Show simple item record

AuthorQanas, Jalal
AuthorSawyer, Malcolm
Available date2024-05-07T06:43:09Z
Publication Date2023-04-27
Publication NameReview of Political Economy
Identifierhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09538259.2023.2189006
CitationQanas, J., & Sawyer, M. (2024). ‘Independence’of central banks and the political economy of monetary policy. Review of Political Economy, 36(2), 565-580.
ISSN0953-8259
URIhttps://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=85158143796&origin=inward
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10576/54719
AbstractThe notion of an ‘independent’ central bank has dominated monetary policy debates for the past three decades. The arguments for the political independence of central banks are closely related to the adoption of ‘inflation targeting’. The arguments for an independent central bank are based on the ‘credibility’ of the ‘conservative’ central bank in comparison to government decision making. The independence of a central bank has been a matter of independence from government but not independence from the grip of the ‘new consensus in macroeconomics’ nor from the interests of the banking and financial sector. That independence has also supported a lack of co-ordination between monetary and fiscal policies, diminishing the effectiveness of macroeconomic policies. In addition, there remain doubts about the effectiveness of ‘inflation targeting’ on the achievement of low inflation. The policy mandates of central banks have begun to shift towards financial stability and paying attention to issues of inequality and the climate emergency.
SponsorOpen Access funding was provided by the Qatar National Library.
Languageen
PublisherTaylor & Francis
Subjectclimate emergency
Independent central bank
inequality
inflation targeting
monetary policy
Title‘Independence’ of Central Banks and the Political Economy of Monetary Policy
TypeArticle
Pagination565-580
Issue Number2
Volume Number36
ESSN1465-3982
dc.accessType Open Access


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record