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AuthorZeitun, Rami
AuthorGoaied, Mohamed
Available date2023-01-18T08:39:01Z
Publication Date2022
Publication NameApplied Economics
ResourceScopus
URIhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2022.2140770
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10576/38564
AbstractThis paper examines the nonlinear connection between corporate governance (CG) and corporate leverage. Our study applied the dynamic panel threshold model (DPTM) to facilitate the capture of the nonlinear effect of CG on a firm's leverage for Japanese listed companies. Additionally, our study sought to demonstrate the linkage between CG and the speed of adjustment (SOA), particularly following the reforms in Japan's CG system, to reach a targeted level of leverage. The empirical findings confirm the presence of the threshold influence of managerial ownership and board size, thus confirming their nonlinear impact on capital structure. Moreover, at a low level of managerial ownership, the SOA for firms to achieve the optimal level of leverage is faster than it is for firms with a high level of MO, while firms with a larger board achieve their targeted level of leverage quicker than firms with a smaller board. Our findings indicate that recent reforms in Japan's CG system seem to have been inefficient, with no positive effect on corporate leverage. 2022 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
Languageen
PublisherRoutledge
Subjectboard of directors
Corporate governance
dynamic panel threshold
insider manager
leverage
TitleCorporate governance and capital structure: dynamic panel threshold analysis
TypeArticle
dc.accessType Open Access


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