arab and Gulf foreign aid, the effect of Arab Spring on the Gulf policies, Qatar foreign policy, Qatar- African relations and Qatar foreign aid. In reviewing materials driven from these sources, data were categorized according to themes before they were tabled and filtered eventually. In the subsequent stage of reading, relevant information and data were note-taken and used in different part of thesis according to their appropriateness in explaining the impact of the Arab Spring on the flow of Qatar foreign aid in terms of recipients, volumes and motives. This literature survey, as research method technique, is important in this study to scan as much as many literature as possible.
on the issue. In light of scarcity of resource on the topic, literature in both English and Arabic language were consulted.

On the other hand, quantitative method was used to consult reports of Qatar Foreign Aid allocation in the span of four years – 2010 to 2013. These reports were collected personally from department of international cooperation, Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Types of information extracted from these reports include volume of Qatar foreign, recipients of this aid and its objectives. In order to detect changes in Qatar foreign aid architecture in terms of the volume of Qatar foreign aid, the recipients and the motives or objectives, Microsoft Excel sheet was used to produce data and chats that will enable us to follow the trend of changes during the period of studies. In this regard, bi-variable analysis was conducted to see how two variables change together. To this end, year was considered as independent variable while volume, recipient and motives of Qatar foreign aid were used as dependent variables.

**Limitation if the Study:**

Generally, this research has the following limitations:

1- Literature upon which this study relied to highlight the flow of Qatar foreign aid to Africa is scant and the available once are outdated. Thus, they are insufficient to explain the motives and objectives of Qatar foreign aid to Africa, as well as the factors that determine the flow of this aid.
2- This study analyzed the reports of Qatar foreign aid allocation from 2010 to 2013; while this is sufficient to report the changes in the allocation of Qatar foreign, there is possibility that changes in 2010 and 2012 will be clearly understood when we compare it with reports of 2008 and 2009, which were not available to linked them with trend of changes in 2010 upward.

3- There is a concern about the authenticity of data from the report as the data are compiled by the Ministry of foreign Affairs. While this data may represent genuine figures of Qatar foreign aid flow, there is possibility that the data could be manipulated for political purposes.

Organization of the thesis:

After introducing the topic, chapter one analyzes foreign aid from theoretical and conceptual perspectives in order to understand the spectrum on which Qatar foreign aid rests. To this end, various definitions of foreign aid are discussed; this is followed by a rather lengthy discussion of historical development of foreign aid, types of aid and theoretical explanation of why governments give aid to other governments. To locate the importance of foreign aid in Qatar foreign policy, chapter two discusses Qatar foreign policy towards Africa. In the first part of this chapter, light is shed on interplay of changes that shape Qatar foreign policy strategies and tactics including foreign aid. The second part of this chapter discloses how leadership changes and changes in regional
politics defined Qatar strategic interest in Africa and tools it exploited to reach these goals and objectives in Africa. In this connection, emphasis is placed on foreign aid as a viable foreign policy tool at the disposal of the state Qatar in its engagement with Africa.

In the final chapter (chapter three), finding of the thesis is presented. However, in the first part of this chapter institutional aspect of Qatar foreign aid is treated; this uncovers the role played by both the government of Qatar and NGOs in allocation of Qatar development assistance to various countries. The closing part of this chapter is devoted to the discussion of the results of the research. In addition to the changes in Qatar foreign in terms of volume, recipients and motive, this part also presents the effects of the Arab Spring on these changes, and how this is reflected on Qatar foreign aid flow to Africa. Based on the final results, the conclusion of this thesis describes the relevant importance of Africa to the state of Qatar, it also recommends policy options about how Qatar could strategically use its foreign to Africa to promote its national interests in the continent.
Chapter One

Foreign Aid: Theoretical and Conceptual Perspectives

Introduction
One of the scholars who led the way for the study of international relations, Hans Morgenthau, concluded that foreign aid is one of the innovations which the contemporary age has brought into the practice of foreign policy (Morgenthau, 1962; cited in Lancaster, 2007). Foreign aid, as it stands today, has become a familiar and an expected element in relations between states. Until 1950s, it was provided to meet the need for emergency relief in war-torn countries after World War II (Lancaster, 2007). The creation of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency, and the International Refuge Organization were basically meant to facilitate the short-lived provision of this emergency relief to war-affected countries. However, political and economic developments that followed the Second World War have altered the use of aid from emergency relief to an instrument of Cold War diplomacy (Lancaster, 2007). Since then and after over sixty years, financial assistance that is provided by rich countries to less-fortunate ones has become a permanent foreign policy tool for developed and developing countries alike in pursuance of their national interests (Neumayer, 2003).
In this chapter we discuss the theoretical and conceptual aspects of foreign aid; the chapter digs deeper to present multiple definitions of foreign aid, historical evolution of this aid, theoretical explanations of why governments give aid and the mix of purposes governments pursue with their aid.

**Foreign aid: Definitions**

Financial aid that is provided by governments or international organizations to states and nations bears different terms; the definitions of these terms themselves are different as people who defined them. Foreign aid is one of the familiar terms that are used to refer to financial aid; however its definition is varied and confusing with some associate concepts that also refer to financial aid. For some, foreign aid or foreign assistance encompasses all expenditures provided by developed countries to assist foreign countries in the spheres of economic development, humanitarian assistances, disaster responses, security and military assistance, government and rule of law, health and trade development (Veillette & Division, 2008). According to this definition, foreign aid ranges from financial assistance to the financing of different economic and development programs in a foreign country. While this definition puts emphasis on different purposes of aid allocation, it has overlooked different forms through which aid is given; these include grants, loans and technical assistance etc.

In contrast to this definition, improving human condition is recognized in some definitions as default objectives of foreign aid. For example, Lancaster
(2007: p. 9) uses the term foreign aid to refer to "voluntary transfer of public resources from a government to another independent government, to an NGO, or to international organization with at least 25 percent grant element one goal of which is to improve the human condition in the country receiving the aid. As this definition narrows the purposes of foreign aid to the betterment of human condition in the recipient country, it excludes from the broad category of aid the military assistance or military expenditure abroad, credits and capitals the government provides to finance subsidies and promote investment abroad, expenditures related to intelligence and funding to fight terrorism or international crime. While foreign aid provided under this category can contribute, in a long term, to the betterment of human condition and to the reduction of poverty, their immediate purposes being achieving objectives other than the improvement of human condition exclude them from Lancaster's definition of foreign aid. Additionally, his definition does not include private charitable giving (e.g. contributions from individuals or corporation to NGOs, aid from private philanthropic foundations or corporate entities, or remittance from foreign workers to their home countries) from foreign aid as these types of aid are not provided by governments.

Unlike the standard approach to defining foreign aid by focusing predominantly on the purposes for which the aid is given, Riddell (2007) took different approach by looking at resources of which foreign aid consists of.
Reddell has defined foreign aid as all resources—physical goods, skill and technical know-how, financial grants or loans (at concessional rates)—transferred by donors to recipients. Despite the comprehensiveness of Reddell’s definition in terms of referring to many resources governments use for aid, it leaves many crucial questions unanswered. These questions include who gives aid, to whom and why.

The domination of foreign aid giving by so-called first world or developed countries tempted some scholars to restrict foreign to aid provided by that part of the world. For instance, foreign aid is defined by Lumsdaine (1993: p.33) as "gifts and concessional loans of economic resources, such as finance and technology, employed for economic purposes provided to less developed countries by governments of developed democracies, directly or indirectly". What can be deduced from this definition is that it disregards financial assistance provided by autocratic regimes in the second and their worlds. Middle East is a home to emerging donors whose volume of aid exceeds the target set by the World Bank (Shushan & Marcoux, 2011).

While foreign aid is the standard term to refer to the practice of aid giving, there are other terms that are used interchangeably with foreign aid to refer to aid provided by governments to other government. These terms include Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Official Assistance (OD). ODA and OA are terms coined by Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to describe concessional transfers which contribute to both the development and humanitarian and emergency objectives in advanced nation and countries in transitions (OA) and to lower and middle income countries (ODA) (Riddell, 2007). DAC describes transfer as development aid only if the objective is to promote welfare and development. Like other definitions, the definition of ODA and OA exclude any aid funds raised and allocated by private organizations or foundations, NGOs or individuals.

Navigating through the referred definitions of foreign aid, it is clear that there is no consensus over what constitute foreign aid; however, there is agreement that foreign aid is a voluntary gift from a government to another country for the purpose of developing the recipient country. This aid can take different forms; thus, it can be in the form of cash (grants or concessional loans), or kind (food aid) or in the form of debt relief or technical assistance. This aid can be provided to fund activities like budgetary and balance of payment needs in the beneficiary country, the recipient countries investment projects and research activities, reform in political and economic sphere and humanitarian relief. Added to this, aid can be bilateral, when it is provided by one government to another government, or multilateral, when this aid is received by group of countries indirectly and through governmental organizations.
Of these definitions, none is comprehensive enough to satisfy the author; however, DAC’s definitions and that of Lancaster (2007) are worth considering as they emphasize that aid aims at improving human conditions and reduction of poverty, and that it should come from government. Despite that, they are not void of flaws. The fact that these definitions are largely driven and shaped by donor countries and their scholars, they do not represent the views of recipient countries and emerging donors who do not necessarily apply these definitions to describe their aid allocation. For example Qatar does include financial aid provided by charitable organizations as part of its foreign aid. Added to this, these definitions make no mention of whether conditions are attached to aid, and whether both the donor and recipient countries benefit from aid. Finally, while these definitions partly depict the practice of aid giving, it does not describe the great innovation that has redefined the foreign aid giving since its outset in 1950s. This will be discussed in the following section.

**Historical Evolution of Foreign aid**

Two fundamental developments have paved the way for the setting up foreign aid regime: the work of NGOs in early 1900s, and the establishment of welfare states in 1930s (Thérien, 2002). Before governments embark on extending hands to people abroad, such responsibility was shouldered by private aid in developed states. It was estimated that in 1910 developed countries were already
homes to over 300 NGOs active abroad. Unlike contemporary NGOs, the works of the 1910 NGOs were initially concentrated on short-term humanitarian aid; however they were gradually extended during the inter-war years to long-term development projects in the areas of health, education and agriculture (Thérien, 2002). The work of NGOs in international aid was boosted and expanded by the establishment of the welfare states in the 1930s and 1940s. As the welfare state legitimized government intervention to subside the harmful effects of the market, and to help in strengthening equality as a foundational principle of democracy, they embarked on similar projects abroad to supplement the works of NGOs (Thérien, 2002). To a large extent, foreign aid is a projection abroad of welfare state principles. It was in this context, British provided aid to its colonies acting under the Colonial Development and Welfare act of 1940 (Riddell, 2008). These welfare principles were carried along to international organizations by member countries. Consequently, the notion of development aid became rooted in work of these organizations. For instance, in 1940s, International Labor Organization (ILO) called for aid in order to help it to ameliorate living standards in poor countries. Similarly, in 1943, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) started to receive funds from its member states to help and provide food, medicine and agricultural and industrial goods to more than 50 countries (Riddell, 2008).
Despite this, qualitative and quantitative transformations have occurred in aid disbursement due to structural changes in the international system, such as the rise of the US as hegemonic power in postwar world system, the Cold War, decolonization, the failure of the New International Economic Order and the acceleration of globalization.

The end of the Second World War in favor of the US has enabled the US to strengthen its global presence through the use of foreign aid. Thus, as most of Europe was still in ruins, struggling to recover from the war, and in the face of Moscow's efforts to absorb East and Central Europe into the Soviet bloc, the US resorted to foreign aid as foreign policy tool to thwart the expansion of Soviet Union's influence in Europe. In this context, Washington acted through provision of economic assistance not only to stabilize regimes in Turkey and Greece, but also to enforce her presence in Europe. This move was followed by the Marshall Plan of four years 13 billion dollar aid program for the recovery of war-affected countries in other European countries (Lancaster, 2007). In the wake of the Chinese Revolution and the Korean War, the US also penetrated into Asian countries to preempt the Soviet Union to get a foothold in Asia. Similar pretext aroused the US to extend her aid program to cover African countries amid Soviet presence there (Lancaster, 2007).

The contest and the Cold-War rivalry between the West and Socialist bloc, and mini Cold War between US and the USSR, as to which represents the social
aspiration, contributed in significant expansion of aid distribution. In the heyday of growing rivalry between the US and USSR, and following the death of former Soviet Union leader Josef Starling in 1953, Moscow followed suit by commencing its aid program amid the growing demands for aid to African and Asian countries in pursuit of its strategic interests. In 1960, socialist countries became important aid donors as both China and USSR spent $1.1 billion in aid (Lancaster, 2007).

Although the European countries gained antecedence in giving aid in the decade and a half after the Second World War to their colonies in Africa and Caribbean, they became indifferent to provide aid to these countries after their independence. Thus, the rise of Socialist aspiration in Africa, and the European fright for their former colonies' association with the Soviet Union induced both France and Britain to recognize that they have no substitute but to provide large aid to facilitate the development of their colonies and to sustain the predominance of their influence (Van Der Veen, 2011). Therefore, the French and British governments shifted away from the belief that newly independent states had to be self-financing; they have expanded their aid to these states following the decolonization.

While 1960s witnessed the massive establishment of new bilateral and multilateral aid institutions (like DAC of OECD, Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development and Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development), this
expansion in aid institutions did not match with the sustained expansion of aid. However, at the close of 1960s towards the end of 1970, the failure of the New International Economic Order -which pushed nations into poverty-, has revived the discourse about aid and development (Riddell, 2007). Consequently, with the poverty and unemployment become more explicit, multilateral agencies, especially the World Bank, United Nation Development Program (UNDP) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) geared up their efforts through financial aid to tackle poverty (Ibid).

With the acceleration of globalization- hence interdependence, mobility of ideologies and people and technological advancement- the beliefs that underdevelopment and destitute status of the poor countries constitute a threat to the political, security and economic interests of donor countries, and that the battle for territories and colonies are now replaced by battle for minds and hearts of peoples contributed in the growth of foreign aid in relations between states. The US’s aid to various Middle East countries, EU and DAC’s aid programs to poor countries in Africa and Asia and the Arab Middle East countries’ aid to African countries are more or less on this track. Moreover, the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals in 2000 was also geared towards the amelioration of the living standard and stimulation of economic development of developing countries (Van de Veen, 2011).
Overall, foreign aid has transformed significantly since its commencement in 1950s; structural changes in international context have been critical in this transformation. While foreign aid showed a step-change in response to the dynamics of international relations through its evolution, the question of why governments give aid is not adequately captured in this historical narration. The following section will discuss why governments give aid.

**Why Foreign Aid is Given?**

The reason why governments give aid has been a subject of ideological difference between theorists of International Relations, notably between Realists, Liberals, Marxist and Constructivists scholars. For Realists, aid is nothing but a political tool exploited to amplify national interests. Their belief that states operate in an anarchical system wherein power, security and survival are their prime concern propelled them to argue that aid is a diplomatic tool. Therefore, according to this thesis, the default purpose of governments' disbursement of foreign aid is to enhance their national power and security (Liska, 1960; cited in Lancaster, 2007). Unlike the Realists, Liberalists believe that foreign aid reflect the willingness of states to cooperate in addressing problems of interdependence and globalization. Liberalists have drawn their conclusions from the amount of aid that was funneled through international institutions to combat infectious disease worldwide. To them, this suffices to argue that foreign aid is meant to
expand cooperation between states in their collective efforts to address global issues (Lancaster, 2007).

In contrast to Liberalists and Realist, Marxists see foreign aid as an exploitive tool at the disposal of so-call capitalist countries. Their take on why governments give aid is found in dependency, postmodern and anti-globalization cousins. Thus, they make strong connection between the central world capitalism's disbursement of aid and their tendency to exploit and control developing countries. The fact that aid is sometimes goes with conditions or tying aid to export of goods and services from donors countries or securing access to raw materials in developing countries constitute an example of the exploitive nature of foreign aid practice (Lumsdain, 1993).

Last theorists who explains the rationale behind aid allocation is Constructivists. Like Liberalists, constructivists devoid foreign aid from any interest for the donor country; rather they believe that foreign aid is a manifestation of a norm that has developed in relations between states that rich countries should provide assistance to poor countries to ensure better quality of lives for poor nations (Lumsdain, 1993).

Away from the common theories in the realm of foreign aid, the religion of Islam gives explanation of why Muslims, be they countries or individuals, give aid to other Muslims. Since the early Islamic era and continuing through to the present, beneficent giving through Zakat and Waqf has been a core aspect of
Muslim belief and practice. This is rooted in the religious precepts and ideals articulated in the Qur'an and the reports of the words and actions of the prophet Muhammad (hadith). The interpretive writings of Muslim scholars over the centuries have analyzed and elaborated the details of this doctrine and practice (Singer, 2012). Aid giving, therefore, has been and continues to be an important factor in shaping Islamic societies and cultures. Without an appreciation of this fundamental aspect of Islam, it would be difficult to have a full understanding of Islamic societies, either in the past or in the present. By drawing on this, Islamic philanthropy and charity in Muslim society are fulfillment of obligation of helping poor be they individuals or countries. Therefore aid allocation by Muslim countries via NGOs or states is viewed in this context (Singer, 2012). This might explains why countries like Qatar consider aid giving by their charitable organizations as foreign aid.

Broadly speaking, none of the theories explained above gives sufficient explanation of why foreign aid is provided. Each of these theories elucidates one aspect of multiple purposes that governments put into account when disbursing their scare resources to other nations. However, Realists and Marxists’ arguments seem to be compatible, to some extent, with the practice of foreign aid, be they bilateral or multilateral aid. In today's world politics, hence the struggle over influence and power, aid that is being disbursed through regional and international institutions serve the collective interests of member states, or at least powerful
members for that matter. Thus the Liberalists and Constructivists’ claims that aid reflect the cooperation between nations to address shared or poor countries problems is just is superficial motivation; the hidden motivation is actually found in the tenets of Realism and Marxism. The developmental loans that International Monetary Fund IMF and the Word Bank WB provide to African countries are tied with economic and political conditions of structural adjustment program and good governance requirement; this in its essence is imposition of certain values that are not necessary compatible with the historical and social contexts of the recipient countries. Moreover, the US aid to so-called confrontation zone in the Middle East, first and foremost is meant to neutralize security threats that may threaten US strategic interests in the region. Similarly, the recent humanitarian supports offered by the UK and the US to Ebola affected countries in the West Africa is believed to be a pretext to control natural resource of these countries. This is even more acute when the colonial linkage between US and Liberia, and the UK and Sera Lion, and the initial deployment of troops instead of medical staff to these countries are considered.

Overall, regardless of theoretical disagreement over the purposes of foreign aid, in practice, foreign aid is disbursed to achieve one or more of the following purposes: 1- Diplomatic or political purposes: While this can serve other purposes (developmental purposes, humanitarian and cultural purposes), its default purpose is to manage the international relations of the donor country. It
involves international security and international political goals that a donor country pursues in its relations. For example, the US aid to support the Middle East peace process involves international security concern. 2-Development purpose: This aims at supporting economic and social development of recipient countries. Using aid to stimulate economic growth and to reduce poverty in developing world is apparent purposes of concessional loans that are provided by international institutions like IMF and the World Bank. 3-Humanitarian purposes: Until 1940s, aid was disbursed by NGOs in response to critical situations that involve life of human beings. This type of aid is still prominent in the activities of NGOs that work in poor countries that frequently lack necessary resources to accommodate the needs of disaster victims. The International Red Cross Organizations, Oxfam and other local based NGOs’ works fall in this category. 4-Commercial purposes: This includes using aid to expand the donor country's exports or to secure access to raw materials in recipient countries. China and Japan aid to Africa typically bend to serve these purposes. 5- Cultural purposes: this involves the use of aid to promote culture of the donor country through education; or to strengthen and expand particular religious belief in the recipient countries. Charitable organizations from the Arab Middle East countries are famous in this domain.

While these five purposes are not the exhausted purposes, they explain, to a great extent, the rationale behind aid allocation by many countries.
Navigating through the historical development, it becomes obvious that foreign aid, as it stands today, has been an effective, yet a controversial foreign policy tool. While its exploitation in international relations was initially restricted to capitalist and socialist as well as communist camps, the swift of power from the North to South has accompanied the emergence of new donors in middle income countries of the South. Thus, foreign aid becomes a dominant tool in south-south cooperation. One part of the world where foreign aid has a momentum is the Arabian Gulf. In light of their limited foreign policy tool, and with abundant oil revenues, these countries’ foreign policy towards developing countries is facilitated by foreign aid. Qatar as emerging and ambitious small Gulf state is outstanding in this respect. In the following chapter, I present how this naturally gas-rich country exploits its economic edge to manage its relations with world in general, and with Africa in particular.
Chapter Two

Qatar Foreign Policy towards Africa: Strategies and Tactics -1971-2013

Since its independence, Qatar has been a small power among the biggest countries. With narrow vision of foreign policy ambition Qatar remained behind Saudi Arabia to lead the regional policy throughout 1970s and 1980s. The recent surge in Qatar foreign policy is attributed to the ascendancy of Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalif Al-Thani to the throne through a bloodless coup in 1995. Sheikh Hamad's awareness about the limitation of Qatar’s location, and his appreciation of how he can neutralize this limitation and constraints to remain independent guided him in projecting Qatar foreign policy objectives (Roberts, 2012a). Qatar engagement with the US is driven by this principle. While America remains the main protector of Qatar, the later diversifies its dependency to maintain independent action. Towards this direction, Sheikh Hamad made good use of Qatar energy nexus to lure countries like Britain, China and Japan to be concern about Qatar security and to be ready to protect Qatar for the sake of their energy security (Roberts, 2012b). In the MENA region, Qatar pursued proactive foreign policy to place itself in a prominent position in the regional politics; this ambition is extended to include Africa where Qatar exploited different foreign policy instruments to...
create for itself a favorable environment for its investments and to get political weight through its humanitarian work (Woertz, Pradhan, Biberovic, & Jingzhon, 2008).

In the context of discussion of how the Arab Spring might have changed Qatar foreign aid flow to Africa; this chapter borrows from Foreign Policy Change Approach\(^3\) to understand factors that have determined changes in Qatar foreign policy tactics and strategies in relation to its engagement with Africa. It will be shown that changes that occurred in Qatar foreign policy tactics and strategies are driven by changes in leadership and in regional structure. While these changes have significant impacts on tactics (methods or instruments) of Qatar foreign policy towards Africa; it could not bring similar changes in Qatar foreign policy strategies. Thus, despite the evolution of Qatar’s foreign policy tactics— which now include foreign aid, mediation and humanitarian work—, Qatar

\(^3\) Foreign Policy Change Approach explains notion of changes in relations to foreign policy. According to this approach foreign policy changes comprises two main types of changes: Tactical and Strategic. While tactical changes is refereed to shift within the framework of policies that focuses on method and instruments, strategic changes is refereed to fundamental shifts in foreign policy goal and the state position in international system. This approach identified three factors that are considered as sources of changes in foreign policy. these include (1) changes in individuals or leadership (foreign policy changes due to cognitive and motivational psychology of individuals or leaders); (2) changes in state institutions, domestic and regional structure (domestic and regional structure provide clues to the possibilities of changes and obstacles to changes within a given polity); (3) changes in political regimes (state moving from democratic to authoritarian regime changes foreign policy of that state).

While these three factors are worth examining in the case of Qatar, a close examination of Qatar foreign policy since independent in 1971 indicates that the most relevant factors that brought changes to Qatar foreign policy are leadership changes and changes in regional structure. To this end, these two factors are selected to examine their effects on Qatar foreign policy tactics and strategies (Alden & Aran, 2012)
foreign policy strategies in Africa remained revolved- to a great extent- around pursuing immediate political, economic and cultural objectives. Therefore, moving towards long-term strategic political and security cooperation between Qatar and African countries remains in the footnote of Qatar policy strategies in Africa. In this, Qatar shows no difference from overall stands of the GCC foreign policies towards Africa.

To further discuss this argument, the first part of the chapter focuses on the impacts of leadership changes and regional structure on the source of changes to Qatar foreign policy in general; the second part is dedicated to examine how these two factors have determined Qatar foreign policy tactics and strategies in Africa from 1970s to 2013.

**Qatar Foreign Policy: Strategies and Tactics**

A close examination of Qatar foreign policy, form its independence to 2013, two factors have been instrumental in bringing changes in Qatar foreign policy strategies and tactics; these include changes in structure of the regional system, and leadership changes.

1. **Structure of Regional power and Qatar Foreign policy-1970s to 1990s**

Changes in Qatar foreign policy tactics and strategies have been linked to power structure that prevailed in the Gulf and the Middle East regions from 1970s
to 1980s. In light of this prevailing regional structure personalized in the vacuum of power created by the British departure and regional instability brought by the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Arab Israel conflict, Iran-Iraq War and Iraq invasion of Kuwait, Qatar foreign policy strategies remained centered on maintaining the status quos at regional and domestic levels and promoting Arab unity. These strategies reflected the strategic priorities shared by other Gulf countries (Roberts, 2012a). Such common foreign policy approach was necessitated by political instability at regional level. Under these regional turbulences, Qatar did not conduct its foreign policy independently; rather it counted on Riyadh for direction in policy matters and in terms of basic security. Thus, from the end of 1970s to early 1990s, Qatar followed the typical foreign policy decisions taken by other Gulf countries and it pursued no unconventional or odd policies which Qatar has recently become so famous for (Roberts, 2012a).

The Iranian Revolution of 1979 has provoked Gulf regimes and intensified their sense of insecurity in the middle of vacuum of power left by the British. Thus, the perceived threat of the contagion of the Khomeini brand of Islamic fundamentalism and his commitment to export the revolution to countries in the Persian Gulf propelled the Gulf States to embark on a steady build-up hoping to maintain the status quos and offset the Iranian threats. The coordination of the Gulf States' foreign policies in the face of these threats has culminated in the establishment of the GCC in 1980 (F. G. I. Gause, 1994).
Similar to the threats of the Iranian revolution, the Iraq-Iran War has consumed foreign policy orientation of the Gulf States, including Qatar, in terms of time and resources. The belief that this war was a natural response to the threats of Iran’s Islamic revolution necessitated regular cash infusion, stood approximately at 40 billion, from the Gulf states, along with other forms of aid to help Iraq in containing Iran's threats to maintain regional stability (Gause III, 1999).

While the GCC states’ supports of Iraq should have created an opportunity for future cooperation between Iraq and the GCC states, Iraq has surprised its Gulf neighbors when it invaded Kuwait in 1990. Not only did this war increase sense of insecurity within the GCC states, it has also consumed foreign policy efforts of the GCC states. However, The US led liberation of Kuwait from Saddam Hussein in 1991 not only diluted the Iraqi threats, but it has also provided vital comfort to a small but wealthy countries like Qatar to feel less reliant on Saudi Arabia for their protection as the US became the main protector of its regional allies including Qatar (F. G. Gause & III, 2009).

In addition to maintaining regional stability, Arab unity was a core strategy of Qatar foreign policy. This was reflected in the Gulf general stand towards Arab-Israel conflict. Collectively, Gulf States voted for anti-Israeli steps and they were willing to concede that they had an economic obligation towards the
Palestinians (Rosman-Stollman, 2004). During the October War in 1973, the Gulf States collectively refused to sell oil to states supporting Israel in a boycott initiated by Saudi Arabia. Following the Camp David Accords of September 1978, Qatar joined other Gulf States to isolate Egypt diplomatically; this demonstrated the centrality of the Arab unity in Qatar foreign policy objectives (Rosman-Stollman, 2004).

Whereas Qatar pursued regional stability, the ensuring of regime survival and promoting Arab unity as its foreign policy goals and strategies during 1970s and 1980s, it was bent upon mix of foreign aid, economic boycotts and diplomatic isolation as foreign policy tactics and instruments to reach the stated foreign policy strategies. In maintaining regional stability and survival of the monarchical regimes, Qatar employed coordinated diplomacy and foreign aid to contain the Iranian and Iraqi threats to the status quo. The same instruments were used to support Arab causes in Arab-Israel war; these were supplemented by economic boycotts against countries that sympathized with Israel, and diplomatic isolation as it happened with Egypt in 1973.

2- Leadership Change, the Arab Spring and Qatar Proactive Foreign Policy-1995-2013

While the prevalent power structure in the Gulf regional system guided Qatar foreign policy to remain in harmony with that of its Gulf neighbors in the quest of
maintaining the regional stability, the decades that followed 1990s showed significant changes in strategies and tactics of Qatar foreign policy (Peterson, 2013). Although the fade of Iran’s threats of exporting the revolution, the end of Iraq-Iran war and containment of Saddam’s threats by UN sanctions were partially accounted for these substantial changes, the combination of leadership change and changes in the power structure of the Middle East in the wake of the Arab Spring are largely accounted for these changes.

a- Sheikh Hamad the Pioneer of Qatar Foreign Policy

The emergence of Qatar’s power and influence in the Gulf region and the Middle East at large is largely ascribed to the small state’s foreign policy activism formulated by Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani during seventeen years of his Emeriship (From 1995 to 2013). With the support of his charismatic wife, Shaikha Moza bint Nasser al-Misnad, and his Prime Minister Sheikh Jasim bin Hamad Al-Thani, Sheik Hamamd crafted an innovative foreign policy for his country that shifted Qatar’s foreign policy agenda away from his father’s acquiescence to Saudi hegemony in the region (Cooper & Momani, n.d.). Sheikh Hamad’s belief that Qatar needed to fundamentally change its position to become a leading, moderate and internationally-focused country guided him to expand Qatar foreign policy strategies beyond the traditional one. Consequently, while maintaining regional stability, ensuring regime survival and promoting Arab unity remained among the core strategies of Qatar foreign policy, Qatar- under the
leadership of Sheikh Hamad- has strategized its foreign policy to foster a reputation for itself as indispensable and different type of regional and international actor. This strategy has, in many instances, conflicted with strategies pursued by Qatar with its Gulf and Arab neighbors at regional and international levels.

In pursuance of this new foreign policy strategies, Sheikh Hamad exploited Qatar’s abundant natural resources to lure world powers and emerging economies to be concerned about Qatar economy and security and make them feel about Qatar presence as important strategic partner in the Middle East (Roberts, 2012a). In this direction, Qatar has developed a long-term strategic partnership with the US through security arrangement to offset geopolitical threats that it may face. The Constructing of the US airbase facility in Al-Udaid in 1996 -which came as materialization of this arrangement- was viewed as Qatar’s efforts not only to entice the US away from its Prince Sultan airbase in Saudi Arabia, but also to provide protection for Doha as it embark on its proactive foreign policy (Roberts, 2012a). On the other hand, Qatar made itself indispensable to some of the world’s most important actors by selling large amounts of gas to key countries such as the UK, China, Japan and India (Roberts, 2012a).

Beyond the engagement with the West and the rising economies of Asia as indispensable partner, Qatar sought to carve out the image of different actor in the Middle East region. The launch of Al Jazeera in 1995, as the Arab world’s first
all-news satellite television network, was one way of Doha’s efforts to foster its reputation in the region as different actor. In addition of being a tool for legitimizing Qatar foreign policy relations and carving out a favorable image for itself as indispensable international and regional actor, Al-Jazeera has been critical about policies of number of Arab governments. This has led many countries, including Iran, Iraq, Israel and Saudi Arabia, to sanction Al-Jazeera in some ways (Khatib, 2013). Additionally, Qatar has become the preferred destination for many political dissents in the region. In this regard, Doha harbored the region unwelcome political figures like Hamas’s Khaled Misel and leaders of Muslim Brotherhood from Syria and Egypt, some of whom have been granted Qatari citizenship. The discomfort and displeasure of Doha’s international and regional allies to Doha’s granting of asylum to these dissents confirmed Qatar efforts to foster its reputation as a unique actor (Peterson, 2013).

Similarly, Qatar’s determination to present itself as distinctive actor escorted Qatar to maintain balanced diplomacy. While Qatar has friendly relations with Israel and the United States, it also maintained strong relations with regional ‘pariah states’ and stated enemies of the United States: Syria and Iran. Qatar has also donated money to Hamas and Hezbollah, both plain enemies of Israel, classified as terrorist groups by the United States and other Western states(Roberts, 2012b). On the other hand, although Arab unity remained vivid as one Qatar foreign policy strategies, Qatar has taken foreign policy decisions that
are confirmed to be antithetical to Arab unity. For example, while Qatar remained loyal to collective Arabs’ stand toward Arab-Israel conflict, Qatar maintained informal relations with Israel. In this regard, Qatar and Israel commenced quiet business relations in 1996. In that same year, Qatar established its first trade office in Israel and the Israelis opened their second office in Doha. Qatar commercial relations with Israel is not the only incidence that questioned Qatar loyalty to Arab cause (Roberts, 2012a). In 2006, Qatar defied the Arab League consensus by refusing to vote for Jordan’s Prince Zeid for the post of UN Secretary General and instead supported South Korea’s Ban Ki Moon. Additionally, despite that most of the Gulf States preserved to show open relations with Iran, Qatar remained close friend of Iran. In 2007 Qatar invited Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmedinejad to a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) meeting, to the dismay of both regional and world leaders. Subsequently, Qatar used its 2006–07 UN Security Council seat to defy the United States by disagreeing to pressure Iran on nuclear proliferation in 2006 (Roberts, 2012a).

The above instances in Qatar foreign policy behaviors confirmed the occurrence of qualitative changes in Qatar foreign policy strategies since the ascendancy of Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al-Thani. The dynamics of politics personalized in the Arab Spring has also expanded Qatar foreign strategies in the Middle East region.
b- Qatar Foreign Policy amid changes in the power structure of the Middle East

The consumption of foreign and domestic policies of Middle East traditional heavyweights by the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011 has given rise in the influence of countries like Qatar. Thus, in light of the vacuum of power in the Middle East, Qatar strategized its foreign policy to occupy the vacant leadership position of the Middle East. In this context, Qatar pursued high profile and proactive diplomacy; hence, it has been active in supporting the people in Arab Spring countries. Through its proactive foreign policy, it was able to put an end to Qaddafi’s regime in Libya; it led regional and international efforts to isolate Bashar Assad of Syria; it supported and influenced in Egypt revolution; it helped Egypt Muslim brotherhood to win the Egyptian elections and it actively supported Islamic parties of Tunis to strengthen their grip on power in Tunis. In the Middle of this self-assigning leadership role, Doha became central pivot for hosting political and diplomatic conferences as it hosted various talks on Libya and Syria crises (Colombo, 2012).

With regard to Qatar foreign policy tactics, not only did Qatar foreign policy strategies change as the result of changes in leadership and structure of power in the Middle East; rather the tactics and instruments Qatar employed to pursue these

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4 Damascus, Riyadh, Cairo and Baghdad have political, economic and diplomatic significance of Middle East political, economic, military and ideological power base.
strategies have shown profound changes. While foreign aid was familiar foreign policy tactics since 1970s, this instrument was supplemented by an array of wide ranges of new tactics. Prominent among them is public diplomacy. In this regard, Qatar used its financial clout to host multilateral conferences. For example, it hosted the largest conference on United Nations Convention on Climate change from 26th of November to 6th of December 2012. Qatar also aggressively and successfully used sport as part of its public diplomacy strategy. In 2006 it successfully hosted the XV Asian Games; and has just won the bid to host the 2022 World Cup amidst allegation of corruption and human rights violations which persisted to threaten or undermine this unprecedented accomplishment(Antwi-Boateng, 2013).

Foreign aid and humanitarian assistance are yet other foreign policy strategies that Qatar utilizes to yield its strategies. In addition its regular aid flow to countries Middles East, Asia and African countries, Qatar provided $100 million dollars assistance to the U.S in the wake of a devastating natural disaster of Katrina(Antwi-Boateng, 2013).

Additionally, Qatar involved itself in mediation process and it has proved to be one of the world’s most proactive mediators and a neutral peacemaker in many of the international and intra-national conflicts brewing across the Middle East region(Kamrava, 2011b). Surprisingly, the Arab Spring has allowed Qatar to consider military intervention to pursue its foreign policy strategy. In this regard,
Qatar intervened in Libya along with NATO forces to overthrow Qaddafi’s regime (Khatib, 2013).

**Explaining Qatar Foreign Policy Tactics and Strategies in Africa**

1- *Regional Turbulences and Qatar Foreign Policy towards Africa*

Qatar foreign policy towards Africa is relatively new and dates to 1971 when Qatar completely took over its foreign policy after the departure of Britain. However, the connection between Qatar and Africa- which is echoed in the context of the Gulf socio-economic linkage with Africa- predated 1970s. The Gulf-African connection dates back to earliest days of humanity’s spread around the world (Peel & Peel, 2013). In those days, relations between the two regions were tied to the movement of people and goods which has resulted in the settlement of large diasporas communities in both regions. In seventh century, these relations further strengthened through the spread of Islam in Africa and the subsequent annual migration of Africans to Mecca for pilgrimage (Wai, 2014). However, this socio-economic relation was de-linked with the ascendancy of European in Africa that disrupted slave trade which was massively practiced by Omani Empire in Eastern Africa from 1600s to 1800s (Wai, 2014). Notwithstanding this, the struggles of 1950s to 1970s’ liberalization movements in Africa and the Arab Israel war have re-connected the Gulf countries and Africans; these two developments were determinant factors that pushed Arabs in
general and Africans to exchange diplomatic supports and cooperation which were required for the solving of their common concerns (Talbot, & Wallace, 2006). It was under shadow of this Arab-African cooperation the Gulf-African relations evolved in early 1960s to the end of 1970s.

Although Qatar was an emerging independent state during the heydays of the Gulf-African relations, the Arab search for diplomatic supports from African countries in their war with Israel has inspired Qatar along with other Gulf countries (notably oil producing countries like Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates) to provide financial supports to developing countries in Africa (Hunter, 1984). This marked the beginning of Qatar foreign policy towards Africa, which reflected the overall policy strategic priorities of the Gulf in Africa. Thus, Qatar did not pursue independent foreign policy approach towards Africa from 1970s to 1990s; neither the tactics nor the strategies of its foreign policy were different from that of the Gulf States.

In the context of the Arab-Israel conflict, the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973- made foreign aid available for foreign policy tactics to Gulf States for use in their pursuit of specific national interests in Africa. The nature of Afro-Arab cooperation determined that political interests take precedence over economic, humanitarian and religious considerations for both bilateral and multilateral aid. Thus, Qatar foreign policy strategies in Africa was linked to the pursuance of

The decade that followed 1970s has witnessed a setback in Qatar foreign policy towards Africa due to the wane of Arab-Israel conflict after the Camp David agreement in 1978, but also more importantly due to regional crisis in the Gulf which were personalized in Iranian revolution, Iraq-Iran war and Iraq invasion of Kuwait. The 1978 Camp David agreement which marked an end to enduring Arab-Israel conflict has reduced political significance of Africa in the eyes of the Gulf States as they could not justify their engagement with Africans in light of irrelevance of gaining African support for the Arab Israel conflict after the peace deal between Israel and Egypt. The periphery of Africa in the foreign policy of the Gulf States deepened further as the results of Iran Revolution, Iraq-Iran War and Iraq invasion of Kuwait. These regional developments prompted the Gulf States to be preoccupied with regional and domestic security concerns as well as establishment of the regional bloc, the GCC (Boos, 2008).

Notwithstanding the relative pause in the Gulf political engagement with Africa during 1980s and early 1990s, this period witnessed the whetting of Gulf States’ religious interests in Africa as a result of Saudi-Iranian competition over leadership of Muslim world in the aftermath of Iranian revolution (Amirahmadi, 1993), and due to the post-independent religiously motivated conflicts in Africa, in which Gulf countries are perceived to have supported Muslims in these
conflicts (Akinsanya, 2010). Thus, during 1980s, Qatar’s aid were distributed through bilateral organizations like the Muslim League and Multilateral Islamic financial institutions like Islamic Development Bank to provide aid to Africa Muslim countries for economic and social development projects, social welfare programmers, educational and cultural activities and religious-oriented projects and activities (Williams, 2011).

In sum, the fact that Qatar did not develop independent foreign policy approach towards Africa from early 1970s to the first half of 1990s did not necessary mean that Qatar was irrelevant in the middle of the Gulf state’s engagement with Africa. Rather, Qatar foreign policy tactics and strategies remained highly linked to overall Gulf foreign policy priorities. Thus, beside political interests, Gulf countries employed their financial clout to pursue religious interests in Africa during the period of 1970s to 1990s. The events of Arab-Israel conflict, the Iranian revolution, Iraq-Iran war and Iraq invasion of Kuwait were determinant in defining these strategies and tactics.

2- Leadership Change and Whetting of Qatar Interests in Africa

Undoubtedly, the relief of the Gulf region from the regional crises of Iranian revolution and two Gulf Wars has contributed in widening the scope of Qatar foreign policy activities; however the concurrent leadership change in 1995 accounted for the qualitative changes in tactics and strategies of Qatar foreign

5 Especially in Chad, Ethiopia and Eretria.
policy towards Africa. Since his ascendancy to power, Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al-Thani realized the vulnerability of Qatar which stems from its dependence on food importation in light of lack of arable lands for agricultural investments; its dependence on hydrocarbon extraction particularly natural gas to drive its economy; and its small territorial size and small population size as well as relative military force. Out of the necessity to protect its sovereignty and international interests, Hamad has developed a seemingly unique foreign policy to weather Qatar vulnerability (Roberts, 2012a). This has brought Africa to Qatar’s foreign policy attention, and it has determined its foreign policy strategies in Africa and tactics it employs to reach these strategies.

In Qatar’s quest for food security and diversification of its economy, it employed the combination of economic and political tactics to achieve food security and diversification of its economy. On the one hand, it has depended on foreign aid to create favorable environments for its investments and land purchases in the recipient countries. This is evident in the East Africa where, by virtue of its geographical proximity to Qatar, has been the hotspot for Qatar land purchases and investments within Africa (Jason, 2010). Qatar agro-investment in East Africa becomes necessary when it is considered that Qatar imports 90% of its food from around the world, (Brazil, the Philippines, Australia and Saudi Arabia to name just a few suppliers). The reliance on these limited external actors for food security has been disadvantageous for Qatar. The lengths of the routes
that food takes to reach Qatar make it vulnerable to geopolitical shocks. In the event of conflict in the region, food supply could be choked off at the Strait of Hormuz; it could be choked off at its border with Saudi Arabia and the larger, more militarized states in the region could choke off air supplies of food to Qatar as well (Jason, 2010). Consequently, the interest of protecting itself from catastrophe, Qatar aligns itself with multiple actors in East Africa to diversify sources of its food security. For example Hassad Food, one of the five subsidiaries of Qatar Sovereign Fund and which current strategy focuses on investing in existing agricultural business and exporting the products to Qatar, began acquiring farmland for agribusiness in Africa. In 2009, Qatar purchased 250,000 hectares of land in the Sudan (Hassad Food 2009) and 400,000 in Kenya (Makutsa 2010,).

In the realm of economic diversification, Qatar Petroleum (QP) and its international subsidiary QPI are exploiting on the African continent. For example QPI has a share subscription to 15% of Total E&P Congo (TEPC) relating to nine producing assets and three exploration licenses in the country (Energy Boardroom 2014; Tuttle 2013). Moreover, Qatar National Bank’s QNB has made a largest initial entry into Africa by investing in the Togo-based Ecobank Transnational Inc. QNB became the largest shareholder with 23.5 percent stake after making two separate purchases of 12.5% followed by a second 11% purchase (Sharif and Tuttle 2014).
In addition to food security and diversification of economy purposes, Qatar’s inherent vulnerability as a small state in a turbulent region has forced its leaders to present the state as a neutral entity that is willing to work with all sides (Roberts, 2012a). This has reflected in its foreign policy strategies and tactics in Africa. Through mediation, humanitarian assistance and foreign aid Qatar has been trying to secure strong foothold in various African countries. In relation to mediation, Qatar has experienced mediating conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea and part of that negotiation included financial support for development projects in these countries (Kamrava, 2011b).

With regards to humanitarian assistance, in Mali and Central Africa, the Qatari Red Crescent and Qatar Charity have recently been active in supporting refugees and coordinating humanitarian interventions in these countries (Khatib, 2013). The willingness to get out in front of a conflict and show commitment as an outside entity by putting your own resources to bear to promote the prospect of peace has the potential to carry political weight for Qatar. However, it remains to be seen how this will yield the intended results for Qatar given the complexities within African societies in terms of the diversity of peoples, ethnicities and religions that sometimes clash. This is even more acute when one considers Ethiopian accusation of Qatar for bias towards Eritrea which culminated in diplomatic row between Qatar and Ethiopia. Additionally, Qatar humanitarian activities in the North of Mali has sparked rumors that Qatar is using
humanitarian missions as an excuse to send weapons to Arab armed groups in northern Mali (Khatib, 2013). This allegation tends to prove the assumption that Qatar’s tendency to align with Islamic group in the Middle East is reflected in its activities in Africa. While it is difficult to verify this allegation, what remains clear is that Qatar humanitarian work is limited to African Muslim countries, or regions populated by Muslims. This confirmed that Qatar uses humanitarian activities as foreign policy tactics to promote Islam and support Muslims.

Generally Qatar foreign policy has witnessed profound changes in terms of strategies and tactics; these changes were driven by changes in leadership and dynamics of politics at regional level. While the turbulent nature of the Gulf region and the Middle East overall has determined that Qatar pursued regional stability as focus of its foreign policy strategies, the leadership changes in 1995 has expanded the scope and the scale of Qatar foreign policy to include carving out an image of indispensable and different actor. The vacuum of power that was created by the Arab Spring whetted Qatar ambition of regional leadership. The innovative foreign policy of Qatar is also mirrored in its engagement in Africa. While the regional crises limited Qatar foreign policy strategies in Africa to the pursuance of political and religious interests from 1970s to 1980s; such strategic has extended to include economic, political and religious interests following the leadership change. However, the qualitative changes in Qatar foreign policy tactics are not reflected in foreign policy strategies. Thus, strategies of
cooperation between Qatar and African countries in political and security spheres remain periphery in Qatar foreign policy strategy.

While foreign aid was used as an instrument in Qatar foreign policy approach to Africa, what remains unclear is that whether the recent regional turbulence personalized in the Arab Spring will increase or decrease the flow of Qatar aid to Africa in the pursuance of its different economic, political and regions strategies. The following chapter will provide answers to this question.
Chapter Three
The Arab Spring and Changes in Qatar Foreign Aid to Africa

The hyper activism in Qatar foreign policy in the reign of the former Emir, Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al-Thani, was convoyed with parallel activism in the range of foreign policy instruments labored by the small rich Gulf state to advance its national and regional ambitions. Prominent among these instruments is foreign aid. The past ten years was prosperous moment for the large scale use of foreign aid in Qatar foreign policy (Kamrava, 2013). Until this period, Qatar primarily accounted on traditional diplomacy to manage its foreign policy with the wider world. In contrast to its rich neighbors of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, which have their national agencies for the administration of their foreign aid, little was known or noted about Qatar involvement in foreign aid business apart from its contribution to multilateral aid institutions at regional and international levels. However, with the Emirship of Sheikh Hamad in 1995, Qatar used its financial hedge to explore the world of foreign aid hence it became an emerging Arab aid donor; resultantly, foreign aid is being enveloped in Qatar foreign policy and it became as part and parcel in its instrument. In this regard, not only did the geographical coverage of Qatar development assistance stops at its immediate neighbors in the Middle East region, rather it has surpassed the
Middle East regional boundary to cover continents of Asia, Europe, America and Africa (Antwi-Boateng, 2013).

With regards to Africa, the revival of the Gulf-African ties and the emergence of Africa as target destination for Gulf agricultural production and capital investment permitted wide ranges of Africa countries to be considered by Qatar in its foreign aid allocations. Similarly, Qatar humanitarian operation has also stormed the continent, and wherever Qatar could spot potential political, religious and economic opportunities in the continent, its charitable organizations supplement governmental efforts to turn those opportunities into its interests.

In light of the eruption of the Arab Spring and the consequent upward and downward of Qatar foreign policy trend, this chapter presents changes that occurred in the architecture of Qatar foreign aid in general, and the reflection of these changes in Qatar foreign aid flow to Africa. However, the first part of the chapter briefly examines Qatar foreign aid in terms of institutions that are active in the management of this complex business of the government. The remaining part of the chapter demonstrates findings in relations to changes in the pattern of Qatar foreign aid allocation from 2010 to 2013. In the final section of the chapter, the discussion will revolve around the extent to which the Arab Spring has shaped Qatar foreign aid in general and the flow of this aid to Africa in particular.
Qatar Foreign Aid Donors: Government and its Partners

In a sharp contrast to the concepts of foreign aid, which restrict the definitions of foreign aid to resources disbursed by governments, what is considered as foreign aid in Qatari context is not exclusively a jurisdiction of the government. The Qatari government along with considerable number of charitable organizations and foundations operate coordinately to project political and economic interests of the state of Qatar through foreign aid disbursement. The envelopment of NGOs in Qatar foreign aid is officially recognized by the state of Qatar in its report about its external assistance:

“Qatar foreign aid contains the details of external assistance offered by the government and people of Qatar to the peoples and governments of the world, via official donor bodies, charitable associations and institutions, and humanitarian organizations, which have contributed generously to reduce the suffering of victims of national disasters and humanitarian crises. The government and people of Qatar have provided grants and donations to governments, organizations and individuals, through a framework of development cooperation with these countries and organizations, which have applied for donations and assistance in various aspects of reconstruction and sustainable development” (Foreign Aid Report 2010-2011; p.18). Thus institutions that disburse Qatar foreign aid include the government ministries and charitable organizations and institutions.
1- The Government

Foreign Ministry of the State of Qatar is the focal agent in managing Qatar foreign aid. The International Cooperation Department at the ministry, which was tasked as the central body for such activities since 2010, is directly in charge of compiling and monitoring all government and non-government Qatari external assistance. The department is also tasked with the preparation of periodic and annual reports on Qatar’s external assistance (Foreign Aid Report 2010-2011; p.19).

Apparently, the Emir Diwan and Ministry of Finance and Economy are also believed to engage, along with Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the disbursement of Qatar foreign aid. However, due to the secrecy and lack of accountability and transparency in relations to the public fund management in the Gulf in general and in Qatar in particular verification of the pattern of this aid disbursement is of a hard task. Despite this, coordination is believed to exist between these three governmental bodies in overseeing some of the outstanding financial commitments obligations made by the state of Qatar. These include the State of Qatar’s commitment of QR 912.5 million in 2009 during the Gulf donors’ conference in Riyadh to the reconstruction of Gaza; the State of Qatar’s commitment at the New York conference of 2010 to the reconstruction of Haiti
with QR 73 million; Qatar's commitment of supporting the Comoros Island with a payment of QR 113 million; Qatar grant of QR 365 million to Japan following the Tohoku earthquake in Japan and Qatar’s commitment and grants of billions of dollars to various countries of the Arab Spring during 2011 to 2014 (Foreign Aid Report 2010-2011; p.10).

In addition to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Emir Diwan and Ministry of Finance and Economy, Ministry of Endowment and Islamic Affairs via General Directorate of Endowments (Awqaf) and Zakat Fund are other donors that disburse Qatar external aid. These two institutions operate under the directives of the ministry, and their operations go beyond the territory of Qatar. For example, the General Directory of Endowment spends millions of Qatari Riyals annually to fund several educational and social projects and religious programs in Europe, Asia and Africa. In this regard, it has funded the construction of Maifar Islamic Center in Manchester UK, and it has also built Islamic Center in Croatia as well as other small scale programs in Africa and Asia (Website of Awqaf).

2- Charity Institutions and Humanitarian Organizations

Qatar charity institutions and humanitarian organizations are indispensable partners of Qatar government in the aid business. These humanitarian organizations engage in humanitarian and development issues at regional and international levels. They are also involved in crisis and natural disasters, and they are active in a number of vital sectors and areas. There relations to the
government of Qatar rest in that fact that these bodies receive government’s support or assistance with their programs and projects as well as budgetary support from the state. Moreover their external projects, in terms of recipient countries and the type of the project, are determined by the policy framework set by the government to project national interests of the state. This is evident more in the cases of Qatar Charity and Qatar Red Crescent which are regarded as the extension of the state apparatus. In addition to funds they receive from the government, these charities also collect funds from individuals in the forms of charity and donation. These institutions and organizations include:

*a- Qatar Charitable Society*

The Qatar Charitable Society was established in 1992 based on the law governing private associations and institutions in the State of Qatar. Its activities spread to cover 45 countries located throughout the world, particularly in Africa and Asia. In these continents, Charitable Society cooperates with more than 150 accredited local associations. Qatar Charitable Society is funded by donors, revenues from Islamic trusts (waqfs) and local investments; however, it also benefits at times from government supports to implement development projects in the framework of bilateral cooperation between Qatar and friendly states. Additionally, there are revenues available from partnerships and cooperation with certain donor parties, such as investment banks and agencies, and specialized UN
organizations. The average budget of the QCS is around QR 292 million (Foreign Aid Report 2010-2011).

b- *Sheikh Eid Charity Institute*

The Sheikh Eid bin Mohamed Al Thani Charity Institute was established in November 1995 to offer aid and services to victims of natural disasters, and to support educational projects. The Institute offers aid to more than 47 countries around the world which cover sectors of relief, building and construction, culture, education, budget support and health. These projects are funded by individual donors, revenues from Islamic trusts (waqfs) and government support.

c- *Qatar Red Crescent*

The Qatar Red Crescent was the first volunteer charity association formed in the country in 1978. A member of the Arab General Secretariat of Red Crescent Associations, Qatar Red Crescent seeks to achieve the objectives of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent by alleviating human suffering in four key areas: disaster preparedness and relief, health care services, training and supporting vulnerable communities and capacity building.

d- *Munazzamat al-Da'wa al-Islamiia*

Munazzamat al-Da'wa al-Islamiia is an international NGO which was established in 1980, and began its activities in Qatar in 1987. It is funded by
individual donors and some support from the government. It is active in more than 40 countries in various sectors such as education, culture, and social, economic and health development in the poorest communities of Africa and Asia.

e- Sheikh Thani bin Abdullah Foundation for Humanitarian Services

The Sheikh Thani bin Abdullah Foundation for Humanitarian Services (RAF) launched its official humanitarian institution in April 2009. It is active in the areas of relief, education, social affairs and developing charitable work through capacity-building. Like Qatar Charitable Society, it is funded by individual donors, and it also benefits at times from government support to implement development projects.

In addition to these five humanitarian and charity organizations, Silatech Foundation, Reach Out to Asia (ROTA), Al Fakhoora and Sheikh Jassim bin Jabor Al Thani Charitable Foundation are another important government partners in aid disbursement. These institutions, along with the governmental institutions, constitute central bodies in allocating Qatar foreign aid. While they are independent from the government in terms of structural organization, their activities in foreign countries conform to the foreign policy guidelines set by the Qatari government to direct the foreign aid of the state of Qatar. Resultantly, any attempt to examine Qatar foreign aid should also include foreign aid disbursed by these NGOs.
To this end, next section examines changes that occurred in Qatar foreign aid since the eruption of the Arab Spring will be presented.

**Finding and Analysis**

*Pattern of Changes in Qatar Foreign aid*

A qualitative analysis of Qatar Foreign Aid Reports in the span of four years 2010-2013 reveals that the volume and the recipients of Qatar foreign aid were neither constant nor steady; rather, they were dynamic during the period of studies. This is more evident in the governmental aid than Qatari NGOs’ aid. Despite this, the main purposes and objectives of Qatar aid in general remained identical from 2010 to 2013.

In absolute term, the volume of Qatar governmental aid has experienced a substantial growth in 2011 compared to 2010. For example government aid stood at QR 1,075,299,095 in 2010; yet, this has doubled in 2011 to reach QR 2,656,106,843. Distinguishingly, the volume has dropped in 2012 to QR 2,007,969,847 before it was multiplied three times in 2013 to reach QR 6,481,154,339. See figure 5.
External aid allocated by Qatari NGOs during 2010 is totaled QR 799,690,991 and QR 806,333,142 in the following year. While we may notice that the two amounts are very similar, the following two years witnessed constant increase in the volume. For example in 2012 it has surged to QR 993,794,178 and climaxed to QR 1,327,835,368 in 2013. See figure (6).
Similarly the recipients of Qatar development assistance have shown dramatic changes from 2010 to 2013. In this connection the geographical distribution of governmental aid indicates that Africa has been the prime recipient of governmental aid with total aid amounted to QR 2,856,027,684 that reached the continent between 2010 and 2011. Nevertheless, in 2012 and 2013 respectively, Asia outdid Africa as the most continent that benefited from Qatar governmental aid with total amount of QR 4,297,069,841 channeled to Asia. See figure (7)

Unlike the governmental aid, modest changes are noticeable in the recipients of NGOs’ aid. Through the past four years, the highest share of NGOs aid is received by Asia. See figure (8).
In terms of allocation of Qatar foreign aid to African continent, the flow of this aid to the continent has been consistent throughout the past four years in terms of volume and recipients. To this end, figures show that the largest share of governmental aid to Africa was received by North Africa while East Africa has
been the favorite recipient of for Non-governmental aid. This persisted throughout the years under study. See figures (9) and (10).

Figure 9: Recipients of Qatar governmental aid 2010-2013

Figure (10): Recipients of Non-governmental aid in Africa 2010-2013

With regard to the purposes and objectives of Qatar foreign aid, there are no noteworthy changes in this respect as Qatar foreign aid was disbursed to serve developmental and humanitarian causes. (See figure 11 and 12). Nevertheless, a
close observation of the figures shows that Qatar aid program was not specific to one particular purpose within the broad categories of development and humanitarian cause. In this regard, and within the development category budget support was the prime purpose of governmental aid between 2010 and 2011; however, in the following years (2012 and 2013), construction and reconstruction emerged as the main objectives of development aid. See figure 13. Similarly, education was the main purposes of NGOs in 2010, 2011 and 2013; nevertheless in 2012; their prime focus was on construction. See figure 11. In a sharp contrast and within the realm of humanitarian cause, both governments and NGOs’ humanitarian aid was predominantly disbursed to serve relief works. See figures 14, 15 and 16.

Figure 11: Share of Humanitarian and Developmental Aid in Government Aid
Figure 12: Share of Humanitarian and Developmental Aid in Non-Government Aid

Figure 13: Government’s development aid
Figure 14: Development aid of NGOs

Figure 15: Government’s Humanitarian aid

Figure 16: Humanitarian aid of NGOs
In relation to the first question of this thesis, the refereed charts and figures confirmed that profound changes have occurred in the architecture of Qatar foreign aid since 2010. These changes are equally observed in terms of the volume and size of the aid, countries that received the aid and purposes for which the aid was allocated. Nevertheless, the question remains to what extent these changes are related to the outbreak of the Arab Spring.

**The Impact of the Arab Spring on Qatar Foreign Aid**

Quantitative data and literature (Zoltan Barany, 2012; Echagüe, 2013; Haykel, 2013) evidence that the changes in the architecture of Qatar foreign aid in terms of volume and the recipient countries were determined by the Arab Spring. Nevertheless, the extent to which the Arab Spring has remodeled the purpose of the overall Qatar foreign aid is generally imprecise and sketchy as the purposes of Qatar foreign aid prior to the eruption of the Arab Spring and after this event remained identical. While this characterized the overall aid of Qatar, there is insignificant evidence that the flow of Qatar aid to Non-Arab African countries during the same period was influenced by the Arab Spring.

In terms of the volume, the governmental aid has increased dramatically in 2011 compared to 2010 as the amount jumped from QR 1,075,299,095 in 2010 to QR 2,656,106,843 in 2011. The sudden and dramatic increase in the volume after

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7 This is even more acute when we know that there is no certainty that GDP of Qatar has shown a significant curve in the past four years (Ministry of Development Planing and Statistics, 2012).
2010 could be explained in the context of Qatar foreign policy approach amid the Arab Spring. Post 2010 witnessed a surge in Qatar involvement in Arab Spring countries to champion the causes of the people in overthrowing regimes against whom they revolted. In Libya, Qatar involved militarily, and it reached out to Muslim Brotherhood braches in Tunis and Egypt (Z. Barany, 2013). Given the limited foreign policy tool at the disposal of the state of Qatar, beyond foreign aid, one can expect that Qatar’s outreach to revolutionists in those countries was facilitated by its foreign aid. This is even acute when one considers that in 2011 Qatar launched three quantitative aid funds for Tunis and Egypt. These include Qatar -Tunis Friendly Fund, Fund for Families of Injured People in Egypt and Fund for the People of Egypt. Qatar has allocated considerable amount of fund through these funds to these two countries, and it has also made a significant financial support to Morocco in order to avert the repercussion of the Arab Spring in that country (Ulrichsen, 2014)

Allocation of larger share of Qatar foreign aid to these countries was a new development. Prior to the Arab Spring and during the reigns of Mubarak and Qaddafi, neither Egypt nor Libya was major recipients of Qatar aid. Therefore, while Darfur remained as main major recipient of Qatar aid, due to Qatar commitment to solve the crisis there, the sudden increase of Qatar aid in 2011 to North African countries of Egypt, Tunis, Libya and Morocco, confirmed the
effects of the Arab Spring on rise of the volume of Qatar foreign aid in 2011 (Jamal, 2014).

Whilst 2011 witnessed a rise in the volume of Qatar foreign aid, a sharp drop in the volume of aid was recorded in 2012. Factors that could have caused this sudden drop can be contributable to the fact that the pledges and commitments announced by Qatar in 2012 were not fulfilled until the following year, and that the number of humanitarian crises were lower in 2012 compared to 2011, in which Qatar made significant contribution to the crises of Somalia drought, Japan Tsunami and Gaza crisis2015). Even though these factors are apparently relevant in explaining the sharp drop in the volume of Qatar foreign aid, they are disputable when we know that the size of Nongovernmental aid, the humanitarian arm of the state of Qatar in crises, witnessed a slight increase in 2012 (see figure 6), and if we also bear in the mind the dynamic of politics in the region in 2012, and Qatar responses to the political development in the Arab Spring countries. In 2012 the revolutionists in Tunis, Egypt and Libya have achieved their goals of overthrowing dictators; thus the resources that could be allocated by Qatar for these countries might be relatively low compared to 2011 in the heyday of revolution. Moreover, most of the Arab Spring countries were in transitional period in 2012, and Qatar was prudent to disburse aid to transitional governments in Arab Spring countries. Thus, 2012 was year of hesitation and
doubt, and Qatar wanted to ensure the stability of the political climate before it will involve in those countries (Ulrichsen, 2014)

Additionally, while Qatar was the sole county that financially backed revolutionists in Egypt in 2011, 2012 witnessed introduction of new donors like Saudi Arabia, UAE and Kuwait who also supported the transitional government in Egypt. All these factors could have contributed to the decrease of overall volume of Qatar foreign assistance.

With regard to the recipients of Qatar aid, the largest share of Qatar foreign aid was received by Africa in 2011; however, in the consequent years, Asia overtook Africa as the most recipient of Qatar aid. In this connection, figures related to funds that are channeled to individual countries within Asia proved that changes in the recipient countries were dictated by the Arab Spring. For example while Syrian was missed in 2011 list of top recipients of Qatar aid, it was ranked as the most recipient country in 2012 and 2013 respectively. The Arab Spring factor in this is evident in Qatar diplomatic and political efforts to isolate Bashar Assad’s regime and to support different factions, be they oppositions or militants on the ground, to uproot Syrian regime. Therefore, the nature and dynamics of crisis in Syria have influenced Qatar foreign aid in terms of recipients (Jamal, 2014)

On the other hand, the surge in the volume of Qatar foreign aid in 2013 was connected to the Arab Spring. In 2013 Qatar and Saudi Arabia involved in
fierce competition over position and influence in the Middle East region. This competition was especially evident in Arab Spring countries where Qatar and Saudi Arabia have divergent positions and disagreement on the wide range of decisive issues. Such competition permitted Qatar to rely on its financial clout to bankroll its allies in those countries. In Syria, while both Saudi Arabia and Qatar hoped for the immediate overthrow of Bashar Assad regime, they favored different opposition groups to achieve this goal (Echagüe, 2013). In this connection, they both outreached to their allies through financial and military supports. Similarly, the first half of 2013 witnessed the election of Muslim Brotherhood to the presidency of Egypt; given Qatar pronounced support of the Brotherhood, its foreign aid to Egypt was increased to help President Muhammad Morsi to address the inherited economic problems (Z. Barany, 2013). This has attributed in the increase of Qatar foreign aid in general, and it might be accounted for ranking Syria and Egypt as well as Yemen among the first five of the most recipient countries of Qatar foreign aid (Foreign Aid Report 2013).

In relations to the purposes of Qatar foreign aid, the main purposes of Qatar foreign aid remained identical before and after the outburst of the Arab Spring as aid were mainly disbursed for developmental and humanitarian causes. However, a close look at above figures that show different sectors that are targeted by Qatar foreign aid in the period under study, it will be sufficient to argue that the Arab Spring has determined the purpose of Qatar aid to some
extent. For example, before the outbreak of the Arab spring, Qatar foreign aid was disbursed to finance construction and reconstruction works; however from the 2012 to 2013, most of this aid was disbursed to support budgets and to finance construction works in recipient countries. The point that Egypt was ranked among five top recipient of Qatar foreign aid detonate that Arab Spring has shaped the purpose of this aid (Foreign Aid Reports 2011, 2013 &2013).

On the other hand, while Qatar foreign aid can be viewed from the development and humanitarian perspectives, the ultimate motives for such aid go beyond developing the economies of recipient countries or providing humanitarian relief to the victims. Qatar foreign assistance bears political and diplomatic weights for Qatar especially when it is matched with activism in Qatar foreign policy since the Arab Spring and its political ambitions during the course of the Arab Spring. In the course of past five years Qatar has recalibrated its foreign policy to benefit from the political turmoil that ranged the MENA region in order to assume leadership position in the MENA region (Haykel, 2013 p. 5). In this connection, it has utilized its long standing relationship with Muslim Brotherhood branches in Egypt, Tunis and Libya- who were playing leading role in the region amid the Arab Spring- to reinforce Qatar position in the region and to enhance its foothold to benefit from the Arab Spring. This can be observed in Tunisia, where Elnnahda party, the local branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, is closely allied to and sponsored by Qatar. The same holds true for the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt, which is close to Qatar’s leadership as well as to Qatar-based Islamic scholars like Yusuf al-Qaradawi (Haykel, 2013: p.5). In these two countries, Qatar strategized its relations with Muslim brotherhood to dictate political scene in its favor by employing its foreign aid as policy tool to carve out its images as champion of people right for democratic government. The greatest success Qatar has registered in this regard has been its successful persuasion of the people of these countries that Qatar, unlike other GCC countries, is advocates of people rights. This has also permitted Qatar to draw people attentions to its proactive foreign policy as emerging regional leader.

The Arab Spring and Qatar Foreign aid to Africa

Despite the magnitude of changes in Qatar foreign aid as the result of the outbreak of the Arab Spring, quantitative data echoed literature (Antwi-Boateng, 2013; Dugger, 2011) that the influence of this Arab Spring is not marked in the stream of the Qatar foreign aid to Africa. The volume and the recipient of Qatar development assistance to Africa remained stable and consistent in the last past four years, and the insignificant changes in recipients of Qatar foreign aid to Africa is connected to factors associated with political and economic developments in different African countries.

Therefore, in terms of the volume, the review of data proves insignificant changes in relations to size of aid allocated for African countries. Within Africa, official development assistance from Qatar government has being received by the
North Africa region prior to the Arab Spring; thus, the outbreak of the Arab spring has only increased the flow of governmental aid to this region and the gap between North African and other African regions remained identical before and after the Arab Spring. This suggests that the Arab Spring has neither dramatically increased nor decreased the size of governmental aid to Non-Arab African countries. While this was the case with the governmental aid, East Africa and West Africa regions received more aid from Qatar NGOs than North Africa. This difference remained persistent despite the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011. Additionally, the recipients of both the government and NGOs aid to Africa remained identical despite the outbreak of the Arab Spring; the increase in the size of NGOs aid to Central Africa and Southern Africa is isolated from the effects of the Arab Spring. Such increase was driven by humanitarian crises in these regions. Such crises include outbreak of humanitarian crises as a results of conflicts or civil wars in African Muslim countries. For example, Qatar charities doubled their entries into Africa on wake of Somalia drought in 2011, religious motivated conflict between Muslims and Christians in Central Africa Republic in 2012 and after 2012's rebellion in Northern Mali which forced many Northern Malians to seek refuge in Niger (Tok & Calleja, 2014)

Generally speaking and according to Qatar foreign aid reports, Qatar NGOs are the recognizable arms that distribute Qatar foreign aid in Africa; and despite recent improvement in Qatar relations with African countries, size of aid
disbursed by these NGOs to Africa outweighed that of the government. Therefore, while Qatar NGOs’ aid favors Non-Arab African countries, Qatar governmental aid targets countries that have strategic interests to the Qatar. This explains why North African region exceeds other African regions in terms of size of aid it receives from the government of Qatar. North Africa is strategically important to Qatar from economic, security and political perspective; thus despite Qatar’s strained relations with leaders of Egypt and Libya prior to the Arab Spring, the size of the state of Qatar's official development assistance to these countries was higher than those of Non-Arab Africa countries. Qatar recent attempt to benefit from natural resources of African countries for economic diversifications and food security purposes is being carried out by relying on its NGOs to use their aid to make local environments in African countries favorable to outpouring of Qatar’s investments in Africa. This mirrors the fact that most of Qatar NGO’s secure stronghold of operation in East African countries which are considered as hotspots of Qatar investment in Africa(Dugger, 2011).

Although there is no report of change in the motives of Qatar foreign aid to Africa, the fact remains that motives surpass altruism to include political, religious and economic motives. As Qatar recently hope to attain a respectable regional and international reputation, its substantial foreign aid to African countries via its NGOs is generally meant to generate positive goodwill to enhance its reputation among the beneficiaries. This gives Qatar potential
diplomatic weigh in relations to voting in international fora, and it yields strong foreign relations dividends from the recipient governments and countries in the foreseeable future as Qatar will become an attractive country to deal with politically (Antwi-Boateng, 2013). By providing financial assistance to countries at a critical time of need, Qatar positions itself to influence mind and heart of people in communities where its investments exist. This could offer Qatar an edge for competition with aggressive competitors over Africa resources, and it could downturn local sentiment against Qatar land purchase hence creating favorable environment for its overall economic activities in Africa. Such approach is evident in Comoros Island where Qatar's large scale land purchases matches with its development projects that is being carried out by Qatar NGOs in this country (Dugger, 2011).

Qatar’s discriminative humanitarian assistance to Muslim countries also bears the flavor of promoting Islam as motives of providing humanitarian assistance exclusively to predominant Muslim countries or to Muslim communities within some African countries. This might explains the reason why Qatar NGOs activities is marked in East and West Africa, where African Muslim countries exist, while the remaining region remained periphery in Qatar NGOs target regions.
Conclusion

In the course of last four years, Qatar foreign aid has shown remarkable changes in terms of volume and recipients. These changes corresponded to the Qatar proactive foreign policy triggered by the Arab Spring. Therefore this suggests that the Arab Spring was formidable factor that has dictated changes in the size of Qatar foreign aid and the countries that benefit from this aid. Nevertheless, the waves of changes in the Qatar foreign policy and its wider use of foreign aid as the result of the Arab Spring could not encourage or discourage the flow of Qatar’s foreign aid to Africa. Qatar foreign aid to Africa in the course of previous four years witnessed no significant changes as the volume, recipients and motives remained intact despite the Arab Spring. The small scale of changes that occurred in the aid provided by Qatar NGOs to Africa is related to factors specific to Africa.

The stability in Qatar foreign aid flow to Africa, despite the dynamic of Qatar foreign policy, discloses that Africa occupies peripheral position in Qatar foreign policy priorities. Beyond its recent move to play a supervision role in the
African Union, the state of Qatar could not realize the importance of the Africa in the context of its struggle to optimize its gain from the Arab Spring. Generally, the Arab Spring offered rare golden opportunity for Qatar to strategize its relations with African countries and to move beyond mere diplomatic exchanges which has grown recently (Ashur, 2014). Economic and political crisis in Qatar traditional partners in Middle East as the result of the Arab Spring, the relative stability and economic prosperity in the small Gulf State of Qatar coupled with urgency for food security and economy diversification are sufficient opportunities for Qatar to further its engagement with African countries to enhance its regional position vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia, which has been struggling to survive amid domestic and regional threats of the Arab Spring. The resourcefulness of Africa, its geographical proximity to Qatar and African need of capital to downturn the challenges of 21st century constitute another opportunities that should permit Qatar to turn the preoccupation of other Middle East countries with the threats of the Arab Spring into its benefit by deepening its ties with Africa. As Qatar lacks alternative and meaningful foreign policy tool which is suitable for its engagement with Africa than foreign aid, its economic clout proved to be a viable and attractive tool to win the hearts and the minds of African leaders and public alike in a quest to advance its national interest in the continent. China bent on this strategies and it has yielded intended results in securing a footholds in the continent amid international competition over the African resources. The same
could have worked for Qatar should it has strategically exploited its foreign aid to Africa in light of African's need to such aid to develop its aging infrastructure and build a formidable economic basis for its growing and ambitious youth segment of its population.

In a broad term, there are economic and political justifications for Qatar to strategize its use of foreign aid to Africa. Politically, both Qatar and African countries are weak at international level, and they cannot stand up for the political influences of the US, EU, China and Russian when it comes directing international issues according to one’s national interests. Therefore, given the size of African countries, Qatar employment of foreign aid to get political reward from African countries will give Qatar political weight in general and voting power in regional international organizations in particular. Economically speaking, there is unchallenged justification for Qatar to exploit its foreign aid to Africa for economic purposes to get agro-investment leverage in Africa. This is even more significant when Qatar's dire need for food security (Bailey, 2013), amid population boom, and the international competition over African untapped natural resources are considered. Providing foreign aid to African countries to develop different economics sectors will not only contribute in speeding up the economic growth and the improvement of infrastructure and reduce unemployment rate among youths, it will also bring about more diplomatic, economic and political credits to Qatar in Africa (Swaniker, 2013). It will ultimately stress its regional
position, and it will put Qatar in favorable stand to further tap Africa resource for its national interests.

Despite these outstanding economic and political justifications for providing aid to African, what should be appreciated is that such opportunity could be missed if the state of Qatar continues to rely upon its NGOs to carry out its foreign aid business in Africa, and if it does not diversify its target countries away from Muslim countries.

Charitable organizations in Muslim world in general and in Qatar particularly have a deficiency in trained and competent human resources that could discover how their aid could be rationally tailored to the interests of their respective countries while operating in Africa in particular(Yumna, 2009). In the meantime, their local partners in Africa also suffer from short vision of how these NGOs could tap different sectors that will be appreciated by governments of countries where these NGOs are operating. Therefore, to turn the works of its NGOs into its political gain, Qatar needs to revisit the activities of its NGOs in Africa. This is even necessary when we know that the activities of Islamic NGOs are overshadowed by provision of religious education which output is not tailored to local demands and labor markets(Dugger, 2011). Such flaws have generated large scale unemployment among the graduates of such education institutions as they lack necessary skills to be absorbed in labor market. This has gravitated enduring problems of unemployment in local communities they are working, and
it has been one factor that facilitated the breeding of terrorism and extremism in those communities. The prime examples of this case are Nigeria, Kenya and Somalia where the elements of Bok Haram and Al Shabab hailed from those schools.

Additionally, there is a need for Qatar NGOs to reduce their safety-net projects that provide short term solution to long term problems. The feats projects of offering rams (*Odheyah*), breaking fast projects (*Iftar Saem*), clothing of poor, and cash out to poor communities are short term solution to a long term problem of deficient in human development. These projects should be superseded by more comprehensive development projects that will build the human capabilities of the beneficiaries and move them upward in economic ladder in order to be agents of themselves.

Furthermore, as most of African countries are fragile states, where NGOs operate without the knowledge of governments, the recent rise in terrorism and concurrent doubt and uncertainty about the activities of Islamic based organizations in some Africa countries necessitates that Qatar NGOs work closely with governments to downturn this doubt. This is more important when we take into account the recent case against in Qatar Charity in Northern Mali where it was accused of providing arms to rebels (Khatib, 2013). Unless this is considered, the environment is ripe for further accusation of Islamic NGOs of supporting terrorism in places where they work. The possibility of this is even higher in Non
Muslim countries where Qatar NGOs work exclusively with Muslim communities.

While these policy options are prescriptive, they open door for further research into these hypothesis to see how Qatar NGO's could advance the interests of the governments. A comparison approach to compare the activities of Qatar charities with other western NGOs could be a good step in this context. Furthermore, it also provokes further research into investigating and examining opinions and stands of African governments towards the flow Qatar resources to Africa through the gate of NGOs. The result of these researches could help Qatar to manage its relations with African countries without extra need for official foreign aid from the government.
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