Rawlsian Matching
| Author | Oğuz, Afacan Mustafa |
| Author | Dur, Umut |
| Available date | 2024-09-24T10:45:55Z |
| Publication Date | 2024 |
| Publication Name | Mathematical Social Sciences |
| Resource | Scopus |
| ISSN | 1654896 |
| Abstract | We apply the Rawlsian principle to a canonical discrete object allocation problem. A matching is Rawlsian if it is impossible to improve the ranking of assignment for the worst-off agent or reduce the cardinality of the set of the worst-off agent-body. None of the well-known mechanisms are Rawlsian. We introduce an efficient and Rawlsian class of mechanisms. Strategy-proofness is incompatible with Rawlsianism; therefore, no Rawlsian mechanism is strategy-proof. |
| Language | en |
| Publisher | Elsevier |
| Subject | Efficiency Matching Mechanism Rawlsian Strategy-proofness |
| Type | Article |
| Pagination | 101-106 |
| Volume Number | 129 |
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