Do SWF investments matter for bond ratings? The role of corporate governance

Abstract

We investigate the impact of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) equity ownership on bonds’ credit ratings of their target firms. Using a sample of 2045 bonds issued by 324 SWF target firms from 16 countries over the period 1996–2020, we find evidence linking SWF investments to lower likelihood of bond rating upgrades. Consistent with value-reducing political agenda hypothesis, our results suggest that credit rating agencies perceive SWFs as a structure that could affect the quality of corporate governance and harm bondholder interests by leaving them vulnerable to losses. Our results also show that credit rating could be improved: (i) with SWF transparency and experience; (ii) when SWFs take a more passive investment stance; and (iii) within the financial crisis period. Finally, and interestingly, using generalized structural equation modelling, we provide evidence supporting the mediating role of target firm's corporate governance quality in the relationship between SWF investments and bond ratings. Our findings are robust to controls for the endogeneity and heteroscedasticity issues and to alternative sample compositions and regression frameworks.