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AuthorAfacan, Mustafa Oğuz
AuthorDur, Umut
Available date2023-07-23T10:28:27Z
Publication Date2022-08-08
Publication NameScandinavian Journal of Economics
Identifierhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12515
CitationAfacan, M. O., & Dur, U. (2023). Strategy‐proof size improvement: is it possible?. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 125(2), 321-338.
ISSN0347-0520
URIhttps://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=85146466724&origin=inward
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10576/46139
AbstractThe number of assigned agents (i.e., size) is an important parameter in object allocations. While size maximality clashes with individual rationality and strategy-proofness, it can still be possible to increase the size over a mechanism while keeping these properties. To pursue this research, we devise a size comparison criterion to investigate the possibility of size increase. A mechanism (Formula presented.) size-wise dominates another mechanism (Formula presented.) if the latter never assigns more agents than the former, and at some problem, (Formula presented.) assigns more agents than (Formula presented.). We obtain arguably mild conditions for a mechanism to not be dominated size-wise by an individually rational and strategy-proof mechanism. Moreover, whenever there are at least as many objects as the total number of agents, we find conditions, different from those previously mentioned, for a mechanism to not be dominated size-wise by an individually rational and group strategy-proof mechanism. These results have implications for deferred-acceptance, top trading cycles, efficiency-adjusted deferred-acceptance, serial dictatorship, and Boston mechanisms.
Languageen
PublisherWiley-Blackwell
SubjectEquilibrium
matching
mechanism
size
strategy-proofness
TitleStrategy-proof size improvement: is it possible?*
TypeArticle
Pagination321-338
Issue Number2
Volume Number125
ESSN1467-9442
dc.accessType Full Text


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