The Politics of Sovereign Credit Spreads
Author | Smaoui, Houcem |
Author | Boubakri, Narjess |
Author | Cosset, Jean Claude |
Available date | 2021-01-25T06:45:43Z |
Publication Date | 2017 |
Publication Name | Emerging Markets Finance and Trade |
Resource | Scopus |
ISSN | 1540496X |
Abstract | Using a large sample of 35 developing countries for the period 1993-2009, we provide strong and robust evidence that the political institutions in place play a significant role in explaining sovereign spreads. In particular, we find that unconstrained presidential systems increase spreads, while political stability and higher competition for political contest decrease spreads. In addition, political cohesion (political fragmentation) depresses (increases) spreads. Instead, the latter are insignificantly related to political orientation. |
Sponsor | Innovation Skills Fund |
Language | en |
Publisher | Routledge |
Subject | Credit spreads political institutions political risk |
Type | Article Review |
Pagination | 1894-1922 |
Issue Number | 8 |
Volume Number | 53 |
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Finance & Economics [400 items ]