Dorm augmented college assignments
المؤلف | Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz |
تاريخ الإتاحة | 2024-05-12T07:08:48Z |
تاريخ النشر | 2024 |
اسم المنشور | Social Choice and Welfare |
المصدر | Scopus |
المعرّف | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01510-9 |
الرقم المعياري الدولي للكتاب | 1761714 |
الملخص | In college assignments, a common practice is that students receive their dorm allocation after the realization of college placements. This causes wasted resources and unfair allocation. To fix this, we consider a college assignment problem where students simultaneously receive their college and dorm assignments. We first introduce the so-called "Dorm Augmented Deferred Acceptance" (DDA) and show that it is stable and efficient. However, it is not student-optimal stable. We then introduce our next mechanism, "Student-Improving Dorm Augmented Deferred Acceptance" (SDDA). It is mainly built on DDA, but with some extra steps to neutralize the student-harming rejection cycles. We show that SDDA is student-optimal stable, efficient, and unanimously preferred to DDA by students. Stability and strategy-proofness are incompatible, implying that neither of these mechanisms is strategy-proof. None of these mechanisms is more manipulable than the other; hence SDDA improves the students' welfare without an extra strategic cost. |
اللغة | en |
الناشر | Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH |
الموضوع | college assignment problem Dorm Augmented Deferred Acceptance (DDA) Student-Improving Dorm Augmented Deferred Acceptance (SDDA) |
النوع | Article |
الصفحات | 609-627 |
رقم العدد | 3 |
رقم المجلد | 62 |
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