Game Theoretical Model for Cybersecurity Risk Assessment of Industrial Control Systems
| Author | Nassar, Mohamed |
| Author | Khoury, Joseph |
| Author | Erradi, Abdelkarim |
| Author | Bou-Harb, Elias |
| Available date | 2023-04-10T09:10:06Z |
| Publication Date | 2021 |
| Publication Name | 2021 11th IFIP International Conference on New Technologies, Mobility and Security, NTMS 2021 |
| Resource | Scopus |
| Abstract | Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and Distributed Control Systems (DCS) use advanced computing, sensors, control systems, and communication networks to monitor and control industrial processes and distributed assets. The increased connectivity of these systems to corporate networks has exposed them to new security threats and made them a prime target for cyber-Attacks with the potential of causing catastrophic economic, social, and environmental damage. Recent intensified sophisticated attacks on these systems have stressed the importance of methodologies and tools to assess the security risks of Industrial Control Systems (ICS). In this paper, we propose a novel game theory model and Monte Carlo simulations to assess the cybersecurity risks of an exemplary industrial control system under realistic assumptions. We present five game enrollments where attacker and defender agents make different preferences and we analyze the final outcome of the game. Results show that a balanced defense with uniform budget spending is the best strategy against a look-Ahead attacker. 2021 IEEE. |
| Sponsor | This work was supported partially by a grant from the University Research Board of the American University of Beirut (URB-AUB-2019/2020). V. CONCLUSION In this paper, we proposed a game theory approach and Monte-Carlo simulations for modeling the cybersecurity risk of networked industrial control systems. We tested several attack and defense preferences: The defender preference is based on budget spending (Greedy, Conservative, and Uniform). The defender pays for getting an alert or for taking a response action. The attacker preference is based on lookahead radius in the attack tree. A greater look-ahead models a stronger attacker. We presented the stress curve for each game and the final rewards. Results show that a uniform budget spending that does not underestimate the security of surface nodes and provides in-depth defense in the same time is the best choice for the defender. In future work, we aim at exploring a wider subspace of preferences and study the existence of dominant strategies, Nash-equilibria and Pareto optima in our proposed security game. We aim at making the game as realistic and useful for security experts by providing meaningful recommendations given any ICS network. ACKNOWLEDGMENT This research was made possible by NPRP 9-005-1-002 grant from the Qatar National Research Fund (a member of The Qatar Foundation). The statements made herein are solely the responsibility of the authors. |
| Language | en |
| Publisher | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. |
| Subject | Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Distributed Control Systems (DCS) Industrial Control Systems (ICS) SCADA systems Game theory models Cybersecurity Risk |
| Type | Conference Paper |
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