Identity and Aggregate Signature-Based Authentication Protocol for IoD Deployment Military Drone

Abstract

With the rapid miniaturization in sensor technology, ruddervator, arduino, and multi-rotor system, drone technology has fascinated researchers in the field of network security. It is of critical significance given the advancement in modern strategic narratives. This has special relevance to drone-related operations. This technology can be controlled remotely by an invisible yet credible operator sitting to a powerful intelligence computer system (PICS) or an airborne control and command platform (AC2P). The two types of drones (reconnaissance and attacking) can communicate with each other and with the PICS or AC2P through wireless network channels referred to as Flying Ad Hoc Network or Unmanned Aerial Vehicular Network (FANET or UAVN). This mode of communication is not without some inconvenience. For instance, when the line of sight is broken, communication is mainly carried out through satellite using GPS (Global Positioning System) signals. Both GPS and UAVN/FANET use open network channels for data broadcasting, which are exposed to several threats, thus making security risky and challenging. This risk is specifically eminent in monitoring data transmission traffic, espionage, troop movement, border surveillance, searching, and warfare battlefield phenomenon, etc. This issue of security risk can be minimized conspicuously by developing a robust authentication scheme for IoD deployment military drones. Therefore, this research illustrates the designing of two separate protocols based on the aggregate signature, identity, pairing cryptography, and Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP) to guarantee data integrity, authorization, and confidentiality among drones and AC2P/PICS. More importantly, the outdated data transmission flaw has also been tackled, which is of obvious concern to the past designed protocols. The security of the proposed designs is formally verified using a random oracle model (ROM), a real-or-random (ROR) model, and by informally using pragmatic illustration and mathematical lemmas. Nonetheless, the performance analysis section will be executed using the algorithmic big-O notation. The results show that these protocols are verifiably protected in the ROM and ROR model using the CDHP.